N.M. Stat. § 52-5-12 (2026)

A. It is stated policy for the administration of the Workers' Compensation Act
[Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978] and the New Mexico Occupational Disease
Disablement Law [52-3-1 NMSA 1978] that it is in the best interest of the injured worker
or disabled employee that the worker or employee receive benefit payments on a
periodic basis. Except as provided in this section, lump-sum payments in exchange for
the release of the employer from liability for future payments of compensation or
medical benefits shall not be allowed.

    B. With the approval of the workers' compensation judge, a worker may elect to
receive compensation benefits to which the worker is entitled in a lump sum if the
worker has returned to work for at least six months, earning at least eighty percent of
the average weekly wage the worker earned at the time of injury or disablement. If a
worker receives the benefit income in a lump sum, the worker is not entitled to any
additional benefit income for the compensable injury or disablement and the worker
shall only receive that portion of the benefit income that is attributable to the impairment
rating as determined in Section 52-1-24 NMSA 1978. In making lump-sum payments,
the payment due the worker shall not be discounted at a rate greater than a sum equal
to the present value of all future payments of compensation computed at a five-percent
discount compounded annually.
   C. After maximum medical improvement and with the approval of the workers'
compensation judge, a worker may elect to receive a partial lump-sum payment of
workers' compensation benefits for the sole purpose of paying debts that may have
accumulated during the course of the injured or disabled worker's disability.

    D. The worker and employer may elect to resolve a claim for injury with a lump-sum
payment to the worker for all or a portion of past, present and future payments of
compensation benefits, medical benefits or both in exchange for a full and final release
or an appropriate release of the employer from liability for such compromised benefits.
The proposed lump-sum payment agreement shall be presented to the workers'
compensation judge for approval, and a hearing shall be held on the record. The
workers' compensation judge shall approve the lump-sum payment agreement if the
judge finds that:

      (1)    a written agreement describing the nature of the proposed settlement has
been mutually agreed upon and executed by the worker and the employer;

      (2)  the worker has been fully informed and understands the terms, conditions
and consequences of the proposed settlement;

      (3)     the lump-sum payment agreement is fair, equitable and provides
substantial justice to the worker and employer; and

      (4)     the lump-sum payment agreement complies with the requirements for
approval set forth in Sections 52-5-13 and 52-5-14 NMSA 1978.

   E. The workers' compensation judge shall approve a lump-sum payment agreement
pursuant to Subsection D of this section by order. Once the agreement has been
approved and filed with the clerk of the administration, any further challenge to the
terms of the settlement is barred and the lump-sum payment agreement shall not be
reopened, set aside or reconsidered nor shall any additional benefits be imposed.

   F. If a worker and employer elect to enter into a lump-sum payment agreement
pursuant to Subsection D of this section, the limit on attorney fees pursuant to
Subsection I of Section 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 shall apply.

   G. If an insurer pays a lump-sum payment to an injured or disabled worker without
the approval of a workers' compensation judge and if at a later date benefits are due for
the injured or disabled worker's claim, the insurer alone shall be liable for that claim and
shall not in any manner, including rate determinations and the employer's experience
modifier, pass on the cost of the benefits due to the employer.

   H. If the compensation benefit to which a worker is entitled is less than fifty dollars
($50.00) per week, any party may petition the workers' compensation judge to
consolidate that payment into quarterly installments.
History: Laws 1986, ch. 22, § 38; 1987, ch. 235, § 50; 1990 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 57;
1993, ch. 193, § 12; 2003, ch. 259, § 10; 2009, ch. 235, § 1.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added Subsections D through F and
deleted former Subsection F, which provided that periodic compensation payments for
disability arising from primary mental impairments or secondary mental impairment shall
be paid as incurred and shall not be included in lump-sum payments.

The 2003 amendment, effective June 20, 2003, substituted "fifty dollars ($50.00)" for
"twenty-five dollars ($25.00)" near the middle of Subsection E.

The 1993 amendment, effective June 18, 1993, deleted the former second sentence of
Subsection F, which read "Vocational rehabilitation benefits under the Workers'
Compensation Act and the New Mexico Occupational Disease Disablement Law shall
be paid as incurred and shall not be included in any lump sum payments."

