(A) As used in this section and sections 2919.191 to 2919.199 of the Revised Code:
(1) "Conception" means fertilization.
(2) "Contraceptive" means a drug, device, or chemical that prevents conception.
(3) "DNA" means deoxyribonucleic acid.
(4) "Fetal heartbeat" means cardiac activity or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart within the gestational sac.
(5) "Fetus" means the human offspring developing during pregnancy from the moment of conception and includes the embryonic stage of development.
(6) "Gestational age" means the age of an unborn human individual as calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period of a pregnant woman.
(7) "Gestational sac" means the structure that comprises the extraembryonic membranes that envelop the fetus and that is typically visible by ultrasound after the fourth week of pregnancy.
(8) "Intrauterine pregnancy" means a pregnancy in which the fetus is attached to the placenta within the uterus of the pregnant woman.
(9) "Medical emergency" has the same meaning as in section 2919.16 of the Revised Code.
(10) "Physician" has the same meaning as in section 2305.113 of the Revised Code.
(11) "Pregnancy" means the human female reproductive condition that begins with fertilization, when the woman is carrying the developing human offspring, and that is calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period of the woman.
(12) "Serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function" has the same meaning as in section 2919.16 of the Revised Code.
(13) "Spontaneous miscarriage" means the natural or accidental termination of a pregnancy and the expulsion of the fetus, typically caused by genetic defects in the fetus or physical abnormalities in the pregnant woman.
(14) "Standard medical practice" means the degree of skill, care, and diligence that a physician of the same medical specialty would employ in like circumstances. As applied to the method used to determine the presence of a fetal heartbeat for purposes of section 2919.192 of the Revised Code, "standard medical practice" includes employing the appropriate means of detection depending on the estimated gestational age of the fetus and the condition of the woman and her pregnancy.
(15) "Unborn human individual" means an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.
(B)(1) It is the intent of the general assembly that a court judgment or order suspending enforcement of any provision of this section or sections 2919.171 or 2919.191 to 2919.1913 of the Revised Code is not to be regarded as tantamount to repeal of that provision.
(2) Upon the issuance of any court order or judgment restoring, expanding, or clarifying the authority of states to prohibit or regulate abortion entirely or in part, or the effective date of an amendment to the United States Constitution restoring, expanding, or clarifying the authority of states to prohibit or regulate abortion entirely or in part, the attorney general may apply to the pertinent state or federal court for either or both of the following:
(a) A declaration that any one or more sections specified in division (B)(1) of this section are constitutional;
(b) A judgment or order lifting an injunction against the enforcement of any one or more sections specified in division (B)(1) of this section.
(3) If the attorney general fails to apply for the relief described in division (B)(2) of this section within the thirty-day period after an event described in that division occurs, any county prosecutor, with standing, may apply to the appropriate state or federal court for such relief.
(4) If any provision of this section or sections 2919.171 or 2919.191 to 2919.1913 of the Revised Code is held invalid, or if the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity of that provision does not affect any other provisions or applications of this section and sections 2919.171 and 2919.191 to 2919.1913 of the Revised Code that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this section and sections 2919.171 and 2919.191 to 2919.1913 of the Revised Code are severable as provided in section 1.50 of the Revised Code. In particular, it is the intent of the general assembly that any invalidity or potential invalidity of a provision of this section or sections 2919.171 or 2919.191 to 2919.1913 of the Revised Code is not to impair the immediate and continuing enforceability of the remaining provisions. It is furthermore the intent of the general assembly that the provisions of this section and sections 2919.171 or 2919.191 to 2919.1913 of the Revised Code are not to have the effect of repealing or limiting any other laws of this state, except as specified by this section and sections 2919.171 and 2919.191 to 2919.1913 of the Revised Code.
Last updated August 22, 2025 at 10:40 AM
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 26
cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1996–2026 · leading case: State v. Cupp, 124 N.E.3d 811 (Ohio 2018).
State v. Cupp, 124 N.E.3d 811 (Ohio 2018). · cites it 2ד" Although former R.C. 2919.19(B)(2)(g)(i) is unambiguous, there are other indicia in Ohio law supporting the lower court's interpretation.”
State v. Willis, 2012-Ohio-294. · cites it 3דR.C. 2919.19(B)(6). R.C. 2919.19(B)(6) “does not require a hearing and is devoid of any particular factors for the court to take into consideration in making its determination.”
State v. Miley, 684 N.E.2d 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1996). “R.C. 2919.19(A) is not, however, a strict liability offense; the culpable mental state required is that of recklessness.”
