State v. Boyd, 756 P.2d 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). · Go Syfert
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State v. Boyd, 756 P.2d 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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Still-good law most often cited alongside it: Hubbell (2021) · Hubbell (2023) · Aguilar (1989)
186 citation events (163 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ayala v. Fhuere (orctapp, 2025-03-19) · Strongest negative: Goodlette v. Reyes (orctapp, 2026-06-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
First red flag: 2025
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Overruled Goodlette v. Reyes (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence high
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel provided inadequate assis- tance under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and ineffective assistance under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, by failing to advise him that State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988), overruled by State v. Hubbell, 371 Or 340 , 537 P3d 503 (2023), was likely to be overturned in the near future and that, if petitioner went to trial, he could preserve for appeal a challenge to Boyd.
discussed Overruled Goodlette v. Reyes (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence high
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel provided inadequate assis- tance under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and ineffective assistance under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, by failing to advise him that State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988), overruled by State v. Hubbell, 371 Or 340 , 537 P3d 503 (2023), was likely to be overturned in the near future and that, if petitioner went to trial, he could preserve for appeal a challenge to Boyd.
discussed Overruled State v. Bedford (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 55 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988), overruled by Hubbell, 314 Or App 844 , 500 P3d 728 (2021) (posses- sion of a large quantity of drugs with the intent to deliver constitutes a substantial step toward delivery and thus is sufficient to constitute the completed crime of delivery as an “attempted transfer” under the definition of “delivery” in ORS 475.005(8)).
discussed Overruled State v. Bedford (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 55 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988), overruled by Hubbell, 314 Or App 844 (possession of a large quantity of drugs with the intent to deliver constitutes a substan- tial step toward delivery and thus is sufficient to constitute the completed crime of delivery as an “attempted transfer” under the definition of “delivery” in ORS 475.005(8)).
discussed Overruled State v. Mandaville
Or. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51 , 756 P3d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988), overruled by State v. Hubbell, 314 Or App 844 , 500 P3d 728 (2021), aff’d, 371 Or 340 (2023) (Hubbell I)) (holding that ORS 475.890, unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, may be proven using a constructive transfer theory).
discussed Overruled State v. Mandaville
Or. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51 , 756 P3d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988), overruled by State v. Hubbell, 314 Or App 844 , 500 P3d 728 (2021), aff’d, 371 Or 340 , 537 P3d 503 (2023) (Hubbell I) (holding that ORS 475.890, unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, may be proven using a constructive transfer theory).
discussed Overruled State v. Fredricks (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 54-55 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988), overruled by Hubbell, 314 Or App at 848 .
discussed Overruled State v. Dippre (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988), overruled by Hubbell, 314 Or App at 848 .
discussed Overruled State v. Baker (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence high
During opening statement, the state remarked to the jury that law enforcement agents who were executing a 1 The state proceeded on a Boyd delivery theory, see State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51 , 756 P2d 1276 (1988), overruled by State v. Hubbell, 314 Or App 844 , 500 P3d 728 (2021).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ayala v. Fhuere
Or. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Boyd, 92 Or App at 54-55 (so holding, based on our construction of ORS 475.005(8), which defined “delivery” to include “attempted transfer”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hubbell
Or. · 2023 · confidence medium
That, the state argues, lends sup- port to the view adopted in Boyd, namely, that the legis- lature intended for Oregon to criminalize possession with intent, but envisioned that it would be accomplished by hav- ing possession with intent treated as an “attempted trans- fer.” See Boyd, 92 Or App at 53-54 (applying the principle of a “substantial step” drawn from the attempt statute, ORS 161.405).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hubbell (3×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
“ORS 161.405(1) provides: “A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when the person intentionally engages in conduct which consti- tutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” 92 Or App at 53-54 (footnote setting out the text of ORS 161.035 omitted).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Makin (4×) also: Cited "see"
Or. · 2016 · confidence medium
Id. at 53.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Oliveira
R.I. · 2005 · confidence medium
In State v. Boyd, 92 Or.App. 51 , 756 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (1988), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that possession of a drug with the intent to deliver it amounts to attempted delivery of that drug under Oregon law.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Miller
Or. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver it constitutes an “attempted transfer.” State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 55, 756 , P2d 1276, rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988).
cited Cited "see" State v. Stockert
Or. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Boyd, 92 Or App at 54 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Newsted
Or. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd , 92 Or.
cited Cited "see" State v. Miranda
Or. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Villagomez , 362 Or. 390 , 395, 412 P.3d 189 (2018) (describing the theory of delivery that we held in State v. Boyd , 92 Or.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Stewart (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 33 (citing State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 54 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988)).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Makin (2×)
Or. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Boyd, 92 Or App at 53-54 .5 It follows, the state reasons, that defendant’s 4 This case does not require us to decide whether first-degree child neglect only prohibits allowing underage children to stay in a vehicle where an actual transfer of controlled substances is occurring or whether the prohibition extends to allowing children to stay vehicles in which controlled substances are in the process of being delivered—i.e., are being driven—to an identified buyer.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Lawrence (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
When the state relies on an attempted transfer to prove delivery, it must show that the defendant “intentionally engage[d] in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of [a completed transfer].” ORS 161.405(1); see State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 53-54 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Alvarez-Garcia (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 53 , 53 n 1, 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988) (explaining that, because the statutes governing delivery of controlled substances do not define “attempt” or “attempted transfer,” the definition of “attempt” in ORS 161.405(1) applies). 2 Defendant contends that “[t]he issue of proportionality is also presented” in this case, because the “naked possession of more than 10 grams of meth can be charged and tried as either a possession or a delivery * * Even if defendant had preserved that issue (and defendant has not established that he did)…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Pollock (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
When the state relies on an attempted transfer to prove delivery, it must show that the defendant “intentionally engage [d] in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of [a completed transfer].” ORS 161.405(1); see State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 53-54 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Rojas-Montalvo (2×)
Or. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51 , 756 P2d 1276 , rev den 307 Or 77 (1988).
examined Cited "see" State v. Stalbert (3×)
Or. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Boyd, 92 Or.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE OF OREGON, Respondent,
v.
JOYCELYN BOYD, Appellant
C86-11-35949; CA A44606.
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
Jul 6, 1988.
756 P.2d 1276
Robert A. Goffredi, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant., Rives Kistler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, Salem.
Buttler, Warren, Rossman.
Cited by 68 opinions  |  Published
[*53] WARREN, J.

