New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 37-1-7 (2026)

[Accrual of cause of actions for fraud or mistake, injuries or

✓ current as of May 2026
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conversion of property.]
    In actions for relief, on the ground of fraud or mistake, and in actions for injuries to,
or conversion of property, the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until
the fraud, mistake, injury or conversion complained of, shall have been discovered by
the party aggrieved.

History: Laws 1880, ch. 5, § 6; C.L. 1884, § 1865; C.L. 1897, § 2918; Code 1915, §
3366; C.S. 1929, § 83-123; 1941 Comp., § 27-106; 1953 Comp., § 23-1-7.

                                      ANNOTATIONS
Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not
part of the law.

Compiler's notes. — This section was amended by Laws 1893, ch. 47, § 1, by adding
thereto the provisions contained in 37-1-26 NMSA 1978.

Discovery rule. — A cause of action arises not necessarily at the time of injury, but
rather at the time a plaintiff knows or should have known of the claims. McNeill v.
Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., 2007-NMCA-024, 144 N.M. 212, 153 P.3d 212,
aff'd, 2008-NMCA-022, 143 N.M. 740, 182 P.3d 121.

Constructive fraud is breach of legal or equitable duty which the law declares
fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others; such fraud may be present on the
part of the fraud feasor without any showing of dishonesty of purpose or intent to
deceive. Gaston v. Hartzell, 1976-NMCA-041, 89 N.M. 217, 549 P.2d 632.

Accrual where no duty to disclose. — Purchasers' action, eight years after the real
estate closing, against a title insurer for "negligence or oversight" in not informing them
of a balloon payment on an assumed mortgage was barred by 37-1-4 NMSA 1978; this
section does not extend the limitation period where the insurer had no duty to make
such a disclosure and the purchasers failed to make a reasonable inquiry or to examine
the original mortgage. Roscoe v. United States Life Title Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-028, 105
N.M. 589, 734 P.2d 1272, overruled on other grounds by Ruiz v. Garcia, 1993-NMSC-
009, 115 N.M. 269, 850 P.2d 972.

Running of statute of limitations in fraudulent concealment actions. — In an action
for fraudulent concealment, the statute of limitations begins to run when plaintiff learns
of facts that should arouse his suspicion about defendant's statements or nondisclosure.
Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1984).

Particularity of plea. — Where receiver in an action against a director of a failed
savings and loan failed to plead the circumstances giving rise to estoppel with sufficient
particularity, but rather made bald allegations of concealment, the statute of limitations
was not tolled under this section. FDIC v. Schuchmann, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D.N.M.
2002).

Normally some positive act of concealment must be shown such as a false
representation in order to establish fraudulent concealment. Gaston v. Hartzell, 1976-
NMCA-041, 89 N.M. 217, 549 P.2d 632.

Limitation period not tolled where party did not actively or passively conceal
transactions. — Trial court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of
limitations in regard to a claim regarding the purchase of disputed property, where there
was nothing in the record to indicate that the moving party did anything, either actively
or passively, to conceal his transactions from the opposing party, so as to justify the
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Dow v. Chilili Coop. Ass'n, 1986-NMSC-
084, 105 N.M. 52, 728 P.2d 462.

Limitation not tolled. — Although Section 37-1-7 NMSA 1978 is applicable to both
actual fraud and constructive fraud and may be grounds for equitable estoppel for
purpose of tolling the statute of limitations, plaintiff has not made a case of fraudulent
concealment. FDIC v. Schuchmann, 319 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2003).

Mistake of one party. — Oil company's claim that it overpaid oil and gas royalties to
city for sixteen years was barred by the statute of limitations; the period of limitations
was not tolled by the oil company's mistake because it could have been discovered any
time during the sixteen-year period, had the oil company examined its accounting
records. City of Carlsbad v. Grace, 1998-NMCA-144, 126 N.M. 95, 966 P.2d 1178.