The 1990 (2nd S.S.) amendment, effective January 1, 1991, in Subsection A, inserted
"or disabled employee", substituted "Subsections B, C, and D" for "Subsection B",
inserted "not", and deleted language regarding lump sum payments by agreement or
best interest of the parties; added Subsections B to E; and redesignated former
Subsection B as Subsection F, inserting therein "or the New Mexico Occupational
Disease Disablement Law".

                         I.     GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Lump sum settlement. — When an employer or insurer and an employee agree to a
lump-sum settlement for workers' compensation benefits, and that agreement is
reduced to writing and is signed, it becomes "a binding expression of the parties' intent."
Rojo v. Loeper Landscaping, Inc., 1988-NMSC-065, 107 N.M. 407, 759 P.2d 194.

Duty of worker’s compensation judge to advise worker. — When an
employer/insurer solicits a lump sum payment from an unrepresented worker, the
worker’s compensation judge has an affirmative duty to ensure that the worker
understands the lump sum settlement agreement into which he or she is entering.
Sommerville v. Southwest Firebird, 2008-NMSC-034, 144 N.M. 396, 188 P.3d 1147.

The restrictions on lump sum payments set forth the in this section do not violate
equal protection. Rodriguez v. Scotts Landscaping, 2008-NMCA-046, 143 N.M. 726,
181 P.3d 718.

When a worker enters into a final settlement of a workers’ compensation claim in
exchange for a lump-sum payment of all future benefits, the worker may not proceed
with an intentional tort action against the employer. Salazar v. Torres, 2007-NMSC-019,
141 N.M. 559, 158 P.3d 449.
Legislature's policy on lump-sum payments does not deprive employer of due
process. — The legislature has established the policy for the award of lump-sum
payments by providing that a lump-sum settlement must be in the best interests of the
parties entitled to compensation; all parties in interest must have due notice of a
hearing; and lastly, that no lump-sum settlement could be made for less than a payment
equal to the present value of all future payments of compensation computed at 5%
discount, compounded annually. Such an award does not deprive employer of due
process of law or equal protection of the law. Livingston v. Loffland Bros., 1974-NMCA-
047, 86 N.M. 375, 524 P.2d 991, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d 988.

Legislature's policy favoring periodic over lump sum payments in Subsection A of
this section also applies to compensation due a deceased worker's dependents under
Section 52-1-46 NMSA 1978. Paradiso v. Tipps Equip., 2004-NMCA-009, 134 N.M.
814, 82 P.3d 985, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-001.

Not unconstitutional delegation of authority. — The section awarding lump sum
payment to the employee is not an unconstitutional delegation of authority by the
legislature and does not deprive the employer of his right to due process of law.
Livingston v. Loffland Bros., 1974-NMCA-047, 86 N.M. 375, 524 P.2d 991, cert. denied,
86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d 988.

Accelerated periodic payments are not lump-sum settlements requiring pre-approval
by the judge. Therefore, employer was entitled to a credit without discount for advance
periodic payments made to worker. Gomez v. Bernalillo Cnty. Clerk's Office, 1994-
NMCA-102, 118 N.M. 449, 882 P.2d 40.

Lump-sum payment and release agreement effective as waiver of statutory rights.
— Lump-sum payment and release agreement which stated, among other things, that
claimant would be treated by present physician or his referral for life was a binding
contract, and constituted a waiver of employer's right under Section 52-3-15 NMSA
1978 to designate a change in claimant's primary care provider. Ramirez v. Johnny's
Roofing, Inc., 1999-NMCA-038, 127 N.M. 83, 977 P.2d 348.

Limitation on release. — Subsections A and B of this section do not allow the release
of an employer from liability for further benefit payments in exchange for partial lump-
sum payments when worker's condition becomes worse. Souter v. Ancae Heating & Air
Conditioning, 2002-NMCA-078, 132 N.M. 608, 52 P.3d 980.

Facilitating the production of income. — The term "to facilitate the production of
income," as used in the Padilla v. Frito-Lay test (see annotation this section), does not
mean maximizing return on investment. Merrifield v. Auto-Chlor Sys., 1983-NMCA-098,
100 N.M. 263, 669 P.2d 739.

