N.M. Stat. » N.M. Stat. / Chapter 52 / Article 5
New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 52-5-7 (2026)

Hearing procedure.

✓ current as of May 2026
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A. When matters in dispute cannot be resolved by informal conference or other
techniques, the director shall transmit a copy of the claim to the other parties with notice
to respond by written answer. The other parties shall respond with a written answer
within twenty days after receiving a notice or within such extension of that time as the
director may allow. If no timely answer is filed by a party after notice, a workers'
compensation judge may, if he determines it to be appropriate, grant the relief sought
against that party. However, if, in order to enable the workers' compensation judge to
enter an order and carry out its effect, it is necessary to take an account, determine the
amount of benefits due, establish the truth of any claims by evidence or make an
investigation of any matter, the workers' compensation judge may conduct such
hearings as he deems necessary and proper.

    B. A hearing shall be held for determining the questions at issue within sixty days of
the filing of the answer. All parties in interest shall be given at least twenty days' notice
of the hearing and of the issues to be heard, served personally or by mail. Following the
presentation of the evidence, the workers' compensation judge shall determine the
questions at issue and file the decision with the director within thirty days, unless the
time for filing the decision is extended by the mutual agreement of the parties. At the
time of filing, a certified copy of the decision shall be sent by first class mail to all
interested parties at the last known address of each. The decision of the workers'
compensation judge shall be made in the form of a compensation order, appropriately
titled to show its purpose and containing a report of the case, findings of fact and
conclusions of law and, if appropriate, an order for the payment of benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act [Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978] or the New Mexico
Occupational Disease Disablement Law [52-3-1 NMSA 1978].

    C. The decision of the workers' compensation judge shall be final and conclusive as
to all matters adjudicated by him upon the expiration of the thirtieth day after a copy of
the decision has been mailed to the parties, unless prior to that day a party in interest
seeks judicial review of the decision pursuant to Section 52-5-8 NMSA 1978.

   D. All hearings before the workers' compensation judge shall be open to the public.
The director shall by regulation provide for the preparation of a record of each hearing.

    E. The director may authorize a workers' compensation judge or his duly authorized
representative to enter at any reasonable time the premises where an injury or death
has occurred and to make such examination of any tool, appliance, process, machinery
or environmental or other condition as may be relevant to a determination of the cause
and circumstances of the injury, disablement or death.

    F. The testimony of any witness may be taken by deposition or interrogatories
according to the rules of civil procedure for the district courts and may be taken before
any workers' compensation judge or any person authorized to take testimony, but
discovery procedure shall be conducted only upon the workers' compensation judge's
findings that good cause exists. The cost and expense of any discovery procedure
allowed by the workers' compensation judge shall be paid as provided in Section 52-1-
54 NMSA 1978. No costs shall be charged, taxed or collected by the workers'
compensation judge except fees for witnesses who testify under subpoena. The
witnesses shall be allowed the same fee for attendance and mileage as is fixed by the
law in civil actions, except that the workers' compensation judge may assess against the
employer the fees allowed any expert witness, as provided in Section 38-6-4 NMSA
1978, whose examination of the claimant, report or hearing attendance the workers'
compensation judge deems necessary for resolution of matters at issue.

History: Laws 1986, ch. 22, § 33; 1987, ch. 235, § 49; 1989, ch. 263, § 76; 1993, ch.
193, § 11.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

The 1993 amendment, effective June 18, 1993, substituted "as provided in Section 52-
1-54 NMSA 1978" for "by the employer, and in no event shall an unsuccessful claimant
be responsible for the cost and expense of any discovery procedure" in the second
sentence of Subsection F.
Attorney fees. — Nothing in the language of Section 52-5-7B NMSA 1978 indicates
that it applies to subsequent orders awarding attorney fees. Trujillo v. Hilton of Santa
Fe, 1993-NMCA-005, 115 N.M. 398, 851 P.2d 1065, rev'd on other grounds, 1993-
NMSC-017, 115 N.M. 397, 851 P.2d 1064.

