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Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (2026)

Sentencing for aggravated murder; proceedings; issues for jury

✓ current as of May 2026
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      163.150 Sentencing for aggravated murder; proceedings; issues for jury. (1)(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of aggravated murder, the court, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c), life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b), or death. The proceeding shall be conducted in the trial court before the trial jury as soon as practicable. If a juror for any reason is unable to perform the function of a juror, the juror shall be dismissed from the sentencing proceeding. The court shall cause to be drawn the name of one of the alternate jurors, who shall then become a member of the jury for the sentencing proceeding notwithstanding the fact that the alternate juror did not deliberate on the issue of guilt. If the defendant has pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the victim’s family and any aggravating or mitigating evidence relevant to the issue in paragraph (b)(C) of this subsection; however, neither the state nor the defendant shall be allowed to introduce repetitive evidence that has previously been offered and received during the trial on the issue of guilt. The court shall instruct the jury that all evidence previously offered and received may be considered for purposes of the sentencing hearing. This paragraph shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Oregon. The state and the defendant or the counsel of the defendant shall be permitted to present arguments for or against a sentence of death and for or against a sentence of life imprisonment with or without the possibility of release or parole.

      (b) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:

      (A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another would result;

      (B) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased; and

      (C) Whether the defendant should receive a death sentence.

      (c)(A) The court shall instruct the jury to consider, in determining the issues in paragraph (b) of this subsection, any mitigating circumstances offered in evidence, including but not limited to the defendant’s age, the extent and severity of the defendant’s prior criminal conduct and the extent of the mental and emotional pressure under which the defendant was acting at the time the offense was committed.

      (B) The court shall instruct the jury to answer the question in paragraph (b)(C) of this subsection “no” if, after considering any aggravating evidence and any mitigating evidence concerning any aspect of the defendant’s character or background, or any circumstances of the offense and any victim impact evidence as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection, one or more of the jurors believe that the defendant should not receive a death sentence.

      (d) The state must prove each issue submitted under paragraph (b) of this subsection beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury shall return a special verdict of “yes” or “no” on each issue considered.

      (e) The court shall charge the jury that it may not answer any issue “yes,” under paragraph (b) of this subsection unless it agrees unanimously.

      (f) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue considered under paragraph (b) of this subsection, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant to death.

      (2)(a) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall also instruct the jury that if it reaches a negative finding on any issue under subsection (1)(b) of this section, the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b), unless 10 or more members of the jury further find that there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment, in which case the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c).

      (b) If the jury returns a negative finding on any issue under subsection (1)(b) of this section and further finds that there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment, the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections as provided in ORS 163.105 (1)(c).

      (3)(a) When the defendant is found guilty of aggravated murder, and ORS 137.707 (2) applies or the state advises the court on the record that the state declines to present evidence for purposes of sentencing the defendant to death, the court:

      (A) Shall not conduct a sentencing proceeding as described in subsection (1) of this section, and a sentence of death shall not be ordered.

      (B) Shall conduct a sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b) or life imprisonment as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c). If the defendant waives all rights to a jury sentencing proceeding, the court shall conduct the sentencing proceeding as the trier of fact. The procedure for the sentencing proceeding, whether before a court or a jury, shall follow the procedure of subsection (1)(a) of this section, as modified by this subsection. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the victim’s family.

      (b) Following the presentation of evidence and argument under paragraph (a) of this subsection, the court shall instruct the jury that the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b), unless after considering all of the evidence submitted, 10 or more members of the jury find there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment with the possibility of parole as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c). If 10 or more members of the jury find there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c).

      (c) Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the court from sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c), or life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b), pursuant to a stipulation of sentence or stipulation of sentencing facts agreed to and offered by both parties if the defendant waives all rights to a jury sentencing proceeding.

      (4) If any part of subsection (2) of this section is held invalid and as a result thereof a defendant who has been sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole will instead be sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections as provided in ORS 163.105 (2), the defendant shall be confined for a minimum of 30 years without possibility of parole, release on work release or any form of temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp. Subsection (2) of this section shall apply only to trials commencing on or after July 19, 1989.

