N.C. Gen. Stat. » Chapter 42
NC General Statutes

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-40 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of July 2026
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For the purpose of this Article, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) "Action" includes recoupment, counterclaim, defense, setoff, and any other proceeding including an action for possession.

(2) "Premises" means a dwelling unit, including mobile homes or mobile home spaces, and the structure of which it is a part and facilities and appurtenances therein and grounds, areas, and facilities normally held out for the use of residential tenants.

(3) "Landlord" means any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by this Article.

(4) "Protected tenant" means a tenant or household member who is a victim of domestic violence under Chapter 50B of the General Statutes or sexual assault or stalking under Chapter 14 of the General Statutes. (1977, c. 770, s. 1; 1979, c. 880, ss. 1, 2; 1999-420, s. 2; 2005-423, s. 5.)

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1981–2022 · leading case: Shepard v. Bonita Vista Props., LP, 664 S.E.2d 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
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Shepard v. Bonita Vista Props., LP, 664 S.E.2d 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 12× “Plaintiffs argue that recreational vehicle lot spaces in a transient campground are analogous to "mobile home spaces.”
Baker v. Rushing, 409 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 6× “” N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1984). The Act expressly excludes from its application “transient occupancy in a hotel, motel, or similar lodging subject to regulation by the Commission for Health Services.”
Are-100/800/801 Capitola, LLC v. Triangle Labs., Inc., 550 S.E.2d 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 6× “§ 42-38 (1999); see also N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1999). Thus, Defendant, as a commercial tenant, is not protected by the Residential Rental Agreements Act.”
Surratt v. Newton, 393 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 4× “42-40(3) defines "landlord" as "any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by this Article." G.S. 42-42(a) provides that (a) The landlord shall: (1) Comply with…”
Conley v. Emerald Isle Realty, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 556 (N.C. 1999). · cites it 6× “" N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1994). The parties to the case at bar do not dispute that the rented beach cottage was not plaintiffs' primary residence.”
Lenz v. Ridgewood Assocs., 284 S.E.2d 702 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). “§ 42-40. Definitions. —For the purpose of this Article, the following definitions shall apply: *119 (2) “Premises” means a dwelling unit, including mobile homes or mobile home spaces, and the structure of which it is a part and facilities and appurtenances therein and grounds,…”
Allen v. Simmons, 394 S.E.2d 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). “” G.S. 42-40(3) defines “landlord” as “any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by this Article.”
Stanley v. Moore, 439 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 3× “2d 843 (1978), and that N.C.G.S. § 42-40(3) defines “landlord” as “any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by this Article.”
Campos-Brizuela v. Rocha Masonry, L.L.C., 716 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). “] § 42-40(3) (1984). This broad, statutory definition of landlord makes irrelevant in determining the liability of an agent the common law distinction between disclosed and undisclosed principals.”
Conley v. Emerald Isle Realty, Inc., 502 S.E.2d 688 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 6× “1997), applies only to a dwelling unit used as a tenant’s “primary residence,” N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1994). In this case, there is no dispute that the vacation home was not the plaintiffs’ primary residence.”
Taylor v. Batts, 689 S.E.2d 601 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 6× “" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-40 (3) (2005). The facts establish that plaintiff and defendant had entered into a "RESIDENTIAL RENTAL CONTRACT" for a home in Wilson, North Carolina; therefore, Article 5 controls.”
Page v. Corvias Grp., LLC (E.D.N.C. 2021). · cites it 3× “§ 42-40 (3). Defendants contend that only Bragg Communities and Corvias Management are landlords under the RRAA.”
Show all 13 citing cases →
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-40(2) — 5 cases
Shepard v. Bonita Vista Props., LP, 664 S.E.2d 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). “Plaintiffs argue that recreational vehicle lot spaces in a transient campground are analogous to "mobile home spaces.”
Are-100/800/801 Capitola, LLC v. Triangle Labs., Inc., 550 S.E.2d 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). “§ 42-38 (1999); see also N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1999). Thus, Defendant, as a commercial tenant, is not protected by the Residential Rental Agreements Act.”
Baker v. Rushing, 409 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). “” N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1984). The Act expressly excludes from its application “transient occupancy in a hotel, motel, or similar lodging subject to regulation by the Commission for Health Services.”
Conley v. Emerald Isle Realty, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 556 (N.C. 1999). “" N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1994). The parties to the case at bar do not dispute that the rented beach cottage was not plaintiffs' primary residence.”
Conley v. Emerald Isle Realty, Inc., 502 S.E.2d 688 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). “1997), applies only to a dwelling unit used as a tenant’s “primary residence,” N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1994). In this case, there is no dispute that the vacation home was not the plaintiffs’ primary residence.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-40(3) — 7 cases
Surratt v. Newton, 393 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). “42-40(3) defines "landlord" as "any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by this Article." G.S. 42-42(a) provides that (a) The landlord shall: (1) Comply with…”
Baker v. Rushing, 409 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). “” N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1984). The Act expressly excludes from its application “transient occupancy in a hotel, motel, or similar lodging subject to regulation by the Commission for Health Services.”
Allen v. Simmons, 394 S.E.2d 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). “” G.S. 42-40(3) defines “landlord” as “any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by this Article.”
Stanley v. Moore, 439 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). “2d 843 (1978), and that N.C.G.S. § 42-40(3) defines “landlord” as “any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by this Article.”
Campos-Brizuela v. Rocha Masonry, L.L.C., 716 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). “] § 42-40(3) (1984). This broad, statutory definition of landlord makes irrelevant in determining the liability of an agent the common law distinction between disclosed and undisclosed principals.”
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