In addition to the general powers in this Article conferred, and without limitation thereof, a municipality which has established or may hereafter establish airports, restricted landing areas or other air navigation facilities, or which has acquired or set apart or may hereafter acquire or set apart real property for such purpose or purposes is hereby authorized:
(1) To vest authority for the construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, operation and regulation thereof in an officer, a board or body of such municipality by ordinance or resolution which shall prescribe the powers and duties of such officer, board or body. The expense of such construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, operation and regulation shall be a responsibility of the municipality.
(2) To adopt and amend all needful rules, regulations and ordinances for the management, government and use of any properties under its control whether within or without the territorial limits of the municipality; to appoint airport guards or police with full police powers; to fix by ordinance, penalties for the violation of said ordinances and enforce said penalties in the same manner in which penalties prescribed by other ordinances of the municipality are enforced. It may also adopt ordinances designed to safeguard the public upon or beyond the limits of private airports or landing strips within such municipality or its police jurisdiction against the perils and hazards of instrumentalities used in aerial navigation. Such ordinances shall be published as provided by general law or the charter of the municipality for the publication of similar ordinances. They must conform to and be consistent with the laws of this State and shall be kept in conformity, as nearly as may be, with the then current federal legislation governing aeronautics and the regulations duly promulgated thereunder and rules and standards issued from time to time pursuant thereto.
(3) To lease such airports or other air navigation facilities, or real property acquired or set apart for airport purposes, to private parties, to any municipal or State government or to the national government, or to any department of either thereof, for operation; to lease to private parties, to any municipal or State government or to the national government, or any department of either thereof, for operation or use consistent with the purpose of this Article, space, area, improvements, or equipment on such airports; to sell any part of such airports, other air navigation facilities or real property to any municipal government, or to the United States or to any department or instrumentality thereof, for aeronautical purposes or purposes incidental thereto, and to confer the privileges of concessions of supplying upon its airports goods, commodities, things, services and facilities; provided that in each case in so doing the public is not deprived of its rightful, equal, and uniform use thereof.
(4) To sell or lease any property, real or personal, acquired for airport purposes and belonging to the municipality, which, in the judgment of its governing body, may not be required for aeronautic purposes in accordance with the laws of this State or the provisions of the charter of the municipality governing the sale or leasing of similar municipally owned property.
(5) To determine the charge or rental for the use of any properties under its control and the charges for any services or accommodations and the terms and conditions under which such properties may be used, provided that in all cases the public is not deprived of its rightful, equal, and uniform use of such property. Charges shall be reasonable and uniform for the same class of service and established with due regard to the property and improvements used and the expense of operation to the municipality. The municipality shall have and may enforce liens as provided by law for liens and enforcement thereof, for repairs to or improvement or storage or care of any personal property, to enforce the payment of any such charges.
(6) To engage, on an airport, in commercial and industrial land development projects which relate to, develop, or further airborne commerce and cargo and passenger traffic, and, in connection with any project, to improve real estate on an airport and lease that improved real estate to public or private commercial and industrial enterprises, or contract with others to do so.
(7) To exercise all powers necessarily incidental to the exercise of the general and special powers herein created. (1945, c. 490, s. 6; 1991, c. 501, s. 1.)
Notes of Decisions
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
· cites it 44× “It charges that the alleged monopoly position Resort enjoyed as the alleged sole FBO at the Airport violated N.C.G.S. § 63-53 (presumably subsection (2) thereof) in that such a monopoly was in violation of the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.”
Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 1069 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1976).
· cites it 9× “Defendants have raised but not strenuously argued the question of whether or not plaintiffs exercise of its state statutory authority in setting landing fees is invalid as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of Article I, § 8, of the United States…”
City of Asheville v. State, 665 S.E.2d 103 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “755 of the Session Laws of 1959 authorizing the Authority to charge “reasonable and adequate” fees and rents, and the provision of G.S. § 63-53(5) stating that the charges for the use of its properties “shall be reasonable and uniform for the same class of service and…”
Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wash. 2d 862 (Wash. 2004).
“, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 63-53 (5) (2003) (requiring uniform public use of airport property and reasonable and uniform fees set with due regard to the property used and the expense of its operation); see also Alaska Stat.”
Branson v. Port of Seattle, 101 P.3d 67 (Wash. 2004).
“, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 63-53(5) (2003) (requiring uniform public use of airport property and reasonable and uniform fees set with due regard to the property used and the expense of its operation); see also Alaska Stat.”