      (5) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a) of this section, if the trial court grants a mistrial during the sentencing proceeding, the trial court, at the election of the state, shall either:

      (a) Sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life in the custody of the Department of Corrections as provided in ORS 163.105 (1)(c); or

      (b) Impanel a new sentencing jury for the purpose of conducting a new sentencing proceeding to determine if the defendant should be sentenced to:

      (A) Death;

      (B) Imprisonment for life without the possibility of release or parole as provided in ORS 163.105 (1)(b); or

      (C) Imprisonment for life in the custody of the Department of Corrections as provided in ORS 163.105 (1)(c). [1985 c.3 §3; 1987 c.320 §86; 1987 c.557 §1; 1989 c.720 §2; 1989 c.790 §135b; 1991 c.725 §2; 1991 c.885 §2; 1995 c.531 §2; 1995 c.657 §23; 1997 c.784 §1; 1999 c.1055 §1; 2001 c.306 §1; 2005 c.480 §1; 2017 c.359 §4; 2019 c.635 §5]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 181 cases (20 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case: State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004).
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State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). · cites it 218× “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). · cites it 170× “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). · cites it 108× “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). · cites it 94× “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
State v. Acremant, 108 P.3d 1139 (Or. 2005). · cites it 70× “” The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and was amended to its current wording in 1991.”
State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000). · cites it 49× “When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985) provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).”
State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847 (Or. 2003). · cites it 58× “105(l)(a), 10 when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits…”
State v. Washington, 330 P.3d 596 (Or. 2014). · cites it 45× “In a further proceeding under ORS 163.150, the jury answered the applicable penalty-phase questions in the affirmative.”
State v. Moore, 927 P.2d 1073 (Or. 1996). · cites it 52× “Rather, the jury must decide by answering the questions required by ORS 163.150 whether a particular defendant should or should not receive a death sentence.”
State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111 (Or. 1990). · cites it 34× “See ORS 163.150. The grand jury made a determination of the likelihood of defendant's guilt sufficient to justify indicting him and then heard evidence on the penalty phase issues.”
State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994). · cites it 58× “[5] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to a question that defendant's lawyer asked a state's witness on cross-examination. The witness, defendant's wife, [6] testified on direct examination that defendant had abused her and her…”
State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904 (Or. 1993). · cites it 42× “2d 1136 (1988) ( Wagner I ) (statutory term is not indefinite, because it restricts jury to consideration of acts of criminal violence). The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on specific criminal acts of violence.”
Show all 181 citing cases →
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1) — 35 cases
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
Hayward v. Belleque, 273 P.3d 926 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(B) — 1 case
Cunningham v. Premo, 373 P.3d 1167 (Marion Cty. Cir. Ct., O.R. 2016).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(a) — 33 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Acremant, 108 P.3d 1139 (Or. 2005). “” The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and was amended to its current wording in 1991.”
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111 (Or. 1990). “See ORS 163.150. The grand jury made a determination of the likelihood of defendant's guilt sufficient to justify indicting him and then heard evidence on the penalty phase issues.”
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(b) — 40 cases
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111 (Or. 1990). “See ORS 163.150. The grand jury made a determination of the likelihood of defendant's guilt sufficient to justify indicting him and then heard evidence on the penalty phase issues.”
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(b)(1985) — 1 case
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(b)(A) — 17 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Montez, 789 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1990).
State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994). “[5] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to a question that defendant's lawyer asked a state's witness on cross-examination. The witness, defendant's wife, [6] testified on direct examination that defendant had abused her and her…”
State v. Oatney, 66 P.3d 475 (Or. 2003).
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(b)(B) — 32 cases
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111 (Or. 1990). “See ORS 163.150. The grand jury made a determination of the likelihood of defendant's guilt sufficient to justify indicting him and then heard evidence on the penalty phase issues.”
State v. Moore, 927 P.2d 1073 (Or. 1996). “Rather, the jury must decide by answering the questions required by ORS 163.150 whether a particular defendant should or should not receive a death sentence.”
Cunningham v. Thompson, 62 P.3d 823 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904 (Or. 1993). “2d 1136 (1988) ( Wagner I ) (statutory term is not indefinite, because it restricts jury to consideration of acts of criminal violence). The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on specific criminal acts of violence.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(b)(C) — 5 cases
