Courts have cited this section in 3,874 opinions since 1976, 1,336 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (B) (754 cases).
(A) Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider the factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of this section relating to the seriousness of the conduct, the factors provided in divisions (D) and (E) of this section relating to the likelihood of the offender's recidivism, the factors set forth in division (F) of this section pertaining to the offender's service in the armed forces of the United States, and the factors set forth in division (G) of this section relating to Alford pleas and, in addition, may consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.
(B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender's conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:
(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical or mental condition or age of the victim.
(2) The victim of the offense suffered serious physical, psychological, or economic harm, including serious physical harm the victim caused to the victim's self, as a result of the offense.
(3) The victim died by suicide as a result of the offense.
(4) The offender held a public office or position of trust in the community, and the offense related to that office or position.
(5) The offender's occupation, elected office, or profession obliged the offender to prevent the offense or bring others committing it to justice.
(6) The offender's professional reputation or occupation, elected office, or profession was used to facilitate the offense or is likely to influence the future conduct of others.
(7) The offender's relationship with the victim facilitated the offense.
(8) The offender committed the offense for hire or as a part of an organized criminal activity.
(9) In committing the offense, the offender was motivated by prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.
(10) If the offense is a violation of section 2919.25 or a violation of section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code involving a person who was a family or household member at the time of the violation, the offender committed the offense in the vicinity of one or more children who are not victims of the offense, and the offender or the victim of the offense is a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of one or more of those children.
(C) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender's conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:
(1) The victim induced or facilitated the offense.
(2) In committing the offense, the offender acted under strong provocation.
(3) In committing the offense, the offender did not cause or expect to cause physical harm to any person or property.
(4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.
(D) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating that the offender is likely to commit future crimes:
(1) At the time of committing the offense, the offender was under release from confinement before trial or sentencing; was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code; was under post-release control pursuant to section 2967.28 or any other provision of the Revised Code for an earlier offense or had been unfavorably terminated from post-release control for a prior offense pursuant to division (B) of section 2967.16 or section 2929.141 of the Revised Code; was under transitional control in connection with a prior offense; or had absconded from the offender's approved community placement resulting in the offender's removal from the transitional control program under section 2967.26 of the Revised Code.
(2) The offender previously was adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code, or the offender has a history of criminal convictions.
(3) The offender has not been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree after previously being adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code, or the offender has not responded favorably to sanctions previously imposed for criminal convictions.
(4) The offender has demonstrated a pattern of drug or alcohol abuse that is related to the offense, and the offender refuses to acknowledge that the offender has demonstrated that pattern, or the offender refuses treatment for the drug or alcohol abuse.
(5) The offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense.
(E) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating that the offender is not likely to commit future crimes:
(1) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been adjudicated a delinquent child.
(2) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense.
(3) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had led a law-abiding life for a significant number of years.
(4) The offense was committed under circumstances not likely to recur.
(5) Except as provided in division (G) of this section, the offender shows genuine remorse for the offense.
(F) The sentencing court shall consider the offender's military service record and whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or physical condition that is traceable to the offender's service in the armed forces of the United States and that was a contributing factor in the offender's commission of the offense or offenses.
(G) If the offender enters an Alford plea, the sentencing court shall not consider whether the offender showed genuine remorse for the offense.
The Legislative Service Commission presents the text of this section as a composite of the section as amended by multiple acts of the General Assembly. This presentation recognizes the principle stated in R.C. 1.52(B) that amendments are to be harmonized if reasonably capable of simultaneous operation.
Last updated February 19, 2025 at 7:09 AM
The 20 cases that cite Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.12 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment.RelevanceNewestTreatment
“” {¶27} The trial court also stated that it reviewed the presentence report, the victim impact statements, and the comments from those who addressed the court and that it considered the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. {¶28} As to the seriousness…”
Later courts cite it for
“that apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim.” · 2 citing courts
“Anthony’s behalf, and the trial court engaged him in a lengthy discussion regarding the applicability of several of the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. {¶47} The state presented statements from Officer Mazany’s wife, his brother, and his son.”
cites § 2929.12 15×subsections: (A) 3× (B)(1)(C)(1)(D)cited by 3,570 cases
Where it cites § 2929.12
“39 {¶ 37} The second general statute, R.C. 2929.12, grants the sentencing judge discretion “to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.”
The case’s holding
The Sixth Amendment prohibits judges from making factual findings that increase a sentence beyond the maximum authorized by a jury verdict or a defendant's admission.
Later courts cite it for
“trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.” · 152 citing courts
“While Bryant agrees that trial courts are permitted to consider a defendant’s showing of “genuine remorse” or lack thereof pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 (D)(5) and (E)(5), respectively, he argues that his outburst may not reasonably be construed as evincing a lack of remorse.”
The case’s holding
A defendant's disruptive or disrespectful courtroom behavior does not constitute a lawful basis for increasing a sentence under statutory sentencing factors.
