Ohio Revised Code

Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.07 (2026)

Local traffic regulations

✓ current as of May 2026
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(A) Sections 4511.01 to 4511.78, 4511.99, and 4513.01 to 4513.37 of the Revised Code do not prevent local authorities from carrying out the following activities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power:

(1) Regulating the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles, trackless trolleys, and streetcars;

(2) Regulating traffic by means of police officers or traffic control devices;

(3) Regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways;

(4) Designating particular highways as one-way highways and requiring that all vehicles, trackless trolleys, and streetcars on the one-way highways be moved in one specific direction;

(5) Regulating the speed of vehicles, streetcars, and trackless trolleys in public parks;

(6) Designating any highway as a through highway and requiring that all vehicles, trackless trolleys, and streetcars stop before entering or crossing a through highway, or designating any intersection as a stop intersection and requiring all vehicles, trackless trolleys, and streetcars to stop at one or more entrances to the intersection;

(7) Regulating or prohibiting vehicles and trackless trolleys from passing to the left of safety zones;

(8) Regulating the operation of bicycles; provided that no such regulation shall be fundamentally inconsistent with the uniform rules of the road prescribed by this chapter and that no such regulation shall prohibit the use of bicycles on any public street or highway except as provided in section 4511.051 of the Revised Code;

(9) Requiring the registration and licensing of bicycles, including the requirement of a registration fee for residents of the local authority;

(10) Regulating the use of certain streets by vehicles, streetcars, or trackless trolleys.

(B) No ordinance or regulation enacted under division (A)(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), or (10) of this section shall be effective until signs giving notice of the local traffic regulations are posted upon or at the entrance to the highway or part of the highway affected, as may be most appropriate.

(C) Every ordinance, resolution, or regulation enacted under division (A)(1) of this section shall be enforced in compliance with section 4511.071 of the Revised Code, unless the local authority that enacted it also enacted an ordinance, resolution, or regulation pursuant to division (A) of section 4521.02 of the Revised Code that specifies that a violation of it shall not be considered a criminal offense, in which case the ordinance, resolution, or regulation shall be enforced in compliance with Chapter 4521. of the Revised Code.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases, 1958–2014 · leading case: Geauga Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners v. Munn Road Sand & Gravel, 67 Ohio St. 3d 579 (Ohio 1993).
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Geauga Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners v. Munn Road Sand & Gravel, 67 Ohio St. 3d 579 (Ohio 1993). · cites it 42× “This case presents one issue for our consideration: Is R.C. 4511.07 an express grant of authority to a board of county commissioners to regulate traffic in the county? For the reasons which follow, after careful review, we determine that it is not.”
Zilba v. City of Port Clinton, 924 F. Supp. 2d 867 (N.D. Ohio 2013). · cites it 16× “A local authority that has enacted any ordinance regulating parking pursuant to § 4511.07 may also enact an ordinance specifying that a violation of the parking ordinance “shall not be considered a criminal offense for any purpose, that a person who commits the violation shall…”
Mendenhall v. City of Akron, 117 Ohio St. 3d 33 (Ohio 2008). · cites it 5× “{¶ 33} The parties challenging the ordinance and their amici argue that R.C. 4511.07 provides for exclusive operation of state traffic statutes and limits the ability of municipalities to enact their own regulations.”
Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Munn Rd. Sand & Gravel, 1993 Ohio 55 (Ohio 1993). · cites it 46× “R.C. 4511.07 is not an express grant of authority to a board of county commissioners to regulate traffic.”
State v. Parker, 626 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio 1994). · cites it 5× “R.C. 4511.07, however, provides: “Sections 4511.”
Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St. 3d 553 (Ohio 2008). · cites it 2× “2d 696 , the power to enact ordinances comes solely from the Constitution: “While the effect of R.C. 4511.07 * * * could be viewed as very much like a grant of authority to the municipality, the municipality does not need the grant of authority because it already possesses it…”
State, Ex Rel. Ohio Motorists Assn. v. Masten, 456 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 4× “” Respondents contend that under the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution (Section 3, Article XVIII), and under R.C. 4511.07, that the village of Linndale has authority to erect traffic control devices which conflict with R.”
State v. Blatnik, 478 N.E.2d 1016 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). “See, also, R.C. 4511.07. Further, the Supreme Court, in amending the Ohio Traffic Rules, effective January 1, 1975, defined the term “traffic case” in Traf.”
City of Brook Park v. Short, 573 N.E.2d 168 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 3× “II For his first assignment of error, appellant contends that his conviction must be reversed because the traffic sign posted failed to provide him with notice that all overweight vehicles were prohibited on local streets, as required by the ordinance and R.C. 4511.07. We find…”
State v. Parker, 1994 Ohio 93 (Ohio 1994). · cites it 5× “{¶ 6} R.C. 4511.07, however, provides: "Sections 4511.”
Jodka v. Cleveland, 2014 Ohio 208 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “*** R.C. 4511.07 does not expressly signal that the state has exclusivity in the area of speed enforcement.”
City of Akron v. Davies, 170 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959). · cites it 2× “The Legislature, in recognition of the constitutional grant of authority to municipalities, enacted Section 4511.07, Revised Code. It stipulates, in part: “Sections 4511.”
Show all 16 citing cases →
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.07(1) — 1 case
Geauga Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners v. Munn Road Sand & Gravel, 67 Ohio St. 3d 579 (Ohio 1993). “This case presents one issue for our consideration: Is R.C. 4511.07 an express grant of authority to a board of county commissioners to regulate traffic in the county? For the reasons which follow, after careful review, we determine that it is not.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.07(A) — 1 case
Mendenhall v. City of Akron, 117 Ohio St. 3d 33 (Ohio 2008). “{¶ 33} The parties challenging the ordinance and their amici argue that R.C. 4511.07 provides for exclusive operation of state traffic statutes and limits the ability of municipalities to enact their own regulations.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.07(A)(1) — 1 case
Zilba v. City of Port Clinton, 924 F. Supp. 2d 867 (N.D. Ohio 2013). “A local authority that has enacted any ordinance regulating parking pursuant to § 4511.07 may also enact an ordinance specifying that a violation of the parking ordinance “shall not be considered a criminal offense for any purpose, that a person who commits the violation shall…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.07(C) — 1 case
Zilba v. City of Port Clinton, 924 F. Supp. 2d 867 (N.D. Ohio 2013). “A local authority that has enacted any ordinance regulating parking pursuant to § 4511.07 may also enact an ordinance specifying that a violation of the parking ordinance “shall not be considered a criminal offense for any purpose, that a person who commits the violation shall…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.07(I) — 1 case
Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Munn Rd. Sand & Gravel, 1993 Ohio 55 (Ohio 1993). “R.C. 4511.07 is not an express grant of authority to a board of county commissioners to regulate traffic.”
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