State v. Montez, 789 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1990).
State v. Acremant, 108 P.3d 1139 (Or. 2005). “” The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and was amended to its current wording in 1991.”
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847 (Or. 2003). “105(l)(a), 10 when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits…”
State v. Metz, 887 P.2d 795 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(b)(D) — 20 cases
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Acremant, 108 P.3d 1139 (Or. 2005). “” The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and was amended to its current wording in 1991.”
State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994). “[5] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to a question that defendant's lawyer asked a state's witness on cross-examination. The witness, defendant's wife, [6] testified on direct examination that defendant had abused her and her…”
State v. Langley, 424 P.3d 688 (Or. 2018).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(c) — 9 cases
State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994). “[5] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to a question that defendant's lawyer asked a state's witness on cross-examination. The witness, defendant's wife, [6] testified on direct examination that defendant had abused her and her…”
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
State v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308 (Or. 1992).
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Metz, 887 P.2d 795 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(c)(A) — 4 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
Montez v. Czerniak, 239 P.3d 1023 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Washington (Or. 2014).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(c)(B) — 15 cases
State v. Acremant, 108 P.3d 1139 (Or. 2005). “” The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and was amended to its current wording in 1991.”
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994). “[5] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to a question that defendant's lawyer asked a state's witness on cross-examination. The witness, defendant's wife, [6] testified on direct examination that defendant had abused her and her…”
State v. Wright, 913 P.2d 321 (Or. 1996).
State v. Brumwell, 249 P.3d 965 (Or. 2011).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(d) — 9 cases
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Oatney, 66 P.3d 475 (Or. 2003).
State v. Langley, 424 P.3d 688 (Or. 2018).
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(e) — 11 cases
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
State v. Montez, 789 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1990).
State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904 (Or. 1993). “2d 1136 (1988) ( Wagner I ) (statutory term is not indefinite, because it restricts jury to consideration of acts of criminal violence). The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on specific criminal acts of violence.”
State v. Taylor, 434 P.3d 331 (Or. 2019).
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(f) — 23 cases
State v. Montez, 789 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1990).
State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904 (Or. 1993). “2d 1136 (1988) ( Wagner I ) (statutory term is not indefinite, because it restricts jury to consideration of acts of criminal violence). The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on specific criminal acts of violence.”
State v. Smith, 791 P.2d 836 (Or. 1990).
State v. Walton, 809 P.2d 81 (Or. 1991).
State v. Charboneau, 913 P.2d 308 (Or. 1996).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(g) — 24 cases
Whitmore Ex Rel. Simmons v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
State v. Acremant, 108 P.3d 1139 (Or. 2005). “” The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and was amended to its current wording in 1991.”
State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994). “[5] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to a question that defendant's lawyer asked a state's witness on cross-examination. The witness, defendant's wife, [6] testified on direct examination that defendant had abused her and her…”
State v. McDonnell, 837 P.2d 941 (Or. 1992).
State v. Wright, 913 P.2d 321 (Or. 1996).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(12)(b) — 1 case
State v. Brumwell, 249 P.3d 965 (Or. 2011).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(2) — 22 cases
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000). “When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985) provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).”
State v. Langley, 839 P.2d 692 (Or. 1992).
State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111 (Or. 1990). “See ORS 163.150. The grand jury made a determination of the likelihood of defendant's guilt sufficient to justify indicting him and then heard evidence on the penalty phase issues.”
State v. Montez, 789 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1990).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(2)(a) — 16 cases
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Langley, 861 P.2d 1012 (Or. 1993).
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Tinoco-Camarena, 489 P.3d 572 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Metz, 986 P.2d 714 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(2)(b) — 5 cases
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Weaver, 472 P.3d 717 (Or. 2020).
State v. Langley, 861 P.2d 1012 (Or. 1993).
Harned v. Amsberry, 499 P.3d 825 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Ramsey, 173 P.3d 142 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(2)(b)(A) — 1 case
State v. Montez, 789 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1990).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(2)(f) — 1 case