No lump-sum award of attorney's fees. — Hearing officer did not abuse his discretion
in refusing to award attorney's fees in a lump sum payable by employer and, instead,
awarding attorney's fees to be paid out of claimant's bi-weekly compensation. Strong v.
Sysco Corp./Nobel Sysco, 1989-NMCA-051, 108 N.M. 639, 776 P.2d 1258.

Voluntary payment of maximum compensation benefits over period of time does
not establish total permanent disability, and such payment is not an admission by the
employer of the totality or permanency of any injury. Armijo v. Co-Con Constr. Co.,
1978-NMCA-106, 92 N.M. 295, 587 P.2d 442, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 260, 586 P.2d
1089, overruled on other grounds by Raines v. W.A. Klinger & Sons, 1988-NMSC-083,
107 N.M. 668, 763 P.2d 684; Neumann v. A.S. Horner, Inc., 1983-NMCA-039, 99 N.M.
603, 661 P.2d 503, overruled on other grounds by Maitlen v. Getty Oil Co., 1987-
NMCA-002, 105 N.M. 370, 733 P.2d 1and Raines v. W.A. Klinger & Sons, 1988-NMSC-
083, 107 N.M. 668, 763 P.2d 684.

Rehabilitation is restoration of individual to his greatest potential — physically,
mentally, socially and vocationally. Lane v. Levi Strauss & Co., 1979-NMCA-012, 92
N.M. 504, 590 P.2d 652.

Temporary disability is that which lasts for a limited time only while the workman
(worker) is undergoing treatment and this classification anticipates that eventually there
will be either complete recovery or an impaired bodily condition which is static. Lane v.
Levi Strauss & Co., 1979-NMCA-012, 92 N.M. 504, 590 P.2d 652.

Thirty-one day period for paying first compensation installment has no
applicability to one-year limitation period within which the claimant was required to
bring suit after termination of her employment, and the 31-day period could not be
tacked on to a one-year limitation. Owens v. Eddie Lu's Fine Apparel, 1980-NMCA-149,
95 N.M. 176, 619 P.2d 852.

Filing separate claim to determine total permanent disability. — This section gave
plaintiff the right to file a petition, a separate claim, a separate proceeding, under the
Workmen's (Workers') Compensation Act, to determine if he had a case of total
permanent disability, and if so, if it was in the best interests of the parties entitled to
compensation to grant him a lump-sum award. The purpose of the section was to give a
workman (worker) an early opportunity to solve an economic problem. Briscoe v. Hydro
Conduit Corp., 1975-NMCA-147, 88 N.M. 568, 544 P.2d 283 (decided under prior law).

                             II.    LUMP SUM PAYMENT.

Return-to-work lump sum payments may be modified if the worker’s physical
condition changes. Benny v. Moberg Welding, 2007-NMCA-124, 142 N.M. 501, 167
P.3d 949, cert. denied, 2007-NMCERT-008, 142 N.M. 435, 166 P.3d 1089.

A worker can receive a partial lump-sum payment for payment of debts while
pursuing an intentional tort action against the employer. Luna v. Lewis Casing Crews,
Inc., 2007-NMSC-020, 141 N.M. 607, 159 P.3d 256.
Lump-sum payment exception rather than rule. — Periodic compensation payments
are the rule, and lump-sum awards are the exception, and in applying this exception the
purpose of workmen's (workers') compensation must be kept in mind, that is the public
policy that compensation shall be made in a certain amount, to secure the injured
employee against want, and to avoid his becoming a public charge. Arther v. Western
Co. of N. Am., 1975-NMCA-082, 88 N.M. 157, 538 P.2d 799, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318,
540 P.2d 248.

Three factors determine an award of lump-sum: (1) total permanent disability; (2)
rehabilitation of the workman (worker) and (3) the best interest of the workman (worker).
Lane v. Levi Strauss & Co., 1979-NMCA-012, 92 N.M. 504, 590 P.2d 652 (decided
under former law).

Only exceptional circumstances permit lump-sum award. — Lump summing should
only be permitted when it appears that exceptional circumstances warrant the departure
from the general scheme; however, once a departure is warranted there should be no
hesitancy in making a lump-sum award, which may be made either in whole or in part
so long as it is made because of exceptional circumstances. Codling v. Aztec Well
Servicing Co., 1976-NMCA-044, 89 N.M. 213, 549 P.2d 628.