Effect of fraudulent concealment. — Where a party against whom a cause of action
accrues prevents the one entitled to bring the cause from obtaining knowledge thereof
by fraudulent concealment, or where the cause is known to the injuring party, but is of
such character as to conceal itself from the injured party, the statutory limitation on the
time for bringing the action will not begin to run until the right of action is discovered, or,
by the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have been discovered. Hardin v. Farris,
1974-NMCA-146, 87 N.M. 143, 530 P.2d 407.

Fraudulent concealment is not restricted to actions in which fraud is the gist of the
action, and neither does it create a new or separate cause of action; it merely tolls the
running of a statute of limitations. Gaston v. Hartzell, 1976-NMCA-041, 89 N.M. 217,
549 P.2d 632.

Concealment not shown. — Where municipality not merely failed to enforce collection
of assessments but affirmatively accepted bonds higher in number than those held by
plaintiff in satisfaction of the lien against the property of the persons surrendering the
bonds and canceled the lien against the property, plaintiff was required to take notice of
the records of municipality pertinent to the time and manner of payments, defaults, etc.,
and in the absence of evidence that cancellation of the liens was surrounded by
secrecy, cause of action accrued at time this wrong occurred and a suit initiated more
than four years thereafter was barred by limitations. Freeman v. Town of Gallup, 152
F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1945).

Continuing wrong doctrine. — In an action for fraud, misrepresentation and unfair
trade practices, the fact that the plaintiff knew of his injuries, which he attributed to the
risk of loss inherent in every contract, did not prevent application of the continuing
wrong doctrine since the defendant held the plaintiff to the agreement while at the same
time taking measures to dissolve it. Tiberi v. CIGNA Corp., 89 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir.
1996).

Action for breach of fiduciary duty. — In lessor's action against realtor for breach of
fiduciary duty in connection with negotiation of lease on lessor's behalf, trial court
properly submitted issues of whether lessor relied on realtor acting in fiduciary capacity
and when lessor discovered or should have suspected fraud or negligence of realtor.
Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1984).

Discovery of false representation. — A false representation constitutes fraudulent
concealment and constructive fraud, each of which tolls the statute of limitations; the
date of discovery of the false representation is the time from which plaintiffs' cause of
action accrues. Gaston v. Hartzell, 1976-NMCA-041, 89 N.M. 217, 549 P.2d 632.

Partnership. — Where two brothers operated a farm as partners, but property
purchased in 1950 and 1957 was recorded in only one brother's name, the limitations
period to reform the deeds did not begin to run until the brother in whose name the
property was held repudiated the partnership agreement. Bassett v. Bassett, 1990-
NMSC-070, 110 N.M. 559, 798 P.2d 160.

Discovery not shown. — Where articles of a corporation stated that 10% of
subscriptions to its stock had been paid to its treasurer who made affidavit to that effect,
the fact that he informed a creditor when an indebtedness was incurred that such
subscriptions had not been paid did not constitute a discovery so as to make the statute
of limitations begin to run. Albright v. Texas, S.F. & N.R.R., 1895-NMSC-018, 8 N.M.
110, 42 P. 73, rev'd, 1896-NMSC-010, 8 N.M. 422, 46 P. 448.

Scope of constructive notice. — The recording of an instrument is constructive notice
to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers only, and does not affect prior parties.
Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

When grantor affected. — The recording of a deed must be accompanied by other
circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person upon inquiry in order for the
recording to act as constructive notice to grantor of fraud. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-
NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

Action against void private land grant corporation. — A void private land grant
corporation has no right to the proceeds from a land sale and no authority to pay such
proceeds to its "shareholders." Conversion is present where the "shareholders" claim
and erroneously receive proceeds of the sale. The party aggrieved cannot be deemed
to have discovered she has a cause of action for conversion until the date of the judicial
opinion which declares the company in question to be a void corporation. Apodaca v.
Unknown Heirs of Tome Land Grant, 1982-NMSC-100, 98 N.M. 620, 651 P.2d 1264.