Defendant appeals her conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992. At issue is whether twenty-three bindles of heroin found in defendant’s possession at the time of her arrest and her admission that she had acquired the heroin for the purpose of selling it were sufficient evidence to convict.

On July 7,1986, defendant was arrested in her home in Portland. During the execution of the search warrant, she admitted that, earlier that day, she had acquired about thirteen bindles of heroin with the intent to sell them. She also admitted that she had sold drugs for another person and that she had been receiving $50 a day for selling the drugs. She argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of delivery of heroin, because there was no evidence of actual or attempted delivery.

ORS 475.992 prohibits the manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance. ORS 475.005(8) defines delivery:

“ ‘Deliver’ or ‘delivery’ means the actual, constructive or attempted transfer, other than by administering or dispensing, from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship.”

The relevant inquiry in this case is whether possession of the large amount of heroin, not for personal use but for sale, constitutes attempted delivery within the meaning of the ORS 415.005(8), which does not define either attempted transfer or attempt. The provisions of the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, ORS 161.005 to ORS 167.820, are therefore applicable. See ORS 161.035. [1]

ORS 161.405(1) provides:

[*54] “A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when the person intentionally engages in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.”

The state directs our attention to Commentary to the Criminal Code of 1971, § 54, at 49-50, which provides, in relevant part:

“[T]he Model Penal Code examples of acts which should not be held insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a substantial step are approved and are set out as follows:
«He He He He He
“(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such .unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
“(f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances[.]”

The state is correct that the fact that defendant possessed the large amount of heroin together with her admission that she acquired it in order to sell it amounts to evidence that she had taken a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of delivery of a controlled substance.

Defendant’s next argument relates to the variation between the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and Oregon’s Controlled Substances Act, which substantially adopts the former. She argues that the Oregon legislature intended to penalize only possession and delivery of controlled substances but not possession with intent to deliver, which is a distinct crime, and that the state’s evidence was relevant only to possession, but not to delivery. The uniform act separately penalizes delivery, possession with intent to deliver and possession. 9 Uniform Laws Annot., § 401 (a) (c). The Oregon act separately penalizes delivery and possession, but not possession with intent to deliver. ORS 475.992(1)(4). The definition of “delivery,” in relevant part, is the same in both acts. 9 Uniform Laws Annot., § 101(f); ORS 475.005(8).

The fact that the Oregon legislature did not choose to make possession with intent to deliver a separate crime does not mean that it intended to punish possession of controlled[*55] substances intended for distribution as simple possession only. Under the uniform act, as well as under the federal statutory scheme, delivery and possession with intent to deliver are crimes punishable by the same penalties. The offense of simple possession is subject to substantially lesser penalties. See 21 USC §§ 841(a), 844; 9 Uniform Laws Annot., § 401 (a) (c). There is no indication that the Oregon legislature intended to punish an attempt to transfer a controlled substance other than as the completed transfer. It did so without enacting the distinct crime of possession with intent to deliver, because that crime, considering the meaning of “attempt,” is included in the definition of “delivery”. There was no error.

Affirmed.

1

ORS 161.035 provides, in part:

“(1) Chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, and committed after January 1, 1972, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense.
“(2) Except as otherwise expressly provided, or unless the context requires otherwise, the provisions of chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined outside chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, and committed after January 1,1972, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense.”