New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 40-3-10 (2026)

Priorities for satisfaction of separate debts.

✓ current as of May 2026
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A. The separate debt of a spouse shall be satisfied first from the debtor spouse's
separate property, excluding that spouse's interest in property in which each of the
spouses owns an undivided equal interest as a joint tenant or tenant in common. Should
such property be insufficient, then the debt shall be satisfied from the debtor spouse's
one-half interest in the community property or in property in which each spouse owns an
undivided equal interest as a joint tenant or tenant in common, excluding the residence
of the spouses. Should such property be insufficient, then the debt shall be satisfied
from the debtor spouse's interest in the residence of the spouses, except as provided in
Subsection B of this section or Section 42-10-9 NMSA 1978. Neither spouse's interest
in community property or separate property shall be liable for the separate debt of the
other spouse.

    B. Unless both spouses join in writing in the creation of the underlying debt or
obligation incurred after the marriage, a judgment or other process arising out of such
post-marital debt against one spouse alone or both spouses shall not create a lien or
otherwise be subject to execution against the interest of the nonjoining spouse in the
marital residence, whether held by the spouses as community property, joint tenants or
tenants in common.

   C. The priorities or exemptions established in this section for the satisfaction of a
separate debt must be claimed by either spouse under the procedure set forth in
Section 42-10-13 NMSA 1978, or the right to claim such priorities or exemptions is
waived as between a spouse and the creditor.
   D. This section shall apply only while both spouses are living and shall not apply to
the satisfaction of debts after the death of one or both spouses.

History: 1953 Comp., § 57-4A-4, enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 320, § 5; 1975, ch. 246, §
3; 1995, ch. 184, § 1.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, substituted "Subsection B of this section
or Section 42-10-9 NMSA 1978" for "Section 24-6-1 NMSA 1953", added Subsection B,
redesignated former Subsections B and C as Subsections C and D, and substituted "42-
10-13-NMSA 1978" for "24-7-1 NMSA 1953" in Subsection C.

Wife's interest in community can be segregated and subjected to lien. — The
public policy of the state of New Mexico on the subject of community property does not
preclude a holding that the wife's vested interest in community real property can be
segregated and subjected to a statutory judgment lien for a personal tort committed by
the wife during the coverture. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Chavez, 126 F. Supp. 227
(D.N.M. 1954).

Debt satisfied from community property. — A spouse's separate Arizona debt may
be satisfied from that spouse's half interest in community funds in New Mexico. National
Bank of Ariz. v. Moore, 2005-NMCA-122, 138 N.M. 496, 122 P.3d 1265, cert. denied,
2005-NMCERT-010, 138 N.M. 494, 122 P.3d 1263.

Power to manage and control and actual availability of entire community personal
property distinguished. — Although 40-3-14 NMSA 1978 gives either spouse alone
the full power to manage, control, dispose of and encumber the entire community
personal property, there exists a distinction between the power to manage and control
and actual availability. Since this section provides that a spouse's one-half interest in
the community property is available to satisfy his or her separate debts, it does not
necessarily follow that the power given by 40-3-14 NMSA 1978 makes the entire
community personal property always available to each spouse. Herrera v. Health & Soc.
Servs., 1978-NMCA-118, 92 N.M. 331, 587 P.2d 1342, cert. denied sub nom. Human
Servs. Dep't v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554 (1978).

Separate tort where activity no benefit to community. — If the activity in which the
tort-feasor spouse was engaged was of no benefit to the community, the tort is a
"separate" tort, collectible only as a separate debt under this section. Dell v. Heard, 532
F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1976).

Wife's separate estate not liable for loss in husband's public office. — Where no
attempt was made to show that defendant's wife was in any way responsible for the loss
appearing in the records of her husband's public office, her separate estate was not
liable for her husband's separate obligations. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Chavez, 126 F.
Supp. 227 (D.N.M. 1954).
Wife's estate exempt from attachment proceedings. — The entire community estate
of the defendant and his wife was not subject to his indebtedness, where the wife, so far
as the record showed, had no knowledge of any shortage on the part of her husband,
nor did she give her consent thereto, or ratify the acts, if any, of her husband, which
resulted in the shortage, and neither did the shortage benefit the community estate, so
far as was shown; therefore, the vested estate of the wife (intervenor) in and to the
community property tracts was exempt from the attachment proceedings instituted by
the bonding company, and the community interest of the husband was subject to sale
under the attachment, inasmuch as his shortages created a separate liability on his part,
resulting in a judgment against him. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Chavez, 126 F. Supp. 227
(D.N.M. 1954).