Failure to obtain insurance. — Four-year statute of limitations began to run with
discovery of fraud in 1961 and did not bar suit in 1963 for fraud from 1957 to 1961
against finance company for payments made by house trailer dealers to finance
company for insurance which was not obtained. Sw. Inv. Co. v. Cactus Motor Co., 355
F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1966).
Misrepresentation by real estate broker. — Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, had a right
to rely on the misrepresentation of square footage made by the real estate agent
through whom they purchased their residence; their cause of action for the false
representation accrued not on the date of their purchase but on the date of discovery.
Gaston v. Hartzell, 1976-NMCA-041, 89 N.M. 217, 549 P.2d 632.

In a suit against certain brokers, for intentionally and negligently misrepresenting the
amount of square footage contained in certain apartments, given the purchasers'
backgrounds involving real estate investments, the purchase of other apartment
complexes, the fact that an enlarged version of the survey was made available to one of
the purchasers before closing, the fact that one of the purchasers was a commissioned
broker in the sale of the apartments, and that one of purchasers, according to
testimony, was concerned at the time of sale with the number of square footage
rentable area in the apartments, the court properly determined as a matter of law that
the purchasers knew or should have known of the misrepresentation at the time of the
sale. Ambassador E. Apts. v. Ambassador E. Invs., 1987-NMCA-135, 106 N.M. 534,
746 P.2d 163.

Complaint not barred. — Complaint filed in November, 1903, alleging that fraud was
discovered "about the month of July, 1902," was not barred. Alexander v. Cleland,
1906-NMSC-027, 13 N.M. 524, 86 P. 425.

Specific allegations in pleading showing date of discovery govern a general
statement in determining whether the statute of limitations has run. Mayer v. Lane,
1927-NMSC-078, 33 N.M. 18, 262 P. 178.

Determinations by trial court. — Where, in suit to cancel deed and settlement
agreement entered into prior to divorce, for lack of consideration, the only possible
defense is the statute of limitations, or laches, to establish which the burden rested
upon the defendant husband, trial court should determine, first, whether husband at
time of execution of the deed and the agreement held a fraudulent intent not to perform
on his part, and, second, when the wife first discovered this fraud. Primus v. Clark,
1944-NMSC-030, 48 N.M. 240, 149 P.2d 535, subsequent appeal, 1957-NMSC-025, 62
N.M. 259, 308 P.2d 584.

Timely service of process. — Where complaint was filed before period of limitations
had expired, though process was not actually served until slightly more than 60 days
after expiration of four years from the accrual of the action, the action was timely
brought and running of the statute was interrupted. Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781, 65 S. Ct. 270, 89 L. Ed. 624 (1944).

Point not preserved for review. — Appellants may not urge in the supreme court that
the statute of limitations could not run against them, to give right to adverse possession,
because of ignorance of the mistake or fraud until suit was commenced, when such
plea was not made in the court below. GOS Cattle Co. v. Bragaw's Heirs, 1933-NMSC-
083, 38 N.M. 105, 28 P.2d 529.
What law governs. — The law of New Mexico governs as to the time within which an
action must be commenced when brought in federal court of this state, but the manner
in which actions are commenced, when actions are deemed to have begun, the manner
and method of serving process, all relate to procedure and are governed by the law of
the forum. Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781, 65 S.
Ct. 270, 89 L. Ed. 624 (1944).

Law reviews. — For article, "The Law of Medical Malpractice in New Mexico," see 3
N.M.L. Rev. 294 (1973).

For survey, "The Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions," see 6 N.M.L.
Rev. 271 (1976).

For annual survey of civil procedure in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 287 (1988).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 18 Am. Jur. 2d Conversion § 98; 51 Am.
Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 146.

Action on implied contract arising out of fraud as within statute of limitations applicable
to fraud, 3 A.L.R. 1603.

When action considered to be one on contract rather than one for fraud as regards
statute of limitations, 114 A.L.R. 525.

Inclusion or exclusion of first and last day for purposes of statute of limitations, 20
A.L.R.2d 1249.

Estoppel to rely on statute of limitations, 24 A.L.R.2d 1413.

Running of statute of limitations against claim for contribution or indemnity based on
tort, 57 A.L.R.3d 867.