As each request for a lump-sum payment is unique, a precise enumeration of what
factual ingredients constitute special circumstances is impossible, but in each case
which has granted a lump-sum award, a certain factual situation has emerged which, by
its quantum and quality of evidence, has convincingly portrayed the existence of
exceptional circumstances. Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 1976-NMCA-044, 89
N.M. 213, 549 P.2d 628.

Generally, a lump sum is awarded only when present, pressing need is shown, and the
spectre of distant deprivation to plaintiff is simply insufficient to warrant a lump-sum
award. Zamora v. CDK Contracting Co., 1987-NMCA-093, 106 N.M. 309, 742 P.2d 521,
cert. denied, 106 N.M. 353, 742 P.2d 1058.

It was error to award a claimant lump-sum benefits, when such a payment would create
an undue risk that the worker would end up on the welfare rolls well before the periodic
payments would have terminated. Riesenecker v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., 1990-
NMCA-059, 110 N.M. 654, 798 P.2d 1040, vacated on other grounds, 1990-NMCA-100,
110 N.M. 451, 796 P.2d 1147 (decided under prior law).

Exceptional circumstances necessary for lump-sum award. — Where maximum
compensation benefits for disability are not being paid, a suit to establish disability may
be brought, and if total permanent disability is established, a lump-sum may be awarded
where exceptional circumstances warrant a departure from payments of compensation
in installments. Minnerup v. Stewart Bros. Drilling Co., 1979-NMCA-125, 93 N.M. 561,
603 P.2d 300, cert. denied, 94 N.M. 629, 614 P.2d 546 (1980), overruled on other
grounds by Raines v. W.A. Klinger & Sons, 1988-NMSC-083, 107 N.M. 668, 763 P.2d
684.
Lump-sum payments are justified only when exceptional circumstances exist. Woodson
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483.

Each case considered independently in determining lump sum. — Each request for
a lump-sum payment stands or falls on its own merits, and each case must be
considered according to the evidence produced to determine whether sufficient "special
circumstances" exist to bring the request within the exception of Subsection B. Padilla v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 1981-NMCA-154, 97 N.M. 354, 639 P.2d 1208, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50,
644 P.2d 1039.

Special circumstances for lump sum award. — A precise enumeration of what
factual ingredients constitute special circumstances is impossible; the propriety of a
lump-sum award in each case stands or falls on its own merits. Woodson v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483.

No limitation on full lump-sum payments in Subsection C. — The different statutory
provisions of this section applicable to full and partial lump sum payments, represent a
legislative balancing of competing interests. Subsection C recognizes the economic
difficulties faced by injured and disabled workers who, because of injury or disability, are
unable to pay certain debts and authorizes a lump sum payment, rather than periodic
payment, if necessary to avoid extreme hardship. Because the purpose of such a
payment is need, rather than convenience, there is no reason to reduce benefits to the
level calculated based solely on impairment. Cabazos v. Calloway Constr., 1994-
NMCA-091, 118 N.M. 198, 879 P.2d 1217, cert. denied, 119 N.M. 168, 889 P.2d 203.

Periodic compensation payments are the rule and lump-sum awards are the
exception; because lump-summing is a departure it should only be permitted when it
appears that exceptional circumstances warrant the departure. Lamont v. N.M. Military
Inst., 1979-NMCA-047, 92 N.M. 804, 595 P.2d 774, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d
1078; Spidle v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 1981-NMSC-058, 96 N.M. 290, 629 P.2d
1219.

Periodic payments ordinarily serve the policy of this article; the award of a lump sum is
the exception. Padilla v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 1981-NMCA-154, 97 N.M. 354, 639 P.2d 1208,
cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039.

Subsection C of this section enacted into law what had been treated in case law as an
exception to the periodic payment provision of the workers’ compensation law. Jackson
v. K & M Constr., 2004-NMCA-082, 136 N.M. 94, 94 P.3d 837, cert. denied, 2004-
NMCERT-007, 136 N.M. 452, 99 P.3d 1164.

