N.M. Stat. § 30-20-13 (2026)

general public; trespass; damage to property; misdemeanors;
penalties.
    A. No person shall, at or in any building or other facility or property owned, operated
or controlled by the state or any of its political subdivisions, willfully deny to staff, public
officials or the general public:

       (1)      lawful freedom of movement within the building or facility or the land on
which it is situated;

       (2)    lawful use of the building or facility or the land on which it is situated; or
      (3)      the right of lawful ingress and egress to the building or facility or the land
on which it is situated.

    B. No person shall, at or in any building or other facility or property owned, operated
or controlled by the state or any of its political subdivision [subdivisions], willfully impede
the staff or a public official or a member of the general public through the use of
restraint, abduction, coercion or intimidation or when force and violence are present or
threatened.

    C. No person shall willfully refuse or fail to leave the property of or any building or
other facility owned, operated or controlled by the state or any of its political
subdivisions when requested to do so by a lawful custodian of the building, facility or
property if the person is committing, threatens to commit or incites others to commit any
act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes,
procedures or functions of the property, building or facility.

    D. No person shall willfully interfere with the educational process of any public or
private school by committing, threatening to commit or inciting others to commit any act
which would disrupt, impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes,
procedures or functions of a public or private school.

   E. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent lawful assembly and
peaceful and orderly petition for the redress of grievances, including any labor dispute.

    F. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed
guilty of a petty misdemeanor.

History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-20-10, enacted by Laws 1970, ch. 86, § 2; 1975, ch. 52, §
2; 1981, ch. 32, § 1.

                                      ANNOTATIONS

Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not
part of the law.

Statutory standard to sustain a conviction under Subsection D. — Section 30-20-
13(D) NMSA 1978 refers to a defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some
additional consequence, interference with the educational process, and therefore 30-20-
13(D) NMSA 1978 is a specific intent crime; the actus reas of the offense is threatening
to commit any act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful
mission, processes, procedures or functions of a public or private school. State v.
Quintin C., 2019-NMCA-069.

Insufficient evidence to support conviction for willful interference with the
educational process. — Where, based on evidence presented by the state that child
stated that he was creating a “kill list”, the trial judge erred in finding that child
committed the delinquent act of willfully interfering with the educational process by
threatening to commit an act that would disrupt the lawful mission, processes,
procedures or functions of the school, because the trial court applied an incorrect legal
standard to an essential element of the offense. There was insufficient evidence to
support child’s conviction. State v. Quintin C., 2019-NMCA-069.

Criminal trespass charges not a means to enforce rule until filing. — Criminal
trespass charges under Section 30-20-13 NMSA 1978 are not a means to enforce a
rule available to the state until the rule is properly filed in compliance with State Rules
Act (Section 14-4-1 NMSA 1978). State v. Joyce, 1980-NMCA-086, 94 N.M. 618, 614
P.2d 30.

Flexibility not vagueness. — Subsection C of this section, referring prior to 1975
amendment specifically to institutions of higher education, allowed control of campus
disturbances in terms marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than
meticulous specificity, and was not void for vagueness. State v. Silva, 1974-NMCA-072,
86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888 (decided under
prior law).

Campus restrictions not overbroad. — Since this section, referring in Subsection C,
prior to 1975 amendment, specifically to institutions of higher education, vindicated
significant government interest in the control of campus disturbances, reasonable "time,
place and manner" regulations were valid even though they incidentally suppressed
otherwise protected conduct. State v. Silva, 1974-NMCA-072, 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d
903, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888 (decided under prior law).

No invalid delegation of power. — Subsection C of this section specifies adequate
standards and guidelines to be followed, in that criminality is based first on a refusal to
leave after requests, and second on a determination by the judge or jury that the person
committed the specified disruptive acts. State v. Silva, 1974-NMCA-072, 86 N.M. 543,
525 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888 (decided under prior law).

Nor unbridled discretion. — Subsection C of this section does not put unbridled
discretion in the hands of the administrator or police officer because the decision of
each must be checked by the decision of the other, and the discretion of both is limited
by the reasonably precise directive of the statute. State v. Silva, 1974-NMCA-072, 86
N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888 (decided under prior
law).

Meaning of "impair". — The term "impair" in Subsection C means, in context, a
substantial physical diminution or damage and not just any diminution in quality. State v.
Silva, 1974-NMCA-072, 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525
P.2d 888 (decided under prior law).

Substantial physical invasion required. — The word "impair," along with the other
operative verbs of present Subsection C (which subsection prior to 1975 amendment
referred specifically to institutions of higher education), denotes a substantial physical
invasion, and requires interference with the actual functioning of the university. State v.
Silva, 1974-NMCA-072, 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525
P.2d 888 (decided under prior law).

Willfulness and intent essential. — Not only must the refusal contemplated by
Subsection C of this section be willful but the disruption must also be accompanied by
general intent. State v. Silva, 1974-NMCA-072, 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903, cert.
denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888 (decided under prior law).

Application constitutional. — Defendants' refusal to honor the request of the
university president to leave his office although he had appointments to keep,
substantially interfered with the functioning of the president's business, and hence
Subsection C of this section (referring prior to 1975 amendment specifically to
institutions of higher education) was constitutionally applied to warrant their convictions.
State v. Silva, 1974-NMCA-072, 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528,
525 P.2d 888 (decided under prior law).

Limitations on sales of handicrafts on state property. — Since the legislature
intended that those who set the lawful mission, processes, procedures or functions of
state property are to be able to avail themselves of Subsection C's provisions in
furtherance of those policies and functions, the board of regents of the museum of New
Mexico may properly rely on the provisions of this section to effectuate the provisions of
a resolution which permits only Indians to sell handicrafts under the portals of the
governor's palace. Livingston v. Ewing, 1982-NMSC-110, 98 N.M. 685, 652 P.2d 235.

Law reviews. — For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to administrative law,
see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Participation of student in
demonstration on or near campus as warranting imposition of criminal liability for breach
of peace, disorderly conduct, trespass, unlawful assembly, or similar offense, 32
A.L.R.3d 551.

"Choice of evils," necessity, duress, or similar defense to state or local criminal charges
based on acts of public protest, 3 A.L.R.5th 521.