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Ohio Revised Code

Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62 (2026)

Construction contract provisions against public policy

✓ current as of May 2026
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Effective:
March 22, 2001
Latest Legislation:
House Bill 491 - 123rd General Assembly
PDF:
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(A) Any provision of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding that waives rights under a surety bond is void and unenforceable as against public policy.

(B) Any provision of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding, or specification or other documentation that is made a part of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding, that waives any pending or asserted claim on the basis of final payment made from one person to another for the construction contract, agreement, or understanding, is void and unenforceable as against public policy, when the person against whom the claim is pending or asserted has received notice of that pending or asserted claim. Nothing in this division precludes parties to a construction contract, agreement, or understanding from entering into a subsequent settlement agreement arising from a claim under that construction contract, agreement, or understanding.

(C)(1) Any provision of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding, or specification or other documentation that is made a part of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding, that waives or precludes liability for delay during the course of a construction contract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result of the owner's act or failure to act, or that waives any other remedy for a construction contract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result of the owner's act or failure to act, is void and unenforceable as against public policy.

(2) Any provision of a construction subcontract, agreement, or understanding, or specification or other documentation that is made part of a construction subcontract, agreement, or understanding, that waives or precludes liability for delay during the course of a construction subcontract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result of the owner's or contractor's act or failure to act, or that waives any other remedy for a construction subcontract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result of the owner's or contractor's act or failure to act, is void and unenforceable as against public policy.

(D)(1) Any provision of a construction contract, agreement, understanding, or specification or other document or documentation that is made a part of a construction contract, subcontract, agreement, or understanding for an improvement, or portion thereof, to real estate in this state that makes the construction contract or subcontract, agreement, or other understanding subject to the laws of another state is void and unenforceable as against public policy.

(2) Any provision of a construction contract, agreement, understanding, specification, or other document or documentation that is made a part of a construction contract, subcontract, agreement, or understanding for an improvement, or portion thereof, to real estate in this state that requires any litigation, arbitration, or other dispute resolution process provided for in the construction contract, subcontract, agreement, or understanding to occur in another state is void and unenforceable as against public policy. Any litigation, arbitration, or other dispute resolution process provided for in the construction contract, subcontract, agreement, or understanding shall take place in the county or counties in which the improvement to real estate is located or at another location within this state mutually agreed upon by the parties.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to any promissory note, loan agreement, mortgage, security agreement, assignment of rents, or any other contract, agreement, understanding, or other document or documentation to which a financial institution, as defined in section 5725.01 of the Revised Code, or any affiliate, as defined in division (A)(1) of section 1109.53 of the Revised Code, is a party.

(E) No construction contract, agreement, or understanding that makes payment from a contractor to a subcontractor or materials supplier, or from a subcontractor to a materials supplier, lower tier subcontractor, or lower tier materials supplier contingent or conditioned upon receipt of payment from any other person shall prohibit a person from filing a claim to protect rights under sections 153.56, 1311.06, and 1311.26 of the Revised Code from expiring during the pendency of receipt of payment.

(F) Nothing in this section shall be construed to create a liability for a surety on a bond that is greater than that of its principal, or limit the availability to a surety of any defenses available to its principal.

(G) As used in this section:

(1) "Contractor" and "lower tier subcontractor" have the same meanings as in section 4113.61 of the Revised Code.

(2) "Materials supplier" includes any person by whom any materials are furnished in furtherance of an improvement.

(3) "Lower tier materials supplier" means a materials supplier who is not in privity of contract with a contractor but is in privity of contract with another subcontractor or a materials supplier.

(4) "Subcontractor," "improvement," and "materials" have the same meanings as in section 1311.01 of the Revised Code.