No cause of action against husband by wife's judgment creditor. — Where
judgment creditor of wife who committed tort in family car brought suit against husband
and argued his cause of action was for an after-the-fact determination that wife's tort
was a community tort which rendered the husband's separate property liable for
satisfaction of the judgment debt, the court believed the issues presented by appellant
under the community property laws did not set forth a cause of action against husband
but would be determined if and when judgment creditor proceeded to execute on
property belonging to husband. Dell v. Heard, 532 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1976).

One-half of husband's income garnishable for wife's debts. — Considering the
wife's vested one-half interest in all of the community property, findings that the creditor
had exhausted the possibilities of recovering the debt from wife's separate property, and
that husband's income was community property, the trial court correctly concluded that
one-half of husband's income from garnishee was available to satisfy wife's debt to
creditor. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Thevenet, 1984-NMSC-083, 101 N.M. 612,
686 P.2d 954.

Joinder of joint payee spouses in garnishment proceeding. — Where husband is
judgment debtor and the judgment of the trial court in a garnishment proceeding
indicates that garnishee is indebted on a promissory note to husband and wife, if the
note is not a community asset, both payees under the note should be joined so as to
adjudicate their respective rights under the note, but if the note is a community asset,
wife would be considered a proper but not indispensable party. Jemko, Inc. v. Liaghat,
1987-NMCA-069, 106 N.M. 50, 738 P.2d 922.

Aid to child denied where claim based on mother's interest in community income.
— For purposes of determining aid to families with dependent children benefits, where a
wife not only has a technical income resulting from her one-half share in the community
income, but that one-half share in the community income provides the legal basis for
her daughter's legitimate claim on the one-half interest in the community income, the
denial of benefits for the child, on the basis that the mother's income exceeded
permissible limits, is upheld. Duran v. N.M. Dep't of Human Servs., 1980-NMCA-038, 95
N.M. 196, 619 P.2d 1240.
Intentional action of one spouse may not bar insurance recovery by other. — The
intentional burning of a community residence by one spouse will not bar recovery by an
innocent spouse for her interest under a fire insurance policy issued to the community.
Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 1980-NMSC-140, 95 N.M. 257, 620 P.2d 1282.

Law reviews. — For article, "Federal Taxation of New Mexico Community Property,"
see 3 Nat. Resources J. 104 (1963).

For symposium, "The Effects of an Equal Rights Amendment on the New Mexico
System of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management and
Control," see 3 N.M.L. Rev. 11 (1973).

For symposium, "Equal Rights and the Debt Provisions of New Mexico Community
Property Law," see 3 N.M.L. Rev. 57 (1973).

For article, "The Community Property Act of 1973: A Commentary and Quasi-Legislative
History," see 5 N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1974).

For comment, "A Comparison of State and Federal Exemptions: 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330
(Supp. II 1978)," see 10 N.M.L. Rev. 431 (1980).

For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Commercial Law," see 11 N.M.L.
Rev. 69 (1981).

For note, "Community Property - Spouse's Future Federal Civil Service Disability
Benefits are Community Property to the Extent the Community Contributed to the Civil
Service Fund During Marriage: Hughes v. Hughes," see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 193 (1983).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Liability of community property for
antenuptial debts and obligations, 68 A.L.R.4th 877.

