No continuance at any stage of the proceeding, including that for determination of a motion, shall extend for more than ten days unless both the state and the accused consent thereto. Any continuance or delay in ruling contrary to the provisions of this section shall, unless procured by defendant or his counsel, be grounds for discharge of the defendant forthwith.
State ex rel. Haynes v. Powers, 254 N.E.2d 19 (Ohio 1969). · cites it 8ד” This latter language necessarily brings into consideration the provisions of Section 2937.21, Eevised Code, which states: “No continuance at any stage of the proceeding, including that for determination of a motion, shall extend for more than ten days unless both the state and…”
State v. Martin, 384 N.E.2d 239 (Ohio 1978). · cites it 2ד’ Thus, since the present proceeding was begun in the Court of Common Pleas, Section 2937.21 is not applicable thereto.”
City of Columbus v. Nappi, 214 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1966). · cites it 8דWe conclude that no constitutional question raised by the defendant was improperly decided at the trial level. The validity or invalidity of the reversal of the conviction by the Court of Appeals turns upon the interpretation of the quoted Section 2937.”
Sopko v. Maxwell, 209 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1965). · cites it 4דHe bases this on the fact that the attorney waived the preliminary hearing, failed to determine that the affidavit was fraudulent and failed to move for discharge under the provisions of Section 2937.21, Revised Code. These arguments are without merit.”
State v. Hudson, 2013 Ohio 5529 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 3ד{¶21} The statute cited by Appellant, R.C. 2937.21, reads: “No continuance at any stage of the proceeding, including that for determination of a motion, shall extend for more than ten days unless both the state and the accused consent thereto.”
State v. Powell, 2011 Ohio 4112 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 6דAppellant relies on R.C. 2937.21, which provides: {¶19} “No continuance at any stage of the proceeding, including that for determination of a motion, shall extend for more than ten days unless both the state and the accused consent thereto.”
State v. Freed, 2020 Ohio 655 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 5ד{¶ 4} On February 6, 2019, appellant filed an objection pursuant to R.C. 2937.21, objecting to the trial court's continuance and the delay in ruling on his motion to dismiss.”
City of East Cleveland v. Gilbert, 263 N.E.2d 400 (Ohio 1970). · cites it 2דThe Court of Appeals, in its journal entry, said; *66 “ [The] trial court prejudicially erred to detriment of substantial rights of defendant by failing to follow Section 2937.21, R. C., in granting a continuance of more than ten days without the consent of the defendant.”
Cleveland (City) v. Loviness, 125 N.E.2d 890 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955). “(§§2937.21 to 2937.45 R. C. inclusive), the procedure in the common pleas court relative to bail and recognizance in criminal cases, qualification of sureties, forfeiture, etc.”
State ex rel. O'Leary v. Cuyahoga Falls Mun. Court, 176 Ohio St. (N.S.) 197 (Ohio 1964). · cites it 6ד20, Revised Code, relating to affidavits of bias and prejudice in relation to Municipal Court judges has *198 constituted a violation of Section 2937.21, Revised Code, relating to continuances, and that relator, therefore, is entitled to be released.”
State v. Fowler, 174 Ohio St. (N.S.) 362 (Ohio 1963). · cites it 4דThe first question raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for discharge filed under the provisions of Section 2937.21, Revised Code. This section was enacted as a part of Amended Substitute Senate Bill No.”
Maloney v. Court of Common Pleas, 173 Ohio St. (N.S.) 226 (Ohio 1962). · cites it 2דSection 2937.21, Revised Code, relied on by appellant, is not applicable after the trial, judgment and sentence.”
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