(A) Sections 3903.01 to 3903.59 of the Revised Code may be cited as "the insurers supervision, rehabilitation, and liquidation act."
(B) Sections 3903.01 to 3903.59 of the Revised Code do not limit the powers granted the superintendent of insurance under any other section of the Revised Code.
(C) Sections 3903.01 to 3903.59 of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed to effect the purpose stated in division (D) of this section.
(D) The purpose of sections 3903.01 to 3903.59 of the Revised Code is the protection of the interests of insureds, claimants, creditors, and the public generally, with minimum interference with the normal prerogatives of the owners and managers of insurers, through all of the following:
(1) Early detection of any potentially dangerous condition in an insurer, and prompt application of appropriate corrective measures;
(2) Improved methods for rehabilitating insurers, involving the cooperation and management expertise of the insurance industry;
(3) Enhanced efficiency and economy of liquidation, through clarification of the law, to minimize legal uncertainty and litigation;
(4) Equitable apportionment of any unavoidable loss;
(5) Lessening the problems of interstate rehabilitation and liquidation by facilitating cooperation between states in the liquidation process, and by extending the scope of personal jurisdiction over debtors of the insurer outside this state;
(6) Regulation of the insurance business by the impact of the law relating to delinquency procedures and substantive rules on the entire insurance business.
Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 2010 Ohio 4505 (Ohio 2010). · cites it 6דSee R.C. 3903.02(C) and (D). When the superintendent of insurance believes that an insurer has become insolvent, R.”
Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 2011 Ohio 5262 (Ohio 2011). · cites it 8ד09 confers on the superintendent power to identify and supervise a potentially troubled insurer by requiring it to get her permission before engaging in certain business transactions, such as disposing of assets or investing funds.”
Benjamin v. Pipoly, 800 N.E.2d 50 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4דAbsent express statutory authorization for private arbitration to proceed without assent to arbitrate by the liquidator, we hold that the public policy expressed throughout R.”
Boedeker v. Rogers, 746 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 3ד59 of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed to effect the purpose” of protecting “the interests of insureds, claimants, creditors, and the public generally, with minimum interference with the normal prerogatives of the owners and managers of insurers * * R.”
Fabe v. Prompt Fin., Inc., 631 N.E.2d 614 (Ohio 1994). · cites it 3ד’ ” R.C. 3903.02(A). If the Superintendent has reasonable *273 cause to believe that the continuance of an insurer’s business could be hazardous “to the public or to the holders of its policies or certificates of insurance,” the Superintendent may order that the insurer be…”
Covington v. Lucia, 784 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). “R.C. 3903.02(D) provides: {¶ 27} “The purpose of sections 3903.”
State ex rel. Watkins v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals, 696 N.E.2d 1079 (Ohio 1998). “R.C. 3903.02(D). . Under this holding, relators’ alternative contention that Cleveland Clinic has not sufficiently established the existence of a contract -with PIE and relators’ motion to strike Cleveland Clinic’s briefs in opposition are moot.”
Markowitz v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., 759 N.E.2d 838 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2דAppellee argued that appellant could not show that a *159 special duty was created for him by R.C. 3903.02(D) and that under the special-duty exception to the public duty doctrine, “there is no evidence that [appellee] during supervision assumed any affirmative duty on behalf of…”
Anderson v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., 569 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio 1991). “As R.C. 3903.02(D) states: “The purpose of sections 3903.”
State v. Ramos, 534 N.E.2d 885 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2ד” But the law authorizes the liquidator to institute the action not for the agents (whose actions often are responsible for the company’s financial plight), but for “the protection of the interests of insureds, claimants, creditors, and the public generally * * R.C. 3903.02 (D).…”
Hudson v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 937 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). “{¶ 19} Additionally, we stated that “[t]he structure of Ohio’s system serves the state’s strong interest in centralizing claims and defenses raised against an insolvent insurer into a single forum.”
Fabe v. Prompt Fin., Inc., 631 N.E.2d 614 (Ohio 1994). “’ ” R.C. 3903.02(A). If the Superintendent has reasonable *273 cause to believe that the continuance of an insurer’s business could be hazardous “to the public or to the holders of its policies or certificates of insurance,” the Superintendent may order that the insurer be…”
Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 2011 Ohio 5262 (Ohio 2011). “09 confers on the superintendent power to identify and supervise a potentially troubled insurer by requiring it to get her permission before engaging in certain business transactions, such as disposing of assets or investing funds.”
Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 2010 Ohio 4505 (Ohio 2010). “See R.C. 3903.02(C) and (D). When the superintendent of insurance believes that an insurer has become insolvent, R.”
Benjamin v. Pipoly, 800 N.E.2d 50 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). “Absent express statutory authorization for private arbitration to proceed without assent to arbitrate by the liquidator, we hold that the public policy expressed throughout R.”
Boedeker v. Rogers, 746 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). “59 of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed to effect the purpose” of protecting “the interests of insureds, claimants, creditors, and the public generally, with minimum interference with the normal prerogatives of the owners and managers of insurers * * R.”
Fabe v. Prompt Fin., Inc., 631 N.E.2d 614 (Ohio 1994). “’ ” R.C. 3903.02(A). If the Superintendent has reasonable *273 cause to believe that the continuance of an insurer’s business could be hazardous “to the public or to the holders of its policies or certificates of insurance,” the Superintendent may order that the insurer be…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 3903.02(D) — 16 cases
Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 2010 Ohio 4505 (Ohio 2010). “See R.C. 3903.02(C) and (D). When the superintendent of insurance believes that an insurer has become insolvent, R.”
Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 2011 Ohio 5262 (Ohio 2011). “09 confers on the superintendent power to identify and supervise a potentially troubled insurer by requiring it to get her permission before engaging in certain business transactions, such as disposing of assets or investing funds.”
Covington v. Lucia, 784 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). “R.C. 3903.02(D) provides: {¶ 27} “The purpose of sections 3903.”
Boedeker v. Rogers, 746 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). “59 of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed to effect the purpose” of protecting “the interests of insureds, claimants, creditors, and the public generally, with minimum interference with the normal prerogatives of the owners and managers of insurers * * R.”
Benjamin v. Pipoly, 800 N.E.2d 50 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). “Absent express statutory authorization for private arbitration to proceed without assent to arbitrate by the liquidator, we hold that the public policy expressed throughout R.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 3903.02(D)(3) — 1 case
Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 2011 Ohio 5262 (Ohio 2011). “09 confers on the superintendent power to identify and supervise a potentially troubled insurer by requiring it to get her permission before engaging in certain business transactions, such as disposing of assets or investing funds.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 3903.02(D)(5) — 1 case
State v. Ramos, 534 N.E.2d 885 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). “” But the law authorizes the liquidator to institute the action not for the agents (whose actions often are responsible for the company’s financial plight), but for “the protection of the interests of insureds, claimants, creditors, and the public generally * * R.C. 3903.02 (D).…”
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