(a) A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership.
(b) The incidents of this tenancy are such that:
(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this Act and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but he has no right to possess such property for any other purpose without the consent of his partners.
(2) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable except in connection with the assignment of rights of all the partners in the same property.
(3) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership. When partnership property is attached for a partnership debt the partners, or any of them, or the representatives of a deceased partner, cannot claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws.
(4) On the death of a partner his right in specific partnership property vests in the surviving partner or partners, except where the deceased was the last surviving partner, when his right in such property vests in his legal representative. Such surviving partner, or partners, or the legal representative of the last surviving partner, has no right to possess the partnership property for any but a partnership purpose.
(5) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, heirs, or next of kin. (1941, c. 374, s. 25; 2000-140, s. 101(n).)
Notes of Decisions
Magers v. Thomas (In Re Vannoy), 176 B.R. 758 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994).
· cites it 6× “, in the real property owned by the partnership? The starting point for answering this question is G.S. § 59-55 which describes the nature of a partner’s right in specific partnership property.”
Simmons v. Quick-Stop Food Mart, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 275 (N.C. 1982).
· cites it 4× “In a partnership governed by the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act, each partner has three property rights: “(1) His right in specific partnership property, (2) His interest in the partnership, and (3) His right to participate in the management [of the partnership].”…”
Ewing v. Caldwell, 89 S.E.2d 774 (N.C. 1955).
· cites it 3× “” G.S. 59-55 (1). Thus, a new kind of estate, “tenancy in partnership,” was created.”
Doby v. Lowder, 324 S.E.2d 26 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
“G.S. 59-55(b)(5). We conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that defendant appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Prentzas v. Prentzas, 131 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. 1963).
“Plaintiff, in support of his denial of acceptance, contends: When the recorded deed was delivered to him and he was then told by John that it was in full of his claim to partnership assets he stated that he would not so accept it but would insist on an accounting of all…”
In re Gregory, 487 B.R. 444 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2013).
“§ 135-95; disability benefits, Id. § 135-11; policies or proceeds of group life insurance, Id.”
Town of Midland v. Wayne, 748 S.E.2d 35 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 2× “In so holding, we stated that “each general partner has an ownership interest in partnership property along with the other partnersf,]” relying on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 59-55 (a) (1996). Id. at 367, 489 S.”
Smithfield Oil Co. v. Furlonge, 126 S.E.2d 167 (N.C. 1962).
“” G.S. 59-55 (2). Defendants’ fourth argument that they had no notice of the assignment of February 15, 1960 is also untenable.”
Harleysville Mut. Ins. v. Packer, 60 F.3d 1116 (4th Cir. 1995).
· cites it 2× “According to Appellants, implicit in this assertion is the fact that Swain owned the cargo van pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 59-55(a) (Michie 1989), which provides that partners are co-owners of specific partnership property, because he was a general partner of Sheppard Associates.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 59-55(2) — 1 case
Magers v. Thomas (In Re Vannoy), 176 B.R. 758 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994).
“, in the real property owned by the partnership? The starting point for answering this question is G.S. § 59-55 which describes the nature of a partner’s right in specific partnership property.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 59-55(a) — 2 cases
Harleysville Mut. Ins. v. Packer, 60 F.3d 1116 (4th Cir. 1995).
“According to Appellants, implicit in this assertion is the fact that Swain owned the cargo van pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 59-55(a) (Michie 1989), which provides that partners are co-owners of specific partnership property, because he was a general partner of Sheppard Associates.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 59-55(b)(5) — 1 case
Doby v. Lowder, 324 S.E.2d 26 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
“G.S. 59-55(b)(5). We conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that defendant appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
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