State v. McDonnell, 837 P.2d 941 (Or. 1992).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(3) — 4 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Link, 441 P.3d 664 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Ramsey, 173 P.3d 142 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Hill, 921 P.2d 969 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(3)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847 (Or. 2003). “105(l)(a), 10 when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits…”
Harned v. Amsberry, 499 P.3d 825 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(3)(a)(A) — 2 cases
State v. Link, 441 P.3d 664 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Ramsey, 173 P.3d 142 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(3)(a)(B) — 4 cases
State v. Link, 482 P.3d 28 (Or. 2021).
State v. Ramsey, 173 P.3d 142 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
Harned v. Amsberry, 499 P.3d 825 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
Myers v. Howton, 439 P.3d 472 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(3)(b) — 3 cases
State v. Link, 441 P.3d 664 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Ramsey, 173 P.3d 142 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
Barrett v. Bd. of Parole, 522 P.3d 544 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(3)(b)(B) — 1 case
State v. Ramsey, 173 P.3d 142 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(3)(c) — 1 case
Goff v. Fhuere, 335 Or. App. 261 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(3Xa) — 1 case
State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847 (Or. 2003). “105(l)(a), 10 when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(4) — 3 cases
State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000). “When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985) provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).”
State v. Langley, 861 P.2d 1012 (Or. 1993).
State v. Langley, 16 P.3d 489 (Or. 2000).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(5) — 8 cases
State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000). “When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985) provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).”
State v. McDonnell, 987 P.2d 486 (Or. 1999).
State v. Langley, 16 P.3d 489 (Or. 2000).
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(5)(a) — 10 cases
State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000). “When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985) provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).”
State v. McDonnell, 987 P.2d 486 (Or. 1999).
State v. Smith, 791 P.2d 836 (Or. 1990).
McDonnell v. Premo, 483 P.3d 640 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
State Ex Rel. Carlile v. Frost, 956 P.2d 202 (Or. 1998).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(5)(a)(A) — 1 case
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(5)(a)(B) — 2 cases
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000). “When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985) provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(5)(b) — 1 case
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(5)(c) — 1 case
State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990). “The first question before us is whether ORS 163.150 (1987 Replacement Part) (in effect for defendant's trial and later amended as of July 24, 1989) permits the trial judge to submit to the sentencing jury a so-called "fourth question," i.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(5)(d) — 4 cases
State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000). “When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985) provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).”
State v. Guzek, 153 P.3d 101 (Or. 2007).
Humphreys v. State, 947 P.2d 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
State Ex Rel. Carlile v. Frost, 956 P.2d 202 (Or. 1998).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(5)(e) — 3 cases
State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000). “When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985) provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).”
State v. McDonnell, 987 P.2d 486 (Or. 1999).
State v. Langley, 16 P.3d 489 (Or. 2000).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(5Xa) — 2 cases
State v. McDonnell, 987 P.2d 486 (Or. 1999).
State Ex Rel. Carlile v. Frost, 956 P.2d 202 (Or. 1998).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(6) — 3 cases
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Walton, 894 P.2d 1212 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. McDonnell, 733 P.2d 935 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(b) — 1 case
State v. Wolfe, 486 P.3d 748 (Or. 2021).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(b)(B) — 1 case
State v. Wolfe, 486 P.3d 748 (Or. 2021).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(b)(C) — 1 case
State v. Rogers, 288 P.3d 544 (Or. 2012).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(b)(D) — 1 case
State v. Langley, 16 P.3d 489 (Or. 2000).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(g) — 1 case
State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994). “[5] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to a question that defendant's lawyer asked a state's witness on cross-examination. The witness, defendant's wife, [6] testified on direct examination that defendant had abused her and her…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(a) — 33 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847 (Or. 2003). “105(l)(a), 10 when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits…”
State v. Sparks, 83 P.3d 304 (Or. 2004).
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
State v. Washington, 330 P.3d 596 (Or. 2014). “In a further proceeding under ORS 163.150, the jury answered the applicable penalty-phase questions in the affirmative.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(b) — 43 cases
State v. Turnidge, 374 P.3d 853 (Or. 2016).
