In any case in which a sexually violent predator specification is included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging a violent sex offense or a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense and in which the defendant is tried by a jury, the defendant may elect to have the court instead of the jury determine the sexually violent predator specification.
If the defendant does not elect to have the court determine the sexually violent predator specification, the defendant shall be tried before the jury on the charge of the offense and, if the offense is a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense, on the sexual motivation specification that is included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense. Following a verdict of guilty on the charge of the offense and, if the offense is a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense, on the related sexual motivation specification, the defendant shall be tried before the jury on the sexually violent predator specification.
If the defendant elects to have the court determine the sexually violent predator specification, the defendant shall be tried before the jury on the charge of the offense and, if the offense is a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense, on the sexual motivation specification that is included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense. Following a verdict of guilty on the charge of the offense and, if the offense if a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense, on the related sexual motivation specification, the court shall conduct a proceeding at which it shall determine the sexually violent predator specification.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16
cases (5 in the last 5 years), 2001–2026 · leading case: State v. Pyle, 2018-Ohio-3160.
State v. Pyle, 2018-Ohio-3160. · cites it 3דFollowing the jury trial where the jury found Pyle guilty of rape and gross sexual imposition, the trial court conducted the proceeding to determine the specification.”
State v. Jones, 93 Ohio St. 3d 391 (2001). “R.C. 2971.02. Because a defendant must be convicted of a sexually violent offense before he or she can be found guilty of a sexually violent predator specification, R.”
State v. Kelley, 2024-Ohio-157, 233 N.E.3d 1219. · cites it 2ד” R.C. 2971.02(H)(2)(c) and (f). Further, this court has held that “‘R.”
State v. Smith, 104 Ohio St. 3d 106 (2004). “See R.C. 2971.02. Thus, the state argues, “at the time the finder of fact considers the specification, the first element will already have occurred” and accordingly, the underlying conviction can be used to prove the specification alleged in the indictment because the conviction…”
State v. Cartwright, 2013-Ohio-2156. · cites it 2ד80615, 2002-Ohio-4423 , ¶ 54 (finding that, while none of the specific factors listed under R.C. 2971.02(H)(2)(a)-(e) pertained to Williams, the catch-all provision in R.”
State v. Maranger, 2018-Ohio-1425, 110 N.E.3d 895. “1 R.C. 2971.02 states that "[i]n any case in which a sexually violent predator specification is included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging a violent sex offense or a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense and in which the defendant…”
State v. Horn, 2018-Ohio-779, 108 N.E.3d 158. “{¶ 44} A "sexually violent predator" is defined as "a person who, on or after January 1, 1997, commits a sexually violent offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually violent offenses.”
State v. Wasilewski, 2020-Ohio-5141. “02(A)(1)(b) and (B) and R.C. 2971.02(B)(1) (count 1), one count of gross 2 sexual imposition, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.”
State v. Richmond, 2011-Ohio-6450. “” However, R.C. 2971.02(A) states that, “In any case in which a sexually violent predator specification is included in the indictment * * * charging a violent sex offense * * * and in which the defendant is tried by a jury, the defendant may elect to have the court instead of…”
State v. Wooten, 2014-Ohio-3980. · cites it 3דSee R.C. 2971.02. See also State v. Harrod, 1st Dist.”
State v. Turpin, 2017-Ohio-4200. “See R.C. 2971.02. Therefore, we begin with Turpin’s argument that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-3108. “Johnson argues the trial court erred in finding him to be a sexually violent predator because he only had one prior conviction for a sexual offense pursuant to R.C. 2971.02(H)(2)(a). He further argues the evidence did not support the statutory factors that he would likely…”
State v. Richmond, 2011-Ohio-6450. “” However, R.C. 2971.02(A) states that, “In any case in which a sexually violent predator specification is included in the indictment * * * charging a violent sex offense * * * and in which the defendant is tried by a jury, the defendant may elect to have the court instead of…”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2971.02(B)(1): 1 case
State v. Wasilewski, 2020-Ohio-5141. “02(A)(1)(b) and (B) and R.C. 2971.02(B)(1) (count 1), one count of gross 2 sexual imposition, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2971.02(H)(2): 2 cases
State v. Pyle, 2018-Ohio-3160. “Following the jury trial where the jury found Pyle guilty of rape and gross sexual imposition, the trial court conducted the proceeding to determine the specification.”
State v. Pyle, 2018-Ohio-3160. “Following the jury trial where the jury found Pyle guilty of rape and gross sexual imposition, the trial court conducted the proceeding to determine the specification.”
State v. Cartwright, 2013-Ohio-2156. “80615, 2002-Ohio-4423 , ¶ 54 (finding that, while none of the specific factors listed under R.C. 2971.02(H)(2)(a)-(e) pertained to Williams, the catch-all provision in R.”
State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-3108. “Johnson argues the trial court erred in finding him to be a sexually violent predator because he only had one prior conviction for a sexual offense pursuant to R.C. 2971.02(H)(2)(a). He further argues the evidence did not support the statutory factors that he would likely…”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2971.02(H)(2)(c): 1 case
State v. Kelley, 2024-Ohio-157, 233 N.E.3d 1219. “” R.C. 2971.02(H)(2)(c) and (f). Further, this court has held that “‘R.”
State v. Cartwright, 2013-Ohio-2156. “80615, 2002-Ohio-4423 , ¶ 54 (finding that, while none of the specific factors listed under R.C. 2971.02(H)(2)(a)-(e) pertained to Williams, the catch-all provision in R.”
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