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Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.605 (2026)

Definitions for ORS 131.605 to 131.625

✓ current as of May 2026
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      131.605 Definitions for ORS 131.605 to 131.625. As used in ORS 131.605 to 131.625, unless the context requires otherwise:

      (1) “Crime” has the meaning provided for that term in ORS 161.515.

      (2) “Dangerous weapon,” “deadly weapon” and “person” have the meanings given those terms in ORS 161.015.

      (3) “Frisk” is an external patting of a person’s outer clothing.

      (4) “Is about to commit” means unusual conduct that leads a peace officer reasonably to conclude in light of the officer’s training and experience that criminal activity may be afoot.

      (5) “Peace officer” has the meaning given that term in ORS 133.005.

      (6) “Reasonably suspects” means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts as authorized in ORS 131.605 to 131.625.

      (7) A “stop” is a temporary restraint of a person’s liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place. [1973 c.836 §30; 1997 c.866 §2; 2011 c.506 §6; 2011 c.644 §12]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 278 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802 (Or. 1983).
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State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802 (Or. 1983). · cites it 22× “[4] He also cites, for the first time in his petition to this court, Oregon's "stop and frisk" law, ORS 131.605 to 131.625, as governing both the authority for and the limitations on police detention of persons based only on a reasonable suspicion.”
State v. Ehly, 854 P.2d 421 (Or. 1993). · cites it 7× “8 The analysis of a defendant’s rights under ORS 131.605 to 131.625 is substantially the same as the analysis of rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.”
State v. Toevs, 964 P.2d 1007 (Or. 1998). · cites it 9× “A ‘stop’ as authorized under ORS 131.605 to 131.625 is not an arrest.” ORS 133.”
State v. Hall, 115 P.3d 908 (Or. 2005). · cites it 4× “[11] ORS 131.605 defines the term "reasonably suspects" as "a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts * * *.”
State v. Kennedy, 624 P.2d 99 (Or. 1981). · cites it 6× “These facts, together with the contentions of the parties, present three questions: (1) Did the encounter between the police and defendant at the airport constitute a "stop” within the meaning of ORS 131.605(5)? (2) If the encounter between the police and defendant constituted a…”
State v. Dahl, 915 P.2d 979 (Or. 1996). · cites it 10× “See ORS 131.605 to 131.615 (providing circumstances under which a police officer may stop a person who the officer "reasonably suspects" may have committed a crime); see also State v.”
State v. Belt, 932 P.2d 1177 (Or. 1997). · cites it 8× “605(4), “ ‘ [r] easonably suspects’ means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts as authorized in ORS 131.”
State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 389 P.3d 1121 (Or. 2017). · cites it 2× “615 and ORS 131.605(6), 2 when analyzing the reasonable-suspicion standard that applies in cases *172 challenging the constitutionality of a stop under Article I, section 9.”
State v. Holmes, 813 P.2d 28 (Or. 1991). · cites it 4× “15 See ORS 131.605 through ORS 131.625 (stopping of persons by police officers) and ORS 161.”
State v. Holdorf, 333 P.3d 982 (Or. 2014). · cites it 4× “Other provisions of the statutory framework relating to the permissible scope of the stop and frisk of persons, ORS 131.605 to 131.625, are not at issue in this case.”
State v. Valdez, 561 P.2d 1006 (Or. 1977). · cites it 4× “605(4): "`Reasonably suspects' means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place he acts as authorized in ORS 131.605 to 131.625." A "stop" is defined by (5) of the same section: "A `stop' is a…”
State v. Williamson, 772 P.2d 404 (Or. 1989). · cites it 6× “605(5) provides: "As used in ORS 131.605 to 131.625, unless the context requires otherwise: * * * * * * "(5) A `stop' is a temporary restraint of a person's liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place.”
Show all 278 citing cases →
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.605(1) — 8 cases
State v. Painter, 676 P.2d 309 (Or. 1984).
State v. Black, 721 P.2d 842 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