Spouse's receipt of "substantial benefit" as condition precluding entitlement to "innocent
spouse's" relief under 26 USCS § 6013(E), 134 A.L.R. Fed. 415.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1980–2025 · leading case: Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Moore, 122 P.3d 1265 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005).
Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Moore, 122 P.3d 1265 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 8× “¶ 18; see §§ 40-3-10, -11. This Court held that “[b]e-cause New Mexico law cannot be applied for the purpose of characterizing the debt, we necessarily apply the law of Missouri, the state in which all the other pertinent activity took place.”
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993). · cites it 7× “Sproul contends that under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-10 (Repl. Pamp.1989), her one-half community interest in the residence may not be foreclosed upon to satisfy Mr.”
Delph v. Potomac Ins., 620 P.2d 1282 (N.M. 1980). · cites it 4× “Furthermore, in 1973 the New Mexico Legislature enacted Section 40-3-10, N.M. S.A.1978 which sets forth priorities for satisfaction of separate debts.”
Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Thevenet, 686 P.2d 954 (N.M. 1984). · cites it 6× “The question is whether the trial court properly applied NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-10 (Repl.Pamp.1983), in concluding that one-half of twenty-five percent of Stanley’s disposable income, representing Corrine’s community property interest in her spouse’s non-exempt income under…”
Jemko, Inc. v. Liaghat, 738 P.2d 922 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 3× “See NMSA 1978, §§ 40-3-10, -11 (Repl.1986). Garnishment is an ancillary proceeding and not an original civil suit.”
deElche v. Jacobsen, 622 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1980). · cites it 2× “2d 990 (1949); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-10 (1978). California imposes liability first upon community property when the tortious act is for the benefit of the community, and first upon separate property if the tort was separate, but allows recovery from the other category of…”
DeTevis v. Aragon, 727 P.2d 558 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “See NMSA 1978, § 40-3-10 (Repl.1986). Separate property belonging to husband’s new wife, however, must be viewed differently.”
Naranjo v. Paull, 803 P.2d 254 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “After affirming the district court’s dismissal of the family-purpose claim, the court of appeals ruled that the second theory failed to state a cause of action against the husband. The court noted that the issue of whether a debt is a separate debt or a community debt is…”
Est. of Fletcher v. Jackson, 613 P.2d 714 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 2× “The right to hold property as joint tenants or as tenants in common and the legal incidents of so holding, including but not limited to the incident of the right of survivorship of joint tenancy, are not altered by the Community Property Act of 1973 [40-3-6 to 40-3-17 NMSA…”
Swink v. Fingado, 850 P.2d 978 (N.M. 1993). “These provisions from the 1973 Act now appear in substantially the same form in NMSA 1978, Subsections 40-3-10(A), 40-3-11(A), and 40-3-13(A), respectively.”
Swink v. Sunwest Bank (In Re Fingado), 113 B.R. 37 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990). · cites it 2× “*42 § 40-3-10(A) (Repl.Pamp.1989). 3 Thus, whether Valetta Ruth Pingado’s share of the community property can be used to satisfy the debts depends on whether the debts are community or separate.”
Blackwell v. Lurie, 71 P.3d 509 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “{18} However, we need not resolve the issue of the character of the debt represented by the deficiency judgment because application of New Mexico law does not lead to a resolution of the issue. Sproul indicates that we apply the New Mexico statutory provisions pertaining to…”
— N.M. Stat. § 40-3-10(A) — 5 cases
Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Moore, 122 P.3d 1265 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “¶ 18; see §§ 40-3-10, -11. This Court held that “[b]e-cause New Mexico law cannot be applied for the purpose of characterizing the debt, we necessarily apply the law of Missouri, the state in which all the other pertinent activity took place.”
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993). “Sproul contends that under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-10 (Repl. Pamp.1989), her one-half community interest in the residence may not be foreclosed upon to satisfy Mr.”
Swink v. Fingado, 850 P.2d 978 (N.M. 1993). “These provisions from the 1973 Act now appear in substantially the same form in NMSA 1978, Subsections 40-3-10(A), 40-3-11(A), and 40-3-13(A), respectively.”
Swink v. Sunwest Bank (In Re Fingado), 113 B.R. 37 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990). “*42 § 40-3-10(A) (Repl.Pamp.1989). 3 Thus, whether Valetta Ruth Pingado’s share of the community property can be used to satisfy the debts depends on whether the debts are community or separate.”
Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Thevenet, 686 P.2d 954 (N.M. 1984). “The question is whether the trial court properly applied NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-10 (Repl.Pamp.1983), in concluding that one-half of twenty-five percent of Stanley’s disposable income, representing Corrine’s community property interest in her spouse’s non-exempt income under…”
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