(a) It shall be unlawful to operate knowingly, on any public highway or street in this State, any motor vehicle which is registered in the State of North Carolina and which shall have been manufactured or assembled on or after January 1, 1936, unless such motor vehicle be equipped with safety glass wherever glass is used in doors, windows, windshields, wings or partitions; or for a dealer to sell a motor vehicle manufactured or assembled on or after January 1, 1936, for operation upon the said highways or streets unless it be so equipped. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any motor vehicle if such motor vehicle shall have been registered previously in another state by the owner while the owner was a bona fide resident of said other state.
(b) The term "safety glass" as used in this Article shall be construed as meaning glass so treated or combined with other materials as to reduce, in comparison with ordinary sheet glass or plate glass, the likelihood of injury to persons by glass when the glass is cracked or broken.
(c) The Division of Motor Vehicles shall approve and maintain a list of the approved types of glass, conforming to the specifications and requirements for safety glass as set forth in this Article, and in accordance with standards recognized by the United States Bureau of Standards, and shall not issue a license for or relicense any motor vehicle subject to the provisions of this Article unless such motor vehicle be equipped as herein provided with such approved type of glass.
(d) Repealed by Session Laws 1985, c. 764, s. 26. (1937, c. 407, s. 98; 1941, c. 36; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1985, c. 764, s. 26; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 852, s. 17.)
§ 20-135.1: Repealed by Session Laws 1995 (Regular Session, 1996), c. 756, s. 30.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
12
cases, 1996–2019 · leading case:
State v. Hernandez, 612 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Hernandez, 612 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 4× “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2A(a) (2004). “Any driver or passenger who fails to wear a seat belt as required by this section shall have committed an infraction .”
Clontz v. St. Mark's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 578 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 12× “In her complaint, Clontz sets forth five specific grounds in support of her claims of negligence: (I) premises liability; (II) violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2B in the operation of a vehicle with children under twelve years of age in an open bed or cargo area; (III)…”
State v. Veazey, 662 S.E.2d 683 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “§ 20-129 (2007) (establishing requirements for headlights and rear lights); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2B(a) (2007) (children may not be transported in an open truck bed); N.”
State v. Brewington, 612 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 2× “Prior to stopping the vehicle, Deputy Howe observed the driver not wearing a seatbelt, a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2A(a) (2003). Although defendant had not been observed violating any laws at the time of the stop, it is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of…”
State v. McClendon, 502 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 2× “See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2A (a) (1993). Moreover, the Court concluded that “[t]he stop of the vehicle was therefore not inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment, even though a reasonable officer may not have made the stop.”
Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft v. Roth, 252 P.3d 649 (Nev. 2011).
“2A(d) and noting that, read literally, that statute would hold that, “if an irate passenger ripped off his seat belt, tore it from its moorings, and used it to strangle the driver, in the ensuing murder trial the prosecution would be forbidden to identify the murder weapon…”
State v. Jones, 825 S.E.2d 260 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 2× “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2A(a) (2017). Deputy Irvin's reasonable suspicion of Defendant's traffic violation permitted him to initiate the traffic stop.”
Chaney v. Young, 468 S.E.2d 837 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 2× “civil trial, action, or proceeding^]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2A(d), “nor shall a violation constitute negligence per se or contributory negligence per se[,] nor shall it be evidence of negligence or contributory negligence.”
State v. Castellon, 566 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 2× “See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2A(a) (2001). Luz Ibarra, a passenger in the vehicle, also was not wearing her seatbelt.”
State v. Dickenson (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 4× “2d at 100 ; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2A(e). -10- In the present case, the trial court made the following findings of fact: 1.”
State v. Cox, 800 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “" *321 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2A(d) (2015). Furthermore, a child restraint system violation "shall not be evidence of negligence or contributory negligence.”
State v. Louis, 682 S.E.2d 248 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× “See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-135 .2A (2007). This violation, coupled with the vehicle's driver's sudden turn into the service station, gave the officers probable cause to stop the car.”
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