Discovery. — The statute directs that discovery shall be conducted only upon the
hearing officer's findings that good cause exists. Cantrell v. W & C Contracting Co.,
1991-NMCA-091, 112 N.M. 609, 817 P.2d 1251, cert. denied, 112 N.M. 440, 816 P.2d
509.

"Cost and expense". — The words "cost and expense" in Subsection F also permit the
workers' compensation judge to allow a reasonable fee charged by an expert witness in
necessarily reviewing records or otherwise preparing to testify by deposition. Cantrell v.
W & C Contracting Co., 1991-NMCA-091, 112 N.M. 609, 817 P.2d 1251, cert. denied,
112 N.M. 440, 816 P.2d 509.

The words "cost and expense," as used in Subsection F of this section, have been
interpreted to include the actual costs of taking a deposition, such as stenographer and
reporter fees. Cantrell v. W & C Contracting Co., 1991-NMCA-091, 112 N.M. 609, 817
P.2d 1251, cert. denied, 112 N.M. 440, 816 P.2d 509.

Award of expert fees. — The requirement of a subpoena must be met before any
expert fees can be awarded. Murphy v. Duke City Pizza, Inc., 1994-NMCA-085, 118
N.M. 346, 881 P.2d 706, cert. denied, 118 N.M. 430, 882 P.2d 21.

Authority of judge over worker's residual physical capacity. — Even though
evidence must be presented by a qualified health provider on the issue of a worker's
residual physical capacity, a worker's compensation judge is free to consider this
evidence in the same manner, and to the same degree, as any other expert testimony.
Slygh v. RMCI, Inc., 1995-NMCA-081, 120 N.M. 358, 901 P.2d 776.

Law reviews. — For survey of workers' compensation law in New Mexico, see 18
N.M.L. Rev. 579 (1988).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation
§ 602 et seq.