Later courts cite it for
“when a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by r.c. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law,” · 15 citing courts
cites § 2929.12 19×subsections: (A) 4× (B)(D)(F)cited by 152 cases
Where it cites § 2929.12
“In her first argument, Gwynne asserted that the trial court’s seriousness and recidivism findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 were not supported by the record and that her sentence did not comport with the purposes and principles of felony sentencing pursuant to R.”
Holding on this section
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is the exclusive statutory means for appellate review of consecutive sentences because R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 apply only to individual sentences.
Later courts cite it for
“because r.c. 2953.08(g)(2)(a) specifically mentions a sentencing judge's findings made under r.c. 2929.14(c)(4) as falling within a court of appeals' review, the general assembly plainly intended r.c. 2953.08(g)(2)(a) to be the exclusive means of appellate review of consecutive sentences.” · 6 citing courts
“Appellant appealed to this court as a matter of right. {¶ 7} This court reversed, holding the trial court had failed to make the "very specific set of findings" required by R.”
Later courts cite it for
“an order revoking community control and imposing a sentence is a final, appealable order because the order is a made in a special proceeding and affects a substantial right” · 3 citing courts
“Turning to the Bible during her deliberations merely assisted the judge in weighing a seriousness factor required for the court’s consideration under R.C. 2929.12, and the Code does not prohibit the trial judge from describing the nature of her deliberations on the record.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing judge need not use specific language or make specific findings on the record to demonstrate consideration of statutory seriousness and recidivism factors.
Later courts cite it for
“use specific language or make specific findings on the record in order to evince the requisite consideration of the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.” · 105 citing courts
cites § 2929.12 7×subsections: (A)(B)cited by 843 cases
Where it cites § 2929.12
“11 and the findings under R.C. 2929.12” and if, “after reviewing those findings, [the appellate court] find[s] that the sentence is contrary to law or not supported by the record, [it] may take action.”
Holding on this section
An appellate court may not independently weigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the trial court to modify or vacate a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 or R.C. 2929.12.
Later courts cite it for
“nothing in r.c. 2953.08(g)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with r.c. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” · 100 citing courts
“{¶ 7} We reversed, holding that the trial court had failed to make the "very specific set of findings" required by R.C. 2929.”
Later courts cite it for
“the r.c. 2953.08(g)(2) standard of review does not allow an appellate court to reverse a sentence modification if it is contrary to law.” · 1 citing court
cites § 2929.12 14×subsections: (C) 4×cited by 82 cases
Where it cites § 2929.12
“The Seventh District also concluded, “Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12, a trial court is not required to consider the age of a defendant when issuing a felony sentence.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a life sentence even if the sentence includes parole eligibility.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a life sentence under r.c. 2929.03, even if that sentence includes eligibility for parole.” · 3 citing courts
“Under that statute, the appellate court cannot modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.”
The case’s holding
A defendant's right to remain silent extends through sentencing because criminal liability continues until the sentence is imposed.
Later courts cite it for
“under that provision, the appellate court cannot modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under r.c. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” · 4 citing courts
“11, as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. §2929.12. The court then sentenced the Appellant to nine months each on Counts 1 and 2 and ordered them to run consecutively.”
The case’s holding
A trial court may impose consecutive sentences if it makes the findings required by statute at the hearing and in its entry, without stating reasons.
“First, Arnett argued that the judge’s religious beliefs were neither a mandatory nor a relevant factor for consideration under R.C. 2929.12. Arnett also claimed that the sentencing judge’s religious references violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as…”
The case’s holding
A sentencing judge's reference to a religious text does not violate due process if it does not impair the proceeding's fundamental fairness.
“After considering the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, if the court finds that a prison term is consistent with the principles and purposes of felony sentencing and that an offender is not amenable to community control, then the court shall impose a…”
The case’s holding
A private individual holds a position of trust only if they occupy a special relationship of trust and confidence equivalent to a fiduciary relationship.
Later courts cite it for
“ilc is a statutory creation that allows a trial court to stay a criminal proceeding and order an offender to a period of rehabilitation if the court has reason to believe that drug or alcohol usage was a factor leading to the offense.” · 8 citing courts
“11 and failed to balance the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, and instead only considered how "bad" his conduct was.”
The case’s holding
A trial court determines the weight afforded to any statutory factors, mitigating grounds, or other relevant circumstances when imposing a sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“the trial court that, in imposing a sentence, determines the weight afforded to any particular statutory factors, mitigating grounds, or other relevant circumstances.” · 18 citing courts
“11, and * * * the seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.12.” And we have held that even absent such a statement, we presume that the court properly considered the factors.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court abuses its discretion when it imposes maximum consecutive sentences that are unsupported by the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors.
Later courts cite it for
“generally, abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.” · 9 citing courts
cites § 2929.12 10×subsections: (B) 3× (B)(2)(D)(E)cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 2929.12
“11 and had balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.”
The case’s holding
An appellate court may not reverse consecutive sentences unless it clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the trial court's statutory findings.
