Ohio Rev. Code » Chapter 719
Ohio Revised Code

Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01 (2026)

Appropriation of property by municipal corporations

✓ current as of May 2026
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Effective:
January 1, 1966
Latest Legislation:
Senate Bill 94 - 106th General Assembly
PDF:
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Any municipal corporation may appropriate, enter upon, and hold real estate within its corporate limits:

(A) For opening, widening, straightening, changing the grade of, and extending streets, and all other public places, and for this purpose, the municipal corporation may appropriate the right of way across railway tracks and lands held by railway companies, where such appropriation will not unnecessarily interfere with the reasonable use of such property, and for obtaining material for the improvement of streets and other public places;

(B) For parks, park entrances, boulevards, market places, and children's playgrounds;

(C) For public halls and offices, and for all buildings and structures required for the use of any municipal department;

(D) For prisons, workhouses, houses of refuge and correction, and farm schools;

(E) For hospitals, pesthouses, reformatories, crematories, and cemeteries;

(F) For levees, wharves, and landings;

(G) For bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, and approaches thereto;

(H) For libraries, university sites, and grounds therefor;

(I) For constructing, opening, excavating, improving, or extending any canal or watercourse, located in whole or in part within the limits of the municipal corporation or adjacent and contiguous thereto, and which is not owned in whole or in part by the state, or by a company or individual authorized by law to make such improvement;

(J) For sewers, drains, ditches, public urinals, bathhouses, water closets, and sewage and garbage disposal plants and farms;

(K) For natural and artificial gas, electric lighting, heating, and power plants, and for supplying the product thereof;

(L) For establishing esplanades, boulevards, parkways, park grounds, and public reservations in, around, and leading to public buildings, and for the purpose of reselling such land with reservations in the deeds as to the future use of such lands, so as to protect public buildings and their environs, and to preserve the view, appearance, light, air, and usefulness of public grounds occupied by public buildings and esplanades and parkways leading thereto;

(M) For providing a water supply for itself and its inhabitants by the construction of wells, pumps, cisterns, aqueducts, water pipes, dams, reservoirs, reservoir sites, and water works, and for the protection thereof; and to provide for a supply of water for itself and its inhabitants, any municipal corporation may appropriate property within or without its limits; and for such purpose and such municipal corporation may appropriate, in the manner provided in sections 163.01 to 163.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code, any property or right or interest therein, previously acquired by any private corporation for any purpose by appropriation proceedings or otherwise, and either party to such appropriation proceedings shall have the same right to change of venue as is given in the trial of civil actions;

(N) For the construction or operation of street, interurban, suburban, or other railways or terminals and the necessary tracks, way stations, depots, terminals, workshops, conduits, elevated structures, subways, tunnels, offices, sidetracks, turnouts, machine shops, bridges, and other appurtenances for the transportation of persons, packages, express matter, freight, and other matter, in, from, into, or through the municipal corporation; and for such purpose any municipal corporation may appropriate any property within or without its corporate limits; and any municipal corporation may appropriate any property, right, or interest therein previously acquired by any private or public utility corporation for any purpose by appropriate proceedings, as well as the right to cross on, over, or under any street, avenue, alley, way, or public place or part thereof of any other municipal corporation, township, or county;

(O) For establishing airports, landing fields, or other air navigation facilities, either within or without the limits of a municipal corporation for aircraft and transportation terminals, with power to impose restrictions on any part thereof and leasing such part thereof as is desired for purposes associated with or incident to such airports, landing fields, or other air navigation facilities and transportation terminals, including the right to appropriate a right of way for highways, electric, steam, and interurban railroads leading from such airport or landing field to the main highways or the main line of such steam, electric, or interurban railroads, as are desired; all of which are hereby declared to be public purposes.

Division (O) of this section does not authorize a municipal corporation to take or disturb property or facilities belonging to any public utility or to a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, which property or facilities are required for the proper and convenient operation of such utility or carrier, unless provision is made for the restoration, relocation, or duplication of such property or facilities elsewhere, at the sole cost of the municipal corporation.

The powers conferred upon municipal corporations by this section shall be exercised for the purposes and in the manner provided in sections 163.01 to 163.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code.