When statute of limitations begins to run on negligent design claim against architect, 90
A.L.R.3d 496.

When does statute of limitations begin to run upon an action by subrogated insurer
against third-party tort-feasor, 91 A.L.R.3d 844.

Statutes of limitation: actions by purchasers or contractees against vendors or
contractors involving defects in houses or other buildings caused by soil instability, 12
A.L.R.4th 866.

When statute of limitations commences to run on action under state deceptive trade
practice or consumer protection acts, 18 A.L.R.4th 1340.
When statute of limitations commences to run on right of partnership accounting, 44
A.L.R.4th 678.

Modern status of the application of "discovery rule" to postpone running of limitations
against actions relating to breach of building and construction contracts, 33 A.L.R.5th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run upon action against attorney for legal
malpractice - deliberate wrongful acts or omissions, 67 A.L.R.5th 587.

Attorney malpractice - tolling or other exceptions to running of statute of limitations, 87
A.L.R.5th 473.

54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 34, 87, 192, 197.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 44 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: Gallagher v. Santa Fe Fed. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 52 P.3d 412 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).
Gallagher v. Santa Fe Fed. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 52 P.3d 412 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 8× “NMSA 1978, § 37-1-7 (1880) applies: “In actions for relief, on the ground of fraud or mistake, and in actions for injuries to, or conversion of property, the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud, mistake, injury or conversion complained of, shall…”
City of Carlsbad v. Grace, 966 P.2d 1178 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 8× “Mistake {5} ? Grace contends that its claim is not barred because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 1990 when Grace discovered the error in payment.”
Roscoe v. US Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 734 P.2d 1272 (N.M. 1987). · cites it 8× “Roscoes argue, however, that NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-7 applies: In actions for relief, on the ground of fraud or mistake, and in actions for injuries to, or conversion of property, the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud, mistake, injury or…”
Dow v. Chilili Coop. Ass'n, 105 N.W. 52 (N.M. 1986). · cites it 4× “NMSA 1978, § 37-1-7. In support of its position, the Association contends that it only “discovered” Dow’s allegedly fraudulent actions within the past four years.”
Day-Peck v. Little, 2021 NMCA 034 (N.M. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 4× “Day-Peck also alleges in her complaint that Attorneys fraudulently concealed the existence and import of the New Mexico statutes exempting life insurance benefits from creditors’ claims, and that this fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations, pursuant to NMSA…”
McNeill v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., 182 P.3d 121 (N.M. 2008). · cites it 2× “3d 281 (quoted authority omitted); see also NMSA 1978, § 37-1-7 (1880, as amended through 1953) (“the discovery rule”).”
Wilde v. Westland Dev. Co., Inc., 241 P.3d 628 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “NMSA 1978, § 37-1-7 (1880). For purposes of determining when the cause of action accrues, discovery is defined as the “discovery of such facts as would, on reasonable diligent investigation, lead to knowledge of [the] fraud” or other injury.”
Cont'l Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 858 P.2d 66 (N.M. 1993). · cites it 2× “1990), or from the time the fraud is discovered, Section 37-1-7.”
Sandel v. Sandel, 2020 NMCA 025 (N.M. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2× “Section 45-1-106 expressly incorporates this rule into its limitation period, providing that “[a]ny proceeding must be commenced within two years after the discovery of the fraud.”
McNeill v. Burlington Resource Oil & Gas Co., 2007 NMCA 024 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-7 (1880) (stating “the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud, mistake, injury or conversion complained of, shall have been discovered by the party aggrieved”).”
Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Alarcon, 816 P.2d 489 (N.M. 1991). · cites it 4× “NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-7, provides that actions for relief on grounds of fraud shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered by the party aggrieved.”
McNeill v. Rice Eng'g & Operating, Inc., 229 P.3d 489 (N.M. 2010). · cites it 2× “See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-7 (1880) (“In actions for relief, on the ground of fraud or mistake, and in actions for injuries to, or conversion of property, the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud, mistake, injury or conversion complained of, shall have…”
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