161.067
Determining punishable offenses for violation of multiple statutory provisions,
multiple victims or repeated violations. (1)(a) When the same conduct or criminal episode
violates two or more statutory provisions and each provision requires proof of
an element that the others do not, there are as many separately punishable
offenses as there are separate statutory violations.
(b)
Notwithstanding ORS 132.586, 163.160 and 163.190 and paragraph (a) of this
subsection, a pleading, admission or finding that criminal conduct constitutes
a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in ORS 135.230, is not an
element for purposes of this section.
(2) When the same
conduct or criminal episode, though violating only one statutory provision
involves two or more victims, there are as many separately punishable offenses
as there are victims. However, two or more persons owning joint interests in
real or personal property shall be considered a single victim for purposes of
determining the number of separately punishable offenses if the property is the
subject of one of the following crimes:
(a) Theft as
defined in ORS 164.015.
(b) Unauthorized
use of a vehicle as defined in ORS 164.135.
(c) Criminal
possession of rented or leased personal property as defined in ORS 164.140.
(d) Criminal
possession of a rented or leased motor vehicle as defined in ORS 164.138.
(e) Burglary as
defined in ORS 164.215 or 164.225.
(f) Criminal
trespass as defined in ORS 164.243, 164.245, 164.255, 164.265 or 164.278.
(g) Arson and
related offenses as defined in ORS 164.315, 164.325 or 164.335.
(h) Forgery and
related offenses as defined in ORS 165.002 to 165.070.
(3) When the same
conduct or criminal episode violates only one statutory provision and involves
only one victim, but nevertheless involves repeated violations of the same
statutory provision against the same victim, there are as many separately
punishable offenses as there are violations, except that each violation, to be
separately punishable under this subsection, must be separated from other such
violations by a sufficient pause in the defendant’s criminal conduct to afford
the defendant an opportunity to renounce the criminal intent. Each method of
engaging in oral or anal sexual intercourse as defined in ORS 163.305, and each
method of engaging in unlawful sexual penetration as defined in ORS 163.408 and
163.411 shall constitute separate violations of their respective statutory
provisions for purposes of determining the number of statutory violations. [1987
c.2 §13; 1991 c.386 §9; 2003 c.629 §4; 2007 c.684 §3; 2017 c.318 §1; 2025 c.271
§1]
161.070 [Repealed by 1971 c.743 §432]
161.075 [1965 c.516 §1; repealed by 1971
c.743 §432]
161.080 [Repealed by 1971 c.743 §432]
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
371
cases (
98 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case:
State v. Gensitskiy, 446 P.3d 26 (Or. 2019).
State v. Gensitskiy, 446 P.3d 26 (Or. 2019).
· cites it 164× “In support of his argument, defendant relied on ORS 161.067, which establishes rules for when statutory violations, based on *30 the same conduct or criminal episode, constitute "separately punishable offenses.”
State v. White, 211 P.3d 248 (Or. 2009).
· cites it 100× “[2] In my view, an examination of the text, context, and history of ORS 161.067 leads to a simpler and less subjective interpretation of the phrase "statutory provision" than a synthesis of our cases yields.”
State v. Nelson, 386 P.3d 73 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 51× “As we explain below, we agree with defendant that the court should have merged the guilty verdicts for sexual abuse into one conviction for first-degree sexual abuse because there was no evidence to support the trial court’s determination that each instance of sexual contact was…”
State v. White, 147 P.3d 313 (Or. 2006).
· cites it 39× “In this criminal appeal, we are asked to explain the correct application of ORS 161.067, the so-called anti-merger statute, in circumstances in which a defendant is charged with multiple counts of burglary based on the same incident.”
State v. Paye, 486 P.3d 808 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 46× “Thus, under Mansor II, this is not a situation in which the omission of temporal limitations renders the warrant unconstitutionally overbroad.”
State v. Glaspey, 55 P.3d 562 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 88× “160(3) is concerned, defendant acknowledges that the legislature has defined the term "victim" in a number of different statutory settings, but argues that each applies to listed statutory provisions and none expressly applies to ORS 163.”
State v. Luers, 153 P.3d 688 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 42× “Barrett, 331 Or 27 , 10 P3d 901 (2000), under which multiple offenses merge into a single conviction if the offenses are closely joined in fact and if the anti-merger provisions of ORS 161.067 (set out below) do not apply.”