Later courts cite it for
“where a trial court properly makes the findings mandated by r.c. 2929.14(c)(4), an appellate court may not reverse the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences unless it first clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the trial court's findings.” · 18 citing courts
“11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the defendant within the permissible statutory range.”
The case’s holding
A sentence is not contrary to law if the trial court considers statutory principles and factors, imposes mandatory postrelease control, and sentences within the permissible statutory range.
Later courts cite it for
“the fact that the trial court did not expressly cite to r.c. 2929.11 and 2929.12 during the sentencing hearing is immaterial, considering it specifically cited to both statutes within its sentencing entry.” · 6 citing courts
cites § 2929.12 10×subsections: (A)(B)(D)cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 2929.12
“The defendant argued, based on Miller, Graham and Roper, that the trial court erred in failing to consider his “relative youth” as a relevant factor under R.C. 2929.12 and that his youth should have been considered during sentencing because “he lacked * * * maturity and had an…”
The case’s holding
An attorney's mere inaccurate prediction of a defendant's sentence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Later courts cite it for
“an attorney's mere inaccurate prediction of a defendant's sentence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” · 2 citing courts
““‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting State v.”
The case’s holding
An appellate court reverses a sentence only if clear and convincing evidence shows the record does not support the trial court's findings or the sentence is contrary to law.
Later courts cite it for
“r.c. 2929.14(c)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on the record before imposing consecutive sentences.” · 7 citing courts
The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.
Citing cases by year
197620012026
One bar per year. Tallest: 328 cases in 2019. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation. 1 undated case is not charted.
State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio 2006).“39 {¶ 37} The second general statute, R.C. 2929.12, grants the sentencing judge discretion “to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.”
State v. Gwynne, 2019-Ohio-4761, 141 N.E.3d 169.“In her first argument, Gwynne asserted that the trial court’s seriousness and recidivism findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 were not supported by the record and that her sentence did not comport with the purposes and principles of felony sentencing pursuant to R.”
State v. Arnett, 724 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 2000).“Turning to the Bible during her deliberations merely assisted the judge in weighing a seriousness factor required for the court’s consideration under R.C. 2929.12, and the Code does not prohibit the trial judge from describing the nature of her deliberations on the record.”
State v. Russell, 2020-Ohio-3243.“” {¶27} The trial court also stated that it reviewed the presentence report, the victim impact statements, and the comments from those who addressed the court and that it considered the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. {¶28} As to the seriousness…”
State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St. 3d 208 (2000).“First, Arnett argued that the judge’s religious beliefs were neither a mandatory nor a relevant factor for consideration under R.C. 2929.12. Arnett also claimed that the sentencing judge’s religious references violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as…”
State v. Anthony, 2019-Ohio-5410, 151 N.E.3d 13.“Anthony’s behalf, and the trial court engaged him in a lengthy discussion regarding the applicability of several of the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. {¶47} The state presented statements from Officer Mazany’s wife, his brother, and his son.”
State v. Withrow, 2016-Ohio-2884, 64 N.E.3d 553.“11 and had balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.”
State v. Nichter, 2019-Ohio-279, 129 N.E.3d 984.“Appellant appealed to this court as a matter of right. {¶ 7} This court reversed, holding the trial court had failed to make the "very specific set of findings" required by R.”
State v. Massien, 2010-Ohio-1864, 926 N.E.2d 1282.“After considering the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, if the court finds that a prison term is consistent with the principles and purposes of felony sentencing and that an offender is not amenable to community control, then the court shall impose a…”
State v. Nienberg, 2017-Ohio-2920.““‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting State v.”
State v. Nichols, 2011-Ohio-4671, 959 N.E.2d 1082.“11, and * * * the seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.12.” And we have held that even absent such a statement, we presume that the court properly considered the factors.”
State v. Nichter, 2016-Ohio-7268, 63 N.E.3d 1219.“{¶ 7} We reversed, holding that the trial court had failed to make the "very specific set of findings" required by R.C. 2929.”
State v. Patrick, 2020-Ohio-6803, 172 N.E.3d 952.“The Seventh District also concluded, “Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12, a trial court is not required to consider the age of a defendant when issuing a felony sentence.”
State v. Roberts, 2020-Ohio-6722.“11, as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. §2929.12. The court then sentenced the Appellant to nine months each on Counts 1 and 2 and ordered them to run consecutively.”
State v. Hummer, 668 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1995).
(D)392 cases
State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68.“While Bryant agrees that trial courts are permitted to consider a defendant’s showing of “genuine remorse” or lack thereof pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 (D)(5) and (E)(5), respectively, he argues that his outburst may not reasonably be construed as evincing a lack of remorse.”
State v. Brunson, 2022-Ohio-4299, 218 N.E.3d 765.“Under that statute, the appellate court cannot modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.”
Sections that the same cases cite. The first number is counted among the 100 cases that cite § 2929.12 most heavily: how many of them are also among the other section’s own 20 leading cases.