(5) "Construction contract" means a contract or agreement for the design, planning, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, moving, demolition, or excavation of a building, structure, highway, road, appurtenance, or appliance situated on real estate located in this state.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 2006–2026 · leading case: Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio 2008).
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Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio 2008). · cites it 7× “*355 {¶ 11} The trial court held that the provision in the arbitration agreement requiring the arbitration to be held in Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky was unenforceable because it was in violation of R.C. 4113.62. Because the trial court found that the arbitration…”
Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 864 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio 2007). · cites it 4× “{¶ 33} However, Section 3 of the enacting legislation states: “Nothing in section 4113.62 of the Revised Code, as enacted by this act, applies to or shall be construed as applying to any contracts, agreements, or understandings entered into before the effective date of this act.”
Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 860 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “{¶ 10} On August 17, 2005, the trial court issued a decision and entry finding that a provision in the mediation and arbitration clauses requiring that the mediation and/or arbitration take place in Kentucky was “substantively unconscionable” because it violated R.C. 4113.62. As…”
IPS Elec, Servs., L.L.C. v. Univ. of Toledo, 2016 Ohio 361 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 8× “R.C. 4113.62 invalidates contractual provisions that preclude liability for delay when the delay is caused by the owner's act or failure to act.”
Tritonservices, Inc. v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2011 Ohio 7010 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2011). · cites it 4× “1 states: “To the fullest extent permitted by law and subject to any limitations imposed when the cause for the delay is a proximate result of the University’s act or failure to act pursuant to Section 4113.62, ORC, any extension of time granted pursuant to Paragraph GC 6.”
Boone Coleman Constr., Inc. v. Vill. of Piketon, 2014 Ohio 2377 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). “Through its passage of R.C. 4113.62(C)(1), the Ohio Legislature has made it clear that provisions in a construction contract that preclude liability for delay during the course of construction when the cause of the delay is the proximate result of the owner's act or failure to…”
PCS & Build, LLC v. Star Bldg. Sys. (S.D. Ohio 2022). · cites it 8× “Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62 (D)(1). Under the statute, a “construction contract” means “a contract or agreement for the design, planning, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, moving, demolition, or excavation of a building, structure, highway, road, appurtenance, or…”
Vinyl Kraft Acquisition, LLC v. RHI, Inc. (S.D. Ohio 2022). · cites it 3× “Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62(D)(2). Defendant’s reliance is misplaced.”
Stanley Miller Constr. Co. v. Sch. Facilities Comm., 2012 Ohio 3995 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2012). · cites it 7× “{¶ 67} To the extent that Stanley Miller argues that R.C. 4113.62 prohibits OSFC from relying upon Article 8.”
Stanley Miller Constr. Co. v. State, 2012 Ohio 3994 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2012). · cites it 7× “{¶ 67} To the extent that Stanley Miller argues that R.C. 4113.62 prohibits OSFC from relying upon Article 8.”
J3 Eng'g Grp., LLC v. Mack Indus. of Kalamazoo, LLC, 390 F. Supp. 3d 946 (2019). “Mack's Motion to Transfer Mack argues that transfer to the Northern District of Ohio is compelled because Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62(D)(1) and Ind. Code § 32-28-3-17 void the contracts' choice of law and forum selection clauses.”
J&H Reinforcing & Structural Erectors, Inc. v. Ohio Sch. Facilities Comm., 2012 Ohio 5298 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2012). · cites it 6× “2 would prevent recovery under the circumstances, such requirements violate and are void and unenforceable by operation of R.C. 4113.62. 2008 DELAY, INEFFICIENCY, AND ACCELERATION CLAIM {¶ 44} As noted above, the post-CO 29 delays and stacking of trades was the subject of…”
Show all 20 citing cases →
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62(C) — 2 cases
Tritonservices, Inc. v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2011 Ohio 7010 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2011). “1 states: “To the fullest extent permitted by law and subject to any limitations imposed when the cause for the delay is a proximate result of the University’s act or failure to act pursuant to Section 4113.62, ORC, any extension of time granted pursuant to Paragraph GC 6.”
J&H Reinforcing & Structural Erectors, Inc. v. Ohio Sch. Facilities Comm., 2012 Ohio 5308 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2012).
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62(C)(1) — 6 cases
Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 864 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio 2007). “{¶ 33} However, Section 3 of the enacting legislation states: “Nothing in section 4113.62 of the Revised Code, as enacted by this act, applies to or shall be construed as applying to any contracts, agreements, or understandings entered into before the effective date of this act.”
IPS Elec, Servs., L.L.C. v. Univ. of Toledo, 2016 Ohio 361 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). “R.C. 4113.62 invalidates contractual provisions that preclude liability for delay when the delay is caused by the owner's act or failure to act.”
Boone Coleman Constr., Inc. v. Vill. of Piketon, 2014 Ohio 2377 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). “Through its passage of R.C. 4113.62(C)(1), the Ohio Legislature has made it clear that provisions in a construction contract that preclude liability for delay during the course of construction when the cause of the delay is the proximate result of the owner's act or failure to…”
Tritonservices, Inc. v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2011 Ohio 7010 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2011). “1 states: “To the fullest extent permitted by law and subject to any limitations imposed when the cause for the delay is a proximate result of the University’s act or failure to act pursuant to Section 4113.62, ORC, any extension of time granted pursuant to Paragraph GC 6.”
J&H Reinforcing & Structural Erectors, Inc. v. Ohio Sch. Facilities Comm., 2012 Ohio 5308 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2012).
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62(D) — 3 cases
Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio 2008). “*355 {¶ 11} The trial court held that the provision in the arbitration agreement requiring the arbitration to be held in Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky was unenforceable because it was in violation of R.C. 4113.62. Because the trial court found that the arbitration…”
Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 860 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). “{¶ 10} On August 17, 2005, the trial court issued a decision and entry finding that a provision in the mediation and arbitration clauses requiring that the mediation and/or arbitration take place in Kentucky was “substantively unconscionable” because it violated R.C. 4113.62. As…”
PCS & Build, LLC v. Star Bldg. Sys. (S.D. Ohio 2022). “Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62 (D)(1). Under the statute, a “construction contract” means “a contract or agreement for the design, planning, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, moving, demolition, or excavation of a building, structure, highway, road, appurtenance, or…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62(D)(1) — 1 case
J3 Eng'g Grp., LLC v. Mack Indus. of Kalamazoo, LLC, 390 F. Supp. 3d 946 (2019). “Mack's Motion to Transfer Mack argues that transfer to the Northern District of Ohio is compelled because Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62(D)(1) and Ind. Code § 32-28-3-17 void the contracts' choice of law and forum selection clauses.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62(D)(2) — 3 cases
Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio 2008). “*355 {¶ 11} The trial court held that the provision in the arbitration agreement requiring the arbitration to be held in Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky was unenforceable because it was in violation of R.C. 4113.62. Because the trial court found that the arbitration…”
Vinyl Kraft Acquisition, LLC v. RHI, Inc. (S.D. Ohio 2022). “Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.62(D)(2). Defendant’s reliance is misplaced.”
Hamilton v. Fischer Single Fam. Homes IV, LLC (S.D. Ohio 2024).
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