"Airport," "landing field," and "air navigation facility," as defined in section 4561.01 of the Revised Code, apply to division (O) of this section.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 26 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1955–2026 · leading case: State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland, 2023 Ohio 3871 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023).
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State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland, 2023 Ohio 3871 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 20× “Cleveland argues that Lillis did not hold that the precedents set forth Clifton and Moore do not apply to physical takings, rather the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that those property owners could rely on provisions of R.”
State ex rel. Lillis v. Summit, 2017 Ohio 1539 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 28× “The court reasoned, “Ohio law is clear that property owners do not have standing to bring a mandamus action to compel a municipality to appropriate property outside the municipality’s jurisdiction” and “none of the enumerated purposes listed in R.C. 719.01 include appropriating…”
Boardman Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Fleming, 674 N.E.2d 1204 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 10× “Appellant argues that the reference to R.C. 719.01 to 719.21 is only procedural, that is to say, when the township seeks to appropriate property, it is to follow the same procedures that a municipal corporation uses.”
City of St. Marys v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 607 N.E.2d 881 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 7× “Because the city in Britt relied solely on the constitutional grant of power, the application of R.C. 719.01 and 719.02 to the municipality’s appropriation was not an issue in that appeal.”
Clifton v. Vill. of Blanchester, 2012 Ohio 780 (Ohio 2012). · cites it 2× “{¶ 29} Thus, a municipality has no authority to initiate appropriation proceedings in response to a property owner’s complaint in mandamus alleging a regulatory-taking claim if the affected property lies outside the municipality’s limits.”
City of Dublin v. Beatley, 2018 Ohio 3354 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 5× “SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 21} Appellant contends in his second assignment of error that R.C. 719.01 (A) is an all-inclusive list of the purposes for which Appellee may appropriate property and, in support of his argument Appellant offers cases which were decided long before…”
Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Toledo, 759 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ohio 2010). “TMC § 719.01. A courtesy bench may not be installed without a permit from the Commissioner of Building Inspection and Code Enforcement (Commissioner), “on forms prescribed by such official.”
Vill. of Roseville v. Thompson, 567 N.E.2d 1334 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 3× “14 provides in part: “In appropriation proceedings the jury shall be sworn to impartially assess the compensation and damages, if any, without deductions for general benefits as to the property of the owner.”
Cairo Vill. Council v. Miller, 699 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “However, Council also asserted appropriation authority by virtue of the “laws of the State of Ohio.” Because the trial court found that Council’s complaint did not limit the basis of authority by which the appropriation was being made, it determined that Council could proceed…”
City of Mentor v. Osborne, 758 N.E.2d 252 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). “R.C. 719.01(B). Thus, this is not a situation where land is being appropriated for some contemplated but undetermined future use.”
Hunsche v. City of Loveland, 729 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). “Thus, we hold that the city’s construction and maintenance of Boike Park is a governmental function afforded the immunity protections of R.”
State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland, 2025 Ohio 5094 (Ohio 2025). · cites it 6× “It noted that R.C. 719.01 authorized a municipality to appropriate property for purposes of establishing “airports” and “landing fields.”
Show all 26 citing cases →
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(A) — 2 cases
State ex rel. Lillis v. Summit, 2017 Ohio 1539 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). “The court reasoned, “Ohio law is clear that property owners do not have standing to bring a mandamus action to compel a municipality to appropriate property outside the municipality’s jurisdiction” and “none of the enumerated purposes listed in R.C. 719.01 include appropriating…”
Mentor v. Norfolk S.R.R., Unpublished Decision (6-1-2005), 2005 Ohio 3410 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(B) — 2 cases
City of Mentor v. Osborne, 758 N.E.2d 252 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). “R.C. 719.01(B). Thus, this is not a situation where land is being appropriated for some contemplated but undetermined future use.”
Hunsche v. City of Loveland, 729 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). “Thus, we hold that the city’s construction and maintenance of Boike Park is a governmental function afforded the immunity protections of R.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(E) — 1 case
City of Englewood v. Miami Valley Lighting, L.L.C., 911 N.E.2d 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(H) — 1 case
Eighth & Walnut Corp. v. Pub. Library, 385 N.E.2d 1324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(I) — 1 case
State ex rel. Lillis v. Summit, 2017 Ohio 1539 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). “The court reasoned, “Ohio law is clear that property owners do not have standing to bring a mandamus action to compel a municipality to appropriate property outside the municipality’s jurisdiction” and “none of the enumerated purposes listed in R.C. 719.01 include appropriating…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(J) — 5 cases
State ex rel. Lillis v. Summit, 2017 Ohio 1539 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). “The court reasoned, “Ohio law is clear that property owners do not have standing to bring a mandamus action to compel a municipality to appropriate property outside the municipality’s jurisdiction” and “none of the enumerated purposes listed in R.C. 719.01 include appropriating…”
Boardman Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Fleming, 674 N.E.2d 1204 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). “Appellant argues that the reference to R.C. 719.01 to 719.21 is only procedural, that is to say, when the township seeks to appropriate property, it is to follow the same procedures that a municipal corporation uses.”
State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland, 2023 Ohio 3871 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023). “Cleveland argues that Lillis did not hold that the precedents set forth Clifton and Moore do not apply to physical takings, rather the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that those property owners could rely on provisions of R.”
Vill. of Roseville v. Thompson, 567 N.E.2d 1334 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). “14 provides in part: “In appropriation proceedings the jury shall be sworn to impartially assess the compensation and damages, if any, without deductions for general benefits as to the property of the owner.”
Cairo Vill. Council v. Miller, 699 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). “However, Council also asserted appropriation authority by virtue of the “laws of the State of Ohio.” Because the trial court found that Council’s complaint did not limit the basis of authority by which the appropriation was being made, it determined that Council could proceed…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(K) — 1 case
City of Englewood v. Miami Valley Lighting, L.L.C., 911 N.E.2d 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(M) — 2 cases
State ex rel. Lillis v. Summit, 2017 Ohio 1539 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). “The court reasoned, “Ohio law is clear that property owners do not have standing to bring a mandamus action to compel a municipality to appropriate property outside the municipality’s jurisdiction” and “none of the enumerated purposes listed in R.C. 719.01 include appropriating…”
Luckey v. T&S Agriventures, L.L.C., 2025 Ohio 871 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025).
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(O) — 2 cases
State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland, 2023 Ohio 3871 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023). “Cleveland argues that Lillis did not hold that the precedents set forth Clifton and Moore do not apply to physical takings, rather the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that those property owners could rely on provisions of R.”
State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland, 2025 Ohio 5094 (Ohio 2025). “It noted that R.C. 719.01 authorized a municipality to appropriate property for purposes of establishing “airports” and “landing fields.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(o) — 1 case
State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland, 2023 Ohio 3871 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023). “Cleveland argues that Lillis did not hold that the precedents set forth Clifton and Moore do not apply to physical takings, rather the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that those property owners could rely on provisions of R.”
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