Within one year an action or proceeding -
(1) Repealed by Session Laws 1975, c. 252, s. 5.
(2) Upon a statute, for a penalty or forfeiture, where the action is given to the State alone, or in whole or in part to the party aggrieved, or to a common informer, except where the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.
(3) For libel and slander.
(4) Against a public officer, for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned on civil process.
(5) For the year's allowance of a surviving spouse or children.
(6) For a deficiency judgment on any debt, promissory note, bond or other evidence of indebtedness after the foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate securing such debt, promissory note, bond or other evidence of indebtedness, which period of limitation above prescribed commences with the date of the delivery of the deed pursuant to the foreclosure sale: Provided, however, that if an action on the debt, note, bond or other evidence of indebtedness secured would be earlier barred by the expiration of the remainder of any other period of limitation prescribed by this subchapter, that limitation shall govern.
(7) Repealed by Session Laws 1971, c. 939, s. 2.
(7a) For recovery of damages under Article 1A of Chapter 18B of the General Statutes.
(8) As provided in G.S. 105-377, to contest the validity of title to real property acquired in any tax foreclosure action or to reopen or set aside the judgment in any tax foreclosure action.
(9) As provided in Article 14 of Chapter 126 of the General Statutes, entitled "Protection for Reporting Improper Government Activities".
(10) Actions contesting the validity of any zoning or unified development ordinance or any provision thereof adopted under Chapter 160D of the General Statutes or other applicable law, other than an ordinance adopting or amending a zoning map. Such an action accrues when the party bringing such action first has standing to challenge the ordinance; provided that, a challenge to an ordinance on the basis of an alleged defect in the adoption process shall be brought within three years after the adoption of the ordinance.
(11) No suit, action, or proceeding under G.S. 14-190.5A(g) shall be brought or maintained against any person unless such suit, action, or proceeding is commenced within one year after the initial discovery of the disclosure, but in no event may the action be commenced more than seven years from the most recent disclosure of the private image.
(12) Repealed by Session Laws 2017-4, s. 1, effective March 30, 2017. (C.C.P., s. 35; Code, s. 156; 1885, c. 96; Rev., s. 397; C.S., s. 443; 1933, c. 529, s. 1; 1951, c. 837, s. 2; 1965, c. 9; 1969, c. 1001, s. 2; 1971, c. 12; c. 939, s. 2; 1975, c. 252, s. 5; 1977, c. 886, s. 3; 1983, c. 435, s. 38; 1989, c. 236, s. 4; 2001-175, s. 1; 2011-384, s. 1; 2015-250, s. 1.1; 2016-99, s. 2; 2017-4, s. 1; 2019-111, s. 2.5(a); 2020-3, s. 4.33(a); 2020-25, s. 51(a), (b), (d).)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
118
cases (
21 in the last 5 years), 1951–2026 · leading case:
Fowler v. Valencourt, 435 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 1993).
Fowler v. Valencourt, 435 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 1993).
· cites it 133× “§ 1-54, and the Court, in commenting on the applicability of the statute to acts not involving acts done to another by violence or force (such as in the present case, a false imprisonment), said this: True, in its more general sense, a trespass is sometimes said to include any…”
Alford v. Catalytica Pharm., Inc., 564 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 44× “The trial court: (1) granted plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, withdrawing the claims for assault, battery, and inherently dangerous activity; (2) granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Woodson claim as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in N.”
State v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 666 S.E.2d 107 (N.C. 2008).
· cites it 8× “Section 1-54(2) provides for a one-year statute of limitations when the right to collect a penalty authorized by statute “is given to the State alone.” N.C.G.S. § 1-54(2) (2007). Section 66-291(c) vests such a right with the State for failure to comply with the escrow mandate.”
State Ex Rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 646 S.E.2d 790 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 12× “However, we must first address the argument in Heflin’s brief that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54 (2) bars plaintiff from collecting penalties in connection with past due escrow payments from Heflin under a theory of piercing the corporate veil, because plaintiff’s amended complaint…”
Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 259 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 11× “This appeal presents the questions of whether the trial court’s action was proper in awarding summary judgment based upon defendant’s defenses of accord and satisfaction and the one-year statute of limitations set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54 (2). We now hold that with…”
Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. 1981).
· cites it 4× “G.S. 1-54(3). Thus this appeal raises two questions.”
In Re Twin Cnty. Motorsports, Inc., 766 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. 2014).
· cites it 12× “” N.C.G.S. § 1-54, -54(2) (1983). We determined that “apre *616 requisite for application of N.”
In re Hughes, 785 S.E.2d 111 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 6× “1 (2014) (providing for the docketing of judgments rendered in the trial division, whereas N.”
Iadanza v. Harper, 611 S.E.2d 217 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 4× “Under N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3) (2003), the statute of limitations for a claim of slander or libel is one year.”
North Carolina Sch. Boards Ass'n v. Moore, 585 S.E.2d 418 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 16× “Defendants contend that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54 (2) should apply instead, limiting plaintiff’s claims to payments collected within one year preceding the filing of the complaint.”
Ross v. Washington Mut. Bank, 566 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
· cites it 6× “Plaintiff filed suit on August 22, 2006, and WaMu argues that the one-year statute of limitations in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54 (3) bars this claim.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54(1) — 5 cases
Fowler v. Valencourt, 435 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 1993).
“§ 1-54, and the Court, in commenting on the applicability of the statute to acts not involving acts done to another by violence or force (such as in the present case, a false imprisonment), said this: True, in its more general sense, a trespass is sometimes said to include any…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54(10) — 2 cases
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54(2) — 17 cases
State v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 666 S.E.2d 107 (N.C. 2008).
“Section 1-54(2) provides for a one-year statute of limitations when the right to collect a penalty authorized by statute “is given to the State alone.” N.C.G.S. § 1-54(2) (2007). Section 66-291(c) vests such a right with the State for failure to comply with the escrow mandate.”
Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 259 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
“This appeal presents the questions of whether the trial court’s action was proper in awarding summary judgment based upon defendant’s defenses of accord and satisfaction and the one-year statute of limitations set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54 (2). We now hold that with…”
State Ex Rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 646 S.E.2d 790 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
“However, we must first address the argument in Heflin’s brief that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54 (2) bars plaintiff from collecting penalties in connection with past due escrow payments from Heflin under a theory of piercing the corporate veil, because plaintiff’s amended complaint…”
In re Hughes, 785 S.E.2d 111 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
“1 (2014) (providing for the docketing of judgments rendered in the trial division, whereas N.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54(3) — 37 cases
Fowler v. Valencourt, 435 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 1993).
“§ 1-54, and the Court, in commenting on the applicability of the statute to acts not involving acts done to another by violence or force (such as in the present case, a false imprisonment), said this: True, in its more general sense, a trespass is sometimes said to include any…”
Alford v. Catalytica Pharm., Inc., 564 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
“The trial court: (1) granted plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, withdrawing the claims for assault, battery, and inherently dangerous activity; (2) granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Woodson claim as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in N.”
Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. 1981).
“G.S. 1-54(3). Thus this appeal raises two questions.”
Iadanza v. Harper, 611 S.E.2d 217 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
“Under N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3) (2003), the statute of limitations for a claim of slander or libel is one year.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54(6) — 2 cases
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