NC General Statutes
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76 (2026)
Where subject of action situated
✓ current as of July 2026
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Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial in the cases provided by law:
(1) Recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest, and for injuries to real property.
(2) Partition of real property.
(3) Foreclosure of a mortgage of real property.
(4) Recovery of personal property when the recovery of the property itself is the sole or primary relief demanded. (C.C.P., s. 66; Code, s. 190; 1889, c. 219; Rev., s. 419; C.S., s. 463; 1951, c. 837, s. 4.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 47
cases, 1947–2020 · leading case: Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. & Reidsville Transaction Corp. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 541 S.E.2d 157 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. & Reidsville Transaction Corp. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 541 S.E.2d 157 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). “On 2 June 1999, Reidsville moved for removal of the Durham suit pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-76(4) (1999), contending that the suit seeks recovery of personal property and must be brought in the county in which the property is maintained.”
Snow v. Yates, 392 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). “§ 1-76 is inapplicable because the judgment to which he is entitled based on his complaint allegations operates in personam and therefore does not directly affect title to the land. We disagree. In case law parlance, when N.”
Fox Holdings, Inc. v. Wheatly Oil Co., 587 S.E.2d 429 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). “It is from this order that defendant appeals. Defendant’s sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred by denying its motion for change of venue pursuant to N.”
Centura Bank v. Miller, 532 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). “” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76 (1999). Such actions include those for “[r]ecovery of personal property when the recovery of the property itself is the sole or primary relief demanded.”
Stewart v. Se. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 543 S.E.2d 517 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). “N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 1-76 through 1-81 concern the proper venue for certain types of actions.”
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Pinkney, 369 N.C. 723 (N.C. 2017). “Procedurally, to pursue a claim for judicial foreclosure, the creditor files a complaint “in the county in which the subject [property] of the action, or some part thereof, is situated,” N.C.G.S. § 1-76 (2015), “praying that the real property be sold under judicial process and…”
Pierce v. Associated Rest & Nursing Care, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). “Defendant contends that the instant case directly involves a dispute over a leasehold interest and that pursuant to G.S. 1-76 proper venue is in the county where the property is located.”
Wellons Constr., Inc. v. Landsouth Props., LLC, 607 S.E.2d 695 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). “Defendants argue, however, that North Carolina General Statute section 1-76, and not the default section 1-82, applies to actions, such as the instant one, in which a plaintiff seeks the enforcement of a lien against real property. North Carolina General Statute section 1-76…”
Stephenson v. Bartlett, 595 S.E.2d 112 (N.C. 2004). “G.S. § 1-83(2) (2003). In light of the policies implied in these statutory provisions, we perceive no constitutional bar to the General Assembly’s setting venue for redistricting challenges in the county where the capital of North Carolina is located.”
Rose's Stores, Inc. v. Tarrytown Ctr., Inc., 154 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 1967). “Defendants made a motion for change of venue as a matter of right, by virtue of G.S. 1-76, before time for answering expired.”
Neil Realty Co., Inc. v. Med. Care, Inc., 431 S.E.2d 225 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). “Neil Realty filed a complaint in Lenoir County, North Carolina, its principal place of business, seeking a judgment declaring that the option “was extended by valid oral agreement, and that as a result of the extension, [Neil Realty] may exercise” the option.”
Klass v. Hayes, 225 S.E.2d 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976). “Defendants, contending that G.S. 1-76 applies, made their motion as a matter of right.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76(1) — 10 cases
Snow v. Yates, 392 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). “§ 1-76 is inapplicable because the judgment to which he is entitled based on his complaint allegations operates in personam and therefore does not directly affect title to the land. We disagree. In case law parlance, when N.”
Rose's Stores, Inc. v. Bradley Lumber Co., 411 S.E.2d 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
Wise v. Isenhour, 175 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970).
Roanoke Props. v. SPRUILL OIL CO., 429 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
Atkins v. Nash, 300 S.E.2d 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76(4) — 6 cases
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. & Reidsville Transaction Corp. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 541 S.E.2d 157 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). “On 2 June 1999, Reidsville moved for removal of the Durham suit pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-76(4) (1999), contending that the suit seeks recovery of personal property and must be brought in the county in which the property is maintained.”
Centura Bank v. Miller, 532 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). “” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76 (1999). Such actions include those for “[r]ecovery of personal property when the recovery of the property itself is the sole or primary relief demanded.”
Smith v. Mariner, 335 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
Klass v. Hayes, 225 S.E.2d 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976). “Defendants, contending that G.S. 1-76 applies, made their motion as a matter of right.”
M & J Leasing Corp. v. Habegger, 334 S.E.2d 804 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
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