Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.075 (2026)

Residence requirements

✓ current as of May 2026
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      107.075 Residence requirements. (1) If the marriage was solemnized in this state and either party is a resident of or domiciled in the state at the time the suit is commenced, a suit for its annulment or dissolution may be maintained where the ground alleged is one set forth in ORS 106.020 or 107.015.

      (2) When the marriage was not solemnized in this state or when any ground other than set forth in ORS 106.020 or 107.015 is alleged, at least one party must be a resident of or be domiciled in this state at the time the suit is commenced and continuously for a period of six months prior thereto.

      (3) In a suit for separation, one of the parties must be a resident of or domiciled in this state at the time the suit is commenced.

      (4) Residence or domicile under subsection (2) or (3) of this section is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction without regard to the place where the marriage was solemnized or where the cause of suit arose. [1971 c.280 §5; 1973 c.502 §5]

 

      107.080 [Repealed by 1971 c.280 §28]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1977–2021 · leading case: Matter of Marriage of Pirouzkar, 626 P.2d 380 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
Matter of Marriage of Pirouzkar, 626 P.2d 380 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). · cites it 3× “The trial court determined that, under ORS 107.075, one of the parties to a dissolution proceeding must be domiciled in this state, and that plaintiff is unable to establish that she is a domiciliary because of her nonimmigrant alien status.”
Menten & Deatherage, 461 P.3d 1075 (Or. Ct. App. 2020). “But absent certain 430 Menten and Deatherage statutory exceptions (ORS 107.”
In re Marriage of Henry, 721 P.2d 430 (Or. 1986). “The husband’s petition alleged that he had been a resident of and domiciled in Oregon for a period of six months preceding commencement of the suit, thus satisfying the requirement of ORS 107.075(2) for jurisdiction of a suit for dissolution.”
Wood v. White, 558 P.2d 1289 (Or. Ct. App. 1977). “As noted by the Supreme Court of Michigan, in a similar case, there is *179 a fundamental distinction between the absence of jurisdiction and the erroneous exercise of that jurisdiction.”
In re the Marriage of Pearce, 632 P.2d 501 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). · cites it 2× “The trial court properly determined jurisdiction under ORS 107.075(2). 1 After the case was argued in this court, the Supreme Court of the United States decided McCarty v.”
In re the Marriage of Watanabe, 914 P.2d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). “ORS 107.075; Wood, 28 Or App at 178 . Personal jurisdiction requires valid service pursuant to ORCP 7 and, as applicable here, local presence or status as described in ORCP 4.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Goode, 997 P.2d 244 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 3× “Oregon’s policy of discouraging forum shopping by requiring that jurisdiction for dissolution requires domicile of at least one of the spouses in the forum, ORS 107.075, Kelley v. Kelley, 183 Or 169, 183 , 191 P2d 656 (1948), would be undermined by the granting of comity in this…”
In re the Marriage of Ewald, 294 P.3d 511 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 4× “In his second, he contends that, even if claim preclusion did not preclude wife’s motion, it nonetheless fails on the merits because the evidence demonstrates that wife was domiciled in Oregon for more than the requisite six months preceding the filing of the dissolution…”
State v. Underland, 483 P.3d 44 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). “The trial court ruled that Wetmore’s testimony was admissible on two grounds: (1) under OEC 803(18a), which allows to be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule a “complaint” of abuse (as defined in ORS 107.075) made after the com- mission of the alleged abuse, provided…”
DeStael v. Strasburg, 25 Am. Samoa 2d 96 (1993). “In granting the divorce decree, the Oregon court made a factual finding that DeStael was a resident under the residency/domicile requirement of Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.075 . This court is thus precluded from questioning the Oregon court’s findings of fact and its corresponding…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.075(2) — 4 cases
Matter of Marriage of Pirouzkar, 626 P.2d 380 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). “The trial court determined that, under ORS 107.075, one of the parties to a dissolution proceeding must be domiciled in this state, and that plaintiff is unable to establish that she is a domiciliary because of her nonimmigrant alien status.”
In re Marriage of Henry, 721 P.2d 430 (Or. 1986). “The husband’s petition alleged that he had been a resident of and domiciled in Oregon for a period of six months preceding commencement of the suit, thus satisfying the requirement of ORS 107.075(2) for jurisdiction of a suit for dissolution.”
In re the Marriage of Pearce, 632 P.2d 501 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). “The trial court properly determined jurisdiction under ORS 107.075(2). 1 After the case was argued in this court, the Supreme Court of the United States decided McCarty v.”
In re the Marriage of Ewald, 294 P.3d 511 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “In his second, he contends that, even if claim preclusion did not preclude wife’s motion, it nonetheless fails on the merits because the evidence demonstrates that wife was domiciled in Oregon for more than the requisite six months preceding the filing of the dissolution…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.075(4) — 1 case
In re the Marriage of Ewald, 294 P.3d 511 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “In his second, he contends that, even if claim preclusion did not preclude wife’s motion, it nonetheless fails on the merits because the evidence demonstrates that wife was domiciled in Oregon for more than the requisite six months preceding the filing of the dissolution…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.