State v. Regnier, 212 P.3d 1269 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
State v. Brister, 579 P.2d 863 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
State v. Morris, 641 P.2d 77 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.605(2) — 11 cases
State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802 (Or. 1983). “[4] He also cites, for the first time in his petition to this court, Oregon's "stop and frisk" law, ORS 131.605 to 131.625, as governing both the authority for and the limitations on police detention of persons based only on a reasonable suspicion.”
State v. Rickard, 947 P.2d 215 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
State v. Ehly, 854 P.2d 421 (Or. 1993). “8 The analysis of a defendant’s rights under ORS 131.605 to 131.625 is substantially the same as the analysis of rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.”
State v. Bechtold, 783 P.2d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
State v. Kurtz, 612 P.2d 749 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.605(3) — 4 cases
State v. Miglavs, 90 P.3d 607 (Or. 2004).
State v. Rudder, 217 P.3d 1064 (Or. 2009).
State v. Miears, 999 P.2d 493 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
State v. Miglavs (Or. 2004).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.605(4) — 104 cases
State v. Belt, 932 P.2d 1177 (Or. 1997). “605(4), “ ‘ [r] easonably suspects’ means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts as authorized in ORS 131.”
State v. Ehly, 854 P.2d 421 (Or. 1993). “8 The analysis of a defendant’s rights under ORS 131.605 to 131.625 is substantially the same as the analysis of rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.”
State v. Valdez, 561 P.2d 1006 (Or. 1977). “605(4): "`Reasonably suspects' means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place he acts as authorized in ORS 131.605 to 131.625." A "stop" is defined by (5) of the same section: "A `stop' is a…”
State v. Villegas-Varela, 887 P.2d 809 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
State v. Dahl, 915 P.2d 979 (Or. 1996). “See ORS 131.605 to 131.615 (providing circumstances under which a police officer may stop a person who the officer "reasonably suspects" may have committed a crime); see also State v.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.605(5) — 115 cases
State v. Kennedy, 624 P.2d 99 (Or. 1981). “These facts, together with the contentions of the parties, present three questions: (1) Did the encounter between the police and defendant at the airport constitute a "stop” within the meaning of ORS 131.605(5)? (2) If the encounter between the police and defendant constituted a…”
State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802 (Or. 1983). “[4] He also cites, for the first time in his petition to this court, Oregon's "stop and frisk" law, ORS 131.605 to 131.625, as governing both the authority for and the limitations on police detention of persons based only on a reasonable suspicion.”
State v. Hall, 115 P.3d 908 (Or. 2005). “[11] ORS 131.605 defines the term "reasonably suspects" as "a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts * * *.”
State v. Holmes, 813 P.2d 28 (Or. 1991). “15 See ORS 131.605 through ORS 131.625 (stopping of persons by police officers) and ORS 161.”
State v. Ehly, 854 P.2d 421 (Or. 1993). “8 The analysis of a defendant’s rights under ORS 131.605 to 131.625 is substantially the same as the analysis of rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.605(6) — 35 cases
State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 389 P.3d 1121 (Or. 2017). “615 and ORS 131.605(6), 2 when analyzing the reasonable-suspicion standard that applies in cases *172 challenging the constitutionality of a stop under Article I, section 9.”
State v. Toevs, 964 P.2d 1007 (Or. 1998). “A ‘stop’ as authorized under ORS 131.605 to 131.625 is not an arrest.” ORS 133.”
State v. Bush, 126 P.3d 705 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Holdorf, 333 P.3d 982 (Or. 2014). “Other provisions of the statutory framework relating to the permissible scope of the stop and frisk of persons, ORS 131.605 to 131.625, are not at issue in this case.”
State v. Betancourt, 374 Or. 44 (Or. 2025).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.605(7) — 1 case
State v. McClure, 335 P.3d 1260 (Or. 2014).
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