State v. Dillard, 2014-Ohio-4974. “R.C. 2919.19(E)(3) (“If the offender violates division (B)(2), (3), (4), or (6) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this division, endangering children is a felony of the third degree”) The remainder of the subsection provides various aggravating circumstances that…”
State v. Curtis, 2020-Ohio-4152, 157 N.E.3d 879. “{¶ 22} Curtis was charged with having violated R.C. 2919.19(B), which provides that “(1) No person shall abandon, or fail to provide support as established by a court order to, another person whom, by court order or decree, the person: (a) Is legally obligated to support * * *.”
State v. Bond, 2023-Ohio-3996. · cites it 2דTherefore, we sustained that assignment of error, reversed the judgment as to the sentence, and remanded the matter for the sole purpose of resentencing Bond to provide the proper R.C. 2919.19(B)(2)(c) notifications. We -4- affirmed the judgment of the trial court in all other…”
State v. Bond, 2023-Ohio-1226. “Conclusion {¶ 46} Bond’s third assignment of error being sustained, the judgment of the trial court is reversed as to the sentence, and the matter is remanded for the sole purpose of resentencing Bond in order to provide the proper R.C. 2919.19(B)(2)(c) notifications. The…”
State v. Triplett, 2011-Ohio-4628. “Because Triplett only received the notice at the “null” hearing in February, we must remand for a valid sentencing hearing at where he can receive this statutorily mandated notice.”
State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-3211. “Comer held when R.C. 2919.19(B), as it then existed, was read in conjunction with then existing R.”
State v. Fryer, 2015-Ohio-4573, 48 N.E.3d 962. “15-CA-00013 16 {¶35} We find that the trial court substantially complied with the notification requirements regarding post release controls under R.C. 2919.19 and R.C. 2967.28. See, State v.”
State v. Sears, 2023-Ohio-1925, 215 N.E.3d 1282. “is no exception permitting the trial court to consider information not specified in R.C. 2919.19(B) so long as it is “not intrinsically new” or is not a “surprise.”
State v. Moore, 2024-Ohio-5839. “Background of This Appeal {¶ 9} Under this assignment of error, Moore contends the trial court erred in sentencing him because it failed to discuss, recite, or otherwise comply with the mandatory requirements in R.C. 2919.19(B)(1)(b). In response, the State filed a brief…”
State v. Miley, 684 N.E.2d 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1996). “R.C. 2919.19(A) is not, however, a strict liability offense; the culpable mental state required is that of recklessness.”
State v. Curtis, 2020-Ohio-4152, 157 N.E.3d 879. “{¶ 22} Curtis was charged with having violated R.C. 2919.19(B), which provides that “(1) No person shall abandon, or fail to provide support as established by a court order to, another person whom, by court order or decree, the person: (a) Is legally obligated to support * * *.”
State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-3211. “Comer held when R.C. 2919.19(B), as it then existed, was read in conjunction with then existing R.”
State v. Sears, 2023-Ohio-1925, 215 N.E.3d 1282. “is no exception permitting the trial court to consider information not specified in R.C. 2919.19(B) so long as it is “not intrinsically new” or is not a “surprise.”
State v. Moore, 2024-Ohio-5839. “Background of This Appeal {¶ 9} Under this assignment of error, Moore contends the trial court erred in sentencing him because it failed to discuss, recite, or otherwise comply with the mandatory requirements in R.C. 2919.19(B)(1)(b). In response, the State filed a brief…”
State v. Bond, 2023-Ohio-3996. “Therefore, we sustained that assignment of error, reversed the judgment as to the sentence, and remanded the matter for the sole purpose of resentencing Bond to provide the proper R.C. 2919.19(B)(2)(c) notifications. We -4- affirmed the judgment of the trial court in all other…”
State v. Bond, 2023-Ohio-1226. “Conclusion {¶ 46} Bond’s third assignment of error being sustained, the judgment of the trial court is reversed as to the sentence, and the matter is remanded for the sole purpose of resentencing Bond in order to provide the proper R.C. 2919.19(B)(2)(c) notifications. The…”
State v. Cupp, 124 N.E.3d 811 (Ohio 2018). “" Although former R.C. 2919.19(B)(2)(g)(i) is unambiguous, there are other indicia in Ohio law supporting the lower court's interpretation.”
State v. Triplett, 2011-Ohio-4628. “Because Triplett only received the notice at the “null” hearing in February, we must remand for a valid sentencing hearing at where he can receive this statutorily mandated notice.”
State v. Willis, 2012-Ohio-294. “R.C. 2919.19(B)(6). R.C. 2919.19(B)(6) “does not require a hearing and is devoid of any particular factors for the court to take into consideration in making its determination.”
State v. Dillard, 2014-Ohio-4974. “R.C. 2919.19(E)(3) (“If the offender violates division (B)(2), (3), (4), or (6) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this division, endangering children is a felony of the third degree”) The remainder of the subsection provides various aggravating circumstances that…”
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