100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 581 et seq.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 26 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1988–2025 · leading case: Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013 NMCA 103 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013 NMCA 103 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 10× “{8} In asserting that the order was not effective until thirty days after it was mailed, Employer relies upon NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-7(C) (1993) of the Act. This statute provides: The decision of the workers’ compensation judge shall be final and conclusive as to all matters…”
Armijo v. Save 'N Gain, 771 P.2d 989 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 8× “See NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7 (Repl.Pamp. 1987). Specifically claimant argues that she was deprived of due process by requiring her to submit to an informal adjudication of her claim under circumstances where no record was made of the proceedings, no testimony of supporting witnesses…”
Cantrell v. W & C Contracting Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 1251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 19× “The words “cost and expense” as used in Section 52-5-7 have been interpreted to include the actual costs of taking a deposition, such as stenographer and reporter fees.”
Trujillo v. Hilton of Santa Fe, 851 P.2d 1065 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 8× “NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7(B) (Repl.Pamp.1991). Worker contends that the use of the term “compensation order” in Section 52-5-7(B) and the term “final order” in Section 52-5-8(A) indicates that the legislature did not intend the compensation order to be a final order.”
Murphy v. Duke City Pizza, Inc., 881 P.2d 706 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 14× “See NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7(F) (Repl.Pamp.1991). Worker relies on the last sentence of Section 52-5-7(F) to suggest that it is within the judge’s discretion to award an expert witness fee, even if the expert witness did not testify under subpoena.”
Padilla v. Intel Corp., 1998 NMCA 125 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “Compare Rules 1-026 to -037 NMRA 1998 (discovery rules for civil actions in district court) with NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7(F) (1993) (WCA discovery procedure); 11 NMAC 4.”
Ortiz v. Overland Express, 237 P.3d 707 (N.M. 2010). · cites it 2× “See NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7 (1993) (governing procedures for filing claims disputes under the WCA).”
Griego v. Bag 'N Save Food Emporium, 784 P.2d 1030 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 4× “By statute the hearing officer is required to enter a compensation order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law after a formal hearing.”
Medina v. Berg Constr., Inc., 924 P.2d 1362 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “In support of his order, the WCJ cited Section 52-1-54(D) and NMSA1978, Section 52-5-7(F) (Cum.Supp.1995). On appeal, Employer argues that Section 52-5-7(F) was amended, effective June 18, 1993, and that this amended language applies to Worker’s case.”
Baca v. Bueno Foods, 766 P.2d 1332 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “Moon pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-7(F) (Cum.Supp.1986), which incorporates the provisions of NMSA 1978, Section 38-6-4 (Repl.”
Church's Fried Chicken No. 1040 v. Hanson, 845 P.2d 824 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 4× “NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7(F) (Cum.Supp. 1986); Soliz v.”
Levario v. Ysidro Villareal Labor Agency, 906 P.2d 266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “Specifically, Employer notes that a worker who is about to turn forty-five, fifty, fifty-five, or sixty would benefit enormously by having scheduled trials vacated until after the worker has a birthday, thereby gaining an additional modification point.”
Show all 26 citing cases →
— N.M. Stat. § 52-5-7(A) — 5 cases
Levario v. Ysidro Villareal Labor Agency, 906 P.2d 266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). “Specifically, Employer notes that a worker who is about to turn forty-five, fifty, fifty-five, or sixty would benefit enormously by having scheduled trials vacated until after the worker has a birthday, thereby gaining an additional modification point.”
Cantrell v. W & C Contracting Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 1251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “The words “cost and expense” as used in Section 52-5-7 have been interpreted to include the actual costs of taking a deposition, such as stenographer and reporter fees.”
Sanchez v. Bradbury & Stamm Constr., 781 P.2d 319 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, 2012 NMCA 15 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).
Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, 2012 NMCA 015 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
— N.M. Stat. § 52-5-7(B) — 12 cases
Trujillo v. Hilton of Santa Fe, 851 P.2d 1065 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). “NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7(B) (Repl.Pamp.1991). Worker contends that the use of the term “compensation order” in Section 52-5-7(B) and the term “final order” in Section 52-5-8(A) indicates that the legislature did not intend the compensation order to be a final order.”
Griego v. Bag 'N Save Food Emporium, 784 P.2d 1030 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989). “By statute the hearing officer is required to enter a compensation order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law after a formal hearing.”
Slygh v. Rmci, Inc., 901 P.2d 776 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
Baber v. Desert Sun Motors, 164 P.3d 1018 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).
Pennington v. Chino Mines, 789 P.2d 624 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
— N.M. Stat. § 52-5-7(C) — 2 cases
Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013 NMCA 103 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013). “{8} In asserting that the order was not effective until thirty days after it was mailed, Employer relies upon NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-7(C) (1993) of the Act. This statute provides: The decision of the workers’ compensation judge shall be final and conclusive as to all matters…”
Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co. (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
— N.M. Stat. § 52-5-7(F) — 7 cases
Cantrell v. W & C Contracting Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 1251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “The words “cost and expense” as used in Section 52-5-7 have been interpreted to include the actual costs of taking a deposition, such as stenographer and reporter fees.”
Murphy v. Duke City Pizza, Inc., 881 P.2d 706 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). “See NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7(F) (Repl.Pamp.1991). Worker relies on the last sentence of Section 52-5-7(F) to suggest that it is within the judge’s discretion to award an expert witness fee, even if the expert witness did not testify under subpoena.”
Padilla v. Intel Corp., 1998 NMCA 125 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). “Compare Rules 1-026 to -037 NMRA 1998 (discovery rules for civil actions in district court) with NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7(F) (1993) (WCA discovery procedure); 11 NMAC 4.”
Medina v. Berg Constr., Inc., 924 P.2d 1362 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996). “In support of his order, the WCJ cited Section 52-1-54(D) and NMSA1978, Section 52-5-7(F) (Cum.Supp.1995). On appeal, Employer argues that Section 52-5-7(F) was amended, effective June 18, 1993, and that this amended language applies to Worker’s case.”
Baca v. Bueno Foods, 766 P.2d 1332 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). “Moon pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-7(F) (Cum.Supp.1986), which incorporates the provisions of NMSA 1978, Section 38-6-4 (Repl.”
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