Unaccrued disability benefits for lump sum payment of debt. — In enacting
Subsection C of this section, there is no intent on the part of the legislature to call upon
unaccrued disability benefits for the lump sum payment of debt when the worker is no
longer disabled, due to his or her death, and, as a result, there no longer exist any
period payments due from which a lump sum payment for debt would be deducted.
Jackson v. K & M Constr., 2004-NMCA-082, 136 N.M. 94, 94 P.3d 837, cert. denied,
2004-NMCERT-007, 136 N.M. 452, 99 P.3d 1164.

Lump-sum award only where compensation right previously established. —
Section 52-1-56 NMSA 1978 and this section authorize lump-sum awards only where
the right to compensation has been previously established. Where defendants in their
answer admitted death from injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, and
contested only the propriety of a lump-sum award, their admission of liability sufficiently
established plaintiff's right to compensation and authorized a lump-sum award under the
section. Arther v. Western Co. of N. Am., 1975-NMCA-082, 88 N.M. 157, 538 P.2d 799,
cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248.

Obtaining lump sum award through court proceeding. — Lump-sum awards may be
obtained through court proceedings only where the right to compensation has been
previously established. Neumann v. A.S. Horner, Inc., 1983-NMCA-039, 99 N.M. 603,
661 P.2d 503, overruled on other grounds by Raines v. W.A. Klinger & Sons, 1988-
NMSC-083, 107 N.M. 668, 763 P.2d 684.

Application of statute of limitations to lump-sum credit. — Worker's compensation
judge did not abuse her discretion in applying a credit for lump-sum payments
previously made to claimant to a period of time during which employer had failed to pay
benefits, even though the employer had initially stopped paying benefits more than one
year prior to claimant's action. West v. Home Care Res., 1999-NMCA-037, 127 N.M. 78,
976 P.2d 1030.

Matter is vested in trial court's discretion whether to grant lump-sum award.
Boughton v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 1983-NMCA-052, 99 N.M. 723, 663 P.2d 382.

Discretion not abused in awarding widow benefits for house and daughter's care.
— The trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding a widow worker's
compensation benefits in a lump sum to purchase a house and raise her daughter in a
home (rather than an apartment) environment, to attend a nursing school, and for future
medical care for her daughter's physical condition. Boughton v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,
1983-NMCA-052, 99 N.M. 723, 663 P.2d 382.

Lump-sum awarded only if it promotes public policy. — Proof that a lump-sum
award is in the best interest of the recipient will not justify a court in ordering such an
award if to do so would undermine the public policy which the statute is intended to
promote. Spidle v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 1981-NMSC-058, 96 N.M. 290, 629 P.2d
1219; Boughton v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 1983-NMCA-052, 99 N.M. 723, 663 P.2d 382.

Claimant's burden to show lump-sum award in his best interests. — A lump-sum
award should be calculated on a sound annuity basis and should not be permitted for
the purpose of beating the actuarial tables; thus the claimant has the burden of showing
that it is in his best interest and that the lack of lump summing would create a manifest
hardship where relief is essential to protect claimant and his family from want, privation
or to facilitate the production of income or to help in a rehabilitation program, and
depending on the circumstances, the payment of debts may or may not be an important
factor. Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 1976-NMCA-044, 89 N.M. 213, 549 P.2d
628 (decided under former law).

Petitioner's burden of proof. — A petitioner for a lump-sum award has the burden of
showing that it is in his best interest and that the failure to award a lump sum would
create a manifest hardship where relief is essential to protect the claimant and his family
from want or privation, to facilitate the production of income for the claimant or to help
the claimant in a rehabilitation program. Padilla v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 1981-NMCA-154, 97
N.M. 354, 639 P.2d 1208, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039; Boughton v. W.
Nuclear, Inc., 1983-NMCA-052, 99 N.M. 723, 663 P.2d 382; Woodson v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483 (decided under former
law).

Expert testimony not required. — There is no mandatory requirement in the
workmen's (workers') compensation law that the claimant produce expert testimony at a
hearing to obtain an advance payment of compensation. Padilla v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 1981-
NMCA-154, 97 N.M. 354, 639 P.2d 1208, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039.