State v. Barton, 468 P.3d 510 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 40× “Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that ORS 161.067 precluded merger of Count 1 with Count 7 for the 2016 buck and merger of Count 3 with Count 8 for the 2015 buck.”
State v. Parkins, 211 P.3d 262 (Or. 2009).
· cites it 22× “Defendant filed a sentencing memorandum in the trial court that cited the anti-merger statute, ORS 161.067: "Defendant has recorded his objection to any sentence imposed under ORS 137.”
State v. Owens, 795 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 52× “Thus, even if defendant's conduct violates only one statutory provision under subsection (1), he nevertheless has committed separately punishable offenses under subsection (2).”
Martinez v. Cain, 458 P.3d 670 (Or. 2020).
· cites it 21× “Petitioner’s trial counsel did not object or argue that the trial court should have merged the convictions under ORS 161.067, which governs merger. That statute sets out when a trial court may enter separate convictions sentences if a defendant has violated multiple statutory…”
State v. Reeves, 280 P.3d 994 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 24× “Defendant appeals the judgment of conviction, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) based on purported insufficiency of evidence that he “knowingly duplicated” proscribed material and (2) failing to merge the…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.067(1) — 175 cases
State v. White, 211 P.3d 248 (Or. 2009).
“[2] In my view, an examination of the text, context, and history of ORS 161.067 leads to a simpler and less subjective interpretation of the phrase "statutory provision" than a synthesis of our cases yields.”
State v. Gensitskiy, 446 P.3d 26 (Or. 2019).
“In support of his argument, defendant relied on ORS 161.067, which establishes rules for when statutory violations, based on *30 the same conduct or criminal episode, constitute "separately punishable offenses.”
State v. Luers, 153 P.3d 688 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
“Barrett, 331 Or 27 , 10 P3d 901 (2000), under which multiple offenses merge into a single conviction if the offenses are closely joined in fact and if the anti-merger provisions of ORS 161.067 (set out below) do not apply.”
Martinez v. Cain, 458 P.3d 670 (Or. 2020).
“Petitioner’s trial counsel did not object or argue that the trial court should have merged the convictions under ORS 161.067, which governs merger. That statute sets out when a trial court may enter separate convictions sentences if a defendant has violated multiple statutory…”
State v. Paye, 486 P.3d 808 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
“Thus, under Mansor II, this is not a situation in which the omission of temporal limitations renders the warrant unconstitutionally overbroad.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.067(1)(b) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.067(2) — 74 cases
State v. Gensitskiy, 446 P.3d 26 (Or. 2019).
“In support of his argument, defendant relied on ORS 161.067, which establishes rules for when statutory violations, based on *30 the same conduct or criminal episode, constitute "separately punishable offenses.”
State v. Glaspey, 55 P.3d 562 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
“160(3) is concerned, defendant acknowledges that the legislature has defined the term "victim" in a number of different statutory settings, but argues that each applies to listed statutory provisions and none expressly applies to ORS 163.”
State v. Luers, 153 P.3d 688 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
“Barrett, 331 Or 27 , 10 P3d 901 (2000), under which multiple offenses merge into a single conviction if the offenses are closely joined in fact and if the anti-merger provisions of ORS 161.067 (set out below) do not apply.”
State v. Paye, 486 P.3d 808 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
“Thus, under Mansor II, this is not a situation in which the omission of temporal limitations renders the warrant unconstitutionally overbroad.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.067(2)(d) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.067(2)(e) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.067(3) — 139 cases
State v. Nelson, 386 P.3d 73 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
“As we explain below, we agree with defendant that the court should have merged the guilty verdicts for sexual abuse into one conviction for first-degree sexual abuse because there was no evidence to support the trial court’s determination that each instance of sexual contact was…”
State v. White, 211 P.3d 248 (Or. 2009).
“[2] In my view, an examination of the text, context, and history of ORS 161.067 leads to a simpler and less subjective interpretation of the phrase "statutory provision" than a synthesis of our cases yields.”
State v. Barton, 468 P.3d 510 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that ORS 161.067 precluded merger of Count 1 with Count 7 for the 2016 buck and merger of Count 3 with Count 8 for the 2015 buck.”
State v. White, 147 P.3d 313 (Or. 2006).
“In this criminal appeal, we are asked to explain the correct application of ORS 161.067, the so-called anti-merger statute, in circumstances in which a defendant is charged with multiple counts of burglary based on the same incident.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.067(f) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.067(l)(b) — 1 case
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