Jackson v. Stancil, 116 S.E.2d 817 (N.C. 1960).
· cites it 3× “The bare statement of appellant hardly justifies the assumption that the lease was made pursuant to G.S. § 63-53, so as to impose upon defendant observance of the public rights and privileges provided for in that statute.”
Ashton v. City of Concord, North Carolina, 337 F. Supp. 2d 735 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
· cites it 6× “Specifically, Plaintiffs have alleged claims under section 63-53 of the General Statutes of North Carolina and violations of their constitutional rights to freedom of speech, freedom of petition, procedural and substantive due process, and equal protection of the laws.”
Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 52 S.E.2d 371 (N.C. 1949).
· cites it 2× “Calton acting as the servant or agent of the defendants at the time he killed the plaintiff’s intestate, or was he exercising police powers which G.S. 63-53 (b) provides may be exercised by airport guards? A municipal corporation cannot legally engage in any enterprise in its…”
Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 215 S.E.2d 552 (N.C. 1975).
· cites it 4× “755 of the Session Laws of 1959 authorizing the Authority to charge “reasonable and adequate” fees and rents, and the provision of G.S. 63-53 (5) stating that the charges for the use of its properties “shall be reasonable and uniform for the same class of service and established…”
Branson v. Port of Seattle, 115 Wash. App. 695 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
“090 (2002) (same); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 63-53 (2002) (same); N.”
Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth. v. Stewart, 179 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. 1971).
“” G.S. 63-53(3) provides that a municipality is authorized “to confer the privileges of concessions of supplying upon its airports goods, commodities, things, services and facilities; provided that in each case in so doing the public is not deprived of its rightful, equal and…”
Harrelson v. City of Fayetteville, 155 S.E.2d 749 (N.C. 1967).
“) G.S. 63-53 provides that, “(i)n addition to the general powers in this article conferred, and without limitation thereof,” a municipality is specifically authorized, as provided in subsection (3), inter alia, “to confer the privileges of concessions of supplying upon its…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 63-53(1) — 1 case
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
“It charges that the alleged monopoly position Resort enjoyed as the alleged sole FBO at the Airport violated N.C.G.S. § 63-53 (presumably subsection (2) thereof) in that such a monopoly was in violation of the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 63-53(2) — 1 case
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
“It charges that the alleged monopoly position Resort enjoyed as the alleged sole FBO at the Airport violated N.C.G.S. § 63-53 (presumably subsection (2) thereof) in that such a monopoly was in violation of the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 63-53(2)(3) — 1 case
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
“It charges that the alleged monopoly position Resort enjoyed as the alleged sole FBO at the Airport violated N.C.G.S. § 63-53 (presumably subsection (2) thereof) in that such a monopoly was in violation of the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 63-53(3) — 2 cases
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
“It charges that the alleged monopoly position Resort enjoyed as the alleged sole FBO at the Airport violated N.C.G.S. § 63-53 (presumably subsection (2) thereof) in that such a monopoly was in violation of the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.”
Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth. v. Stewart, 179 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. 1971).
“” G.S. 63-53(3) provides that a municipality is authorized “to confer the privileges of concessions of supplying upon its airports goods, commodities, things, services and facilities; provided that in each case in so doing the public is not deprived of its rightful, equal and…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 63-53(5) — 5 cases
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
“It charges that the alleged monopoly position Resort enjoyed as the alleged sole FBO at the Airport violated N.C.G.S. § 63-53 (presumably subsection (2) thereof) in that such a monopoly was in violation of the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.”
Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 1069 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1976).
“Defendants have raised but not strenuously argued the question of whether or not plaintiffs exercise of its state statutory authority in setting landing fees is invalid as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of Article I, § 8, of the United States…”
City of Asheville v. State, 665 S.E.2d 103 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
“755 of the Session Laws of 1959 authorizing the Authority to charge “reasonable and adequate” fees and rents, and the provision of G.S. § 63-53(5) stating that the charges for the use of its properties “shall be reasonable and uniform for the same class of service and…”
Branson v. Port of Seattle, 101 P.3d 67 (Wash. 2004).
“, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 63-53(5) (2003) (requiring uniform public use of airport property and reasonable and uniform fees set with due regard to the property used and the expense of its operation); see also Alaska Stat.”
Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 215 S.E.2d 552 (N.C. 1975).
“755 of the Session Laws of 1959 authorizing the Authority to charge “reasonable and adequate” fees and rents, and the provision of G.S. 63-53 (5) stating that the charges for the use of its properties “shall be reasonable and uniform for the same class of service and established…”
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