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904 (Or. 1993). “2d 1136 (1988) ( Wagner I ) (statutory term is not indefinite, because it restricts jury to consideration of acts of criminal violence). The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on specific criminal acts of violence.”
State v. McAnulty, 338 P.3d 653 (Or. 2014).
State v. Terry, 37 P.3d 157 (Or. 2001).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(b)(A) — 14 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
Johnson v. Premo, 399 P.3d 431 (Or. 2017).
State v. Washington, 330 P.3d 596 (Or. 2014). “In a further proceeding under ORS 163.150, the jury answered the applicable penalty-phase questions in the affirmative.”
State v. Montez, 927 P.2d 64 (Or. 1996).
State v. Johnson, 131 P.3d 173 (Or. 2006).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(b)(B) — 28 cases
State v. Moore, 927 P.2d 1073 (Or. 1996). “Rather, the jury must decide by answering the questions required by ORS 163.150 whether a particular defendant should or should not receive a death sentence.”
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “Quite simply, the people of this state decided by more than a 75 percent margin that the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment were sufficient protection for individuals charged with such homicides.”
State v. Sparks, 83 P.3d 304 (Or. 2004).
State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847 (Or. 2003). “105(l)(a), 10 when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits…”
State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904 (Or. 1993). “2d 1136 (1988) ( Wagner I ) (statutory term is not indefinite, because it restricts jury to consideration of acts of criminal violence). The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on specific criminal acts of violence.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(b)(C) — 7 cases
State v. Rogers, 288 P.3d 544 (Or. 2012).
State v. Serrano, 324 P.3d 1274 (Or. 2014).
State v. Acremant, 108 P.3d 1139 (Or. 2005). “” The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and was amended to its current wording in 1991.”
State v. Sparks, 83 P.3d 304 (Or. 2004).
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(b)(D) — 22 cases
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
State v. Washington, 330 P.3d 596 (Or. 2014). “In a further proceeding under ORS 163.150, the jury answered the applicable penalty-phase questions in the affirmative.”
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847 (Or. 2003). “105(l)(a), 10 when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits…”
State v. Turnidge, 374 P.3d 853 (Or. 2016).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(c) — 8 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Stevens, 806 P.2d 92 (Or. 1991).
State v. Bowen, 135 P.3d 272 (Or. 2006).
State v. Metz, 887 P.2d 795 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
State v. Washington, 330 P.3d 596 (Or. 2014). “In a further proceeding under ORS 163.150, the jury answered the applicable penalty-phase questions in the affirmative.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(c)(A) — 3 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
State v. Washington, 330 P.3d 596 (Or. 2014). “In a further proceeding under ORS 163.150, the jury answered the applicable penalty-phase questions in the affirmative.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(c)(B) — 10 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847 (Or. 2003). “105(l)(a), 10 when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits…”
State v. Washington, 330 P.3d 596 (Or. 2014). “In a further proceeding under ORS 163.150, the jury answered the applicable penalty-phase questions in the affirmative.”
State v. Bowen, 135 P.3d 272 (Or. 2006).
State v. Acremant, 108 P.3d 1139 (Or. 2005). “” The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and was amended to its current wording in 1991.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(d) — 7 cases
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
State v. Longo, 148 P.3d 892 (Or. 2006).
State v. Gornick, 102 P.3d 734 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. McAnulty, 338 P.3d 653 (Or. 2014).
State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272 (Or. 1995). “When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation).”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(e) — 3 cases
State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904 (Or. 1993). “2d 1136 (1988) ( Wagner I ) (statutory term is not indefinite, because it restricts jury to consideration of acts of criminal violence). The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on specific criminal acts of violence.”
State v. Wille, 858 P.2d 128 (Or. 1993).
State v. Agee, 364 P.3d 971 (Or. 2015).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(f) — 22 cases
State v. Smith, 791 P.2d 836 (Or. 1990).
State v. McAnulty, 338 P.3d 653 (Or. 2014).
State v. Sparks, 83 P.3d 304 (Or. 2004).
State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904 (Or. 1993). “2d 1136 (1988) ( Wagner I ) (statutory term is not indefinite, because it restricts jury to consideration of acts of criminal violence). The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on specific criminal acts of violence.”
State v. Brown, 800 P.2d 259 (Or. 1990).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(l)(g) — 29 cases
State v. McDonnell, 837 P.2d 941 (Or. 1992).
State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000). “When defendant committed his crimes, ORS 163.150 (1985) provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life in prison with a 30-year minimum (ordinary life).”
State v. Cunningham, 880 P.2d 431 (Or. 1994).
State v. Smith, 791 P.2d 836 (Or. 1990).
State v. Sparks, 83 P.3d 304 (Or. 2004).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(lXa) — 1 case
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(lXb)(D) — 1 case
State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004). “We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(lXc)(B) — 1 case
State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847 (Or. 2003). “105(l)(a), 10 when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.