Sufficient findings to support lump-sum award. — Trial court's findings that the
financial interests of plaintiff, a 21-year-old widow who had been married to her
deceased husband about one month, and had no children, would be best served by a
lump-sum settlement because of its investment potential and because she could
remarry the day after a lump-sum settlement, or die the day after a lump-sum
settlement, without losing any future payments, was not sufficient to support a lump-
sum award. Arther v. Western Co. of N. Am., 1975-NMCA-082, 88 N.M. 157, 538 P.2d
799, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248.

Lump-sum benefits were properly awarded where the court was concerned that the
mothers of the dependent children of the deceased would mismanage the funds, and a
lump-sum award was the best way to secure the services of a conservator at a
reasonable cost. Sowders v. MFG Drilling Co., 1985-NMCA-081, 103 N.M. 267, 705
P.2d 172.

Stipulated compensation order that failed to comply with approval process was
invalid and unenforceable. — Where, in 2004, the parties entered into a stipulated
compensation order (SCO) to settle a dispute regarding worker’s entitlement to workers’
compensation benefits as the result of an accident and injuries to worker’s back that
occurred in 2002, and where there was no hearing by the workers’ compensation judge
(WCJ) to approve the provisions of the SCO or otherwise confirm worker’s knowledge of
the partial lump-sum settlement or any of the material facts contained therein, and
where, in 2014, employer filed a motion for a supplemental compensation order
(MSCO), the WCJ erred in granting the MSCO and in approving the SCO under 52-5-13
and -14 NMSA 1978, because the SCO was not in compliance with 52-5-12(C) NMSA
1978, and therefore the WCJ had no authority to approve the SCO containing a partial
lump-sum payment of benefits; the SCO was invalid and unenforceable. Baca v. State,
2017-NMCA-076, cert. denied.

Payment of debts accumulated during disability. — Only those debts that have been
added during the worker's disability may be paid off with a lump sum; other debts are
not eligible for lump-sum payment. Carrasco v. Phelps Dodge/Chino Mines, 1995-
NMCA-001, 119 N.M. 347, 890 P.2d 408.

The renewal of a promissory note does not constitute an accumulation of debt within the
scope of this section. Carrasco v. Phelps Dodge/Chino Mines, 1995-NMCA-001, 119
N.M. 347, 890 P.2d 408.

Premature lump-sum award. — In the present case, because the worker had not
returned to work for six months earning 80% of his average weekly wage, he did not
qualify for a full lump-sum payment under Subsection B. Therefore, the employer could
not be required to pay the full amount of the remaining disability as determined at the
time of the hearing, notwithstanding the fact that the payment was denominated as
partial. Subsection C does allow, after maximum medical improvement has been
achieved and with the approval of the judge, a partial lump-sum payment for the sole
purpose of paying debts that may have accumulated during the course of the injured or
disabled worker's disability. However, the judge here did not award a partial lump-sum
payment; he awarded full payment. Therefore, Subsection C was not in fact properly
utilized and the award as made must be set aside. Quintana v. Ilfelds, 1993-NMCA-158,
116 N.M. 836, 867 P.2d 1218.

Review of lump-sum award. — Where the district court determines that a lump-sum
payment is in the best interest of the claimant and the public, a reviewing court will not
disturb the award in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Spidle v. Kerr-McGee
Nuclear Corp., 1981-NMSC-058, 96 N.M. 290, 629 P.2d 1219.

Modification of benefits award. — A worker may, pursuant to Section 52-1-56 NMSA
1978, seek an increase in his compensation based on change in condition at any time
during that statutory benefits period under Section 52-1-42 NMSA 1978, even if, as a
result of receiving partial lump-sum payments for debt pursuant to Subsection C, the
worker has received the monetary equivalent of the benefits allowed in a compensation
order before the benefits period expires. Souter v. Ancae Heating & Air Conditioning,
2002-NMCA-078, 132 N.M. 608, 52 P.3d 980.

Law reviews. — For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to workmen's
compensation, see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 495 (1983).

For survey of 1990-91 workers' compensation law, see 22 N.M.L. Rev. 845 (1992).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation
§§ 679 to 683.
Tort liability of worker's compensation insurer for wrongful delay or refusal to make
payments due, 8 A.L.R.4th 902.

Workers' compensation: reopening lump-sum compensation payment, 26 A.L.R.5th
127.