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Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.707 (2026)

Mandatory minimum sentences for certain juvenile offenders waived to adult court; lesser included offenses; return to juvenile court

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1997–2025 61citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 61 opinions since 1997, 13 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (2) (10 cases).

      137.707 Mandatory minimum sentences for certain juvenile offenders waived to adult court; lesser included offenses; return to juvenile court. (1) When a person waived under ORS 419C.349 (1)(a) is convicted of an offense listed in subsection (4) of this section, the court shall impose at least the presumptive term of imprisonment provided for the offense in subsection (4) of this section. The court may impose a greater presumptive term if otherwise permitted by law, but may not impose a lesser term. The person is not, during the service of the term of imprisonment, eligible for release on post-prison supervision or any form of temporary leave from custody. The person is not eligible for any reduction in the minimum sentence for any reason under ORS 421.121 or any other provision of law. The person is eligible for a hearing and conditional release under ORS 420A.203 and 420A.206.

      (2) ORS 138.052, 163.105 and 163.150 apply to sentencing a person prosecuted under this section and convicted of aggravated murder under ORS 163.095 except that a person who was under 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed is not subject to a sentence of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole.

      (3) The court shall commit the person to the legal and physical custody of the Department of Corrections.

      (4) The offenses to which this section applies and the presumptive sentences are:

______________________________________________________________________________

 

      (a)(A)        Murder in the second

                        degree, as defined in

                        ORS 163.115.             300 months

      (B)             Murder in the first

                        degree, as defined

                        in ORS 163.107.         360 months

      (C)             Attempt or conspiracy

                        to commit aggravated

                        murder, as defined

                        in ORS 163.095.         120 months

      (D)             Attempt or conspiracy

                        to commit murder

                        in any degree.             90 months

      (E)             Manslaughter in the

                        first degree, as defined

                        in ORS 163.118.         120 months

      (F)             Manslaughter in the

                        second degree, as defined

                        in ORS 163.125.         75 months

      (G)             Assault in the first

                        degree, as defined

                        in ORS 163.185.         90 months

      (H)             Assault in the second

                        degree, as defined

                        in ORS 163.175.         70 months

      (I)              Kidnapping in the first

                        degree, as defined in

                        ORS 163.235.             90 months

      (J)              Kidnapping in the second

                        degree, as defined in

                        ORS 163.225.             70 months

      (K)             Rape in the first degree,

                        as defined in ORS 163.375.    100 months

      (L)             Rape in the second

                        degree, as defined in

                        ORS 163.365.             75 months

      (M)            Sodomy in the first

                        degree, as defined in

                        ORS 163.405.             100 months

      (N)             Sodomy in the second

                        degree, as defined in

                        ORS 163.395.             75 months

      (O)             Unlawful sexual

                        penetration in the first

                        degree, as defined

                        in ORS 163.411.         100 months

      (P)             Unlawful sexual

                        penetration in the

                        second degree, as

                        defined in ORS 163.408.        75 months

      (Q)             Sexual abuse in the first

                        degree, as defined in

                        ORS 163.427.             75 months

      (R)             Robbery in the first

                        degree, as defined in

                        ORS 164.415.             90 months

      (S)             Robbery in the second

                        degree, as defined in

                        ORS 164.405.             70 months

      (b)(A)        Arson in the first degree,

                        as defined in ORS 164.325,

                        when the offense represented

                        a threat of serious

                        physical injury.            90 months

      (B)             Using a child in a display

                        of sexually explicit

                        conduct, as defined in

                        ORS 163.670.             70 months

      (C)             Compelling prostitution,

                        as defined in ORS 167.017

                        (1)(a), (b) or (d).         70 months

      (c)              Aggravated vehicular

                        homicide, as defined in

                        ORS 163.149.             240 months

______________________________________________________________________________

 

      (5) If a person charged with an offense under this section is found guilty of a lesser included offense and the lesser included offense is:

      (a) An offense listed in subsection (4) of this section, the court shall sentence the person as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of this section.

      (b) Not an offense listed in subsection (4) of this section:

      (A) But constitutes an offense for which waiver is authorized under ORS 419C.349 (1)(b), the court, upon motion of the district attorney, shall hold a hearing to determine whether to retain jurisdiction or to transfer the case to juvenile court for disposition. In determining whether to retain jurisdiction, the court shall consider the criteria for waiver in ORS 419C.349. If the court retains jurisdiction, the court shall sentence the person as an adult under sentencing guidelines. If the court does not retain jurisdiction, the court shall:

      (i) Order that a presentence report be prepared;

      (ii) Set forth in a memorandum any observations and recommendations that the court deems appropriate;

      (iii) Enter an order transferring the case to the juvenile court for disposition under ORS 419C.067 and 419C.411; and

      (iv) Enter an order providing that all court records of the case are subject to the same limitations on inspection, copying and disclosure of records, reports and materials as those set forth under ORS 419A.255.

      (B) And is not an offense for which waiver is authorized under ORS 419C.349 (1)(b), the court may not sentence the person. The court shall:

      (i) Order that a presentence report be prepared;

      (ii) Set forth in a memorandum any observations and recommendations that the court deems appropriate;

      (iii) Enter an order transferring the case to the juvenile court for disposition under ORS 419C.067 and 419C.411; and

      (iv) Enter an order providing that all court records of the case are subject to the same limitations on inspection, copying and disclosure of records, reports and materials as those set forth under ORS 419A.255.

      (6) When a person is charged under this section, other offenses based on the same act or transaction shall be charged as separate counts in the same accusatory instrument and consolidated for trial, whether or not the other offenses are aggravated murder or offenses listed in subsection (4) of this section. If it appears, upon motion, that the state or the person charged is prejudiced by the joinder and consolidation of offenses, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts or provide whatever other relief justice requires.

      (7)(a) If a person charged and tried as provided in subsection (6) of this section is found guilty of aggravated murder or an offense listed in subsection (4) of this section and one or more other offenses, the court shall impose the sentence for aggravated murder or the offense listed in subsection (4) of this section as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of this section and shall impose sentences for the other offenses as otherwise provided by law.

      (b) If a person charged and tried as provided in subsection (6) of this section is not found guilty of aggravated murder or an offense listed in subsection (4) of this section, but is found guilty of one of the other charges that constitutes an offense for which waiver is authorized under ORS 419C.349 (1)(b), the court, upon motion of the district attorney, shall hold a hearing to determine whether to retain jurisdiction or to transfer the case to juvenile court for disposition. In determining whether to retain jurisdiction, the court shall consider the criteria for waiver in ORS 419C.349. If the court retains jurisdiction, the court shall sentence the person as an adult under sentencing guidelines. If the court does not retain jurisdiction, the court shall:

      (A) Order that a presentence report be prepared;

      (B) Set forth in a memorandum any observations and recommendations that the court deems appropriate;

      (C) Enter an order transferring the case to the juvenile court for disposition under ORS 419C.067 and 419C.411; and

      (D) Enter an order providing that all court records of the case are subject to the same limitations on inspection, copying and disclosure of records, reports and materials as those set forth under ORS 419A.255. [1995 c.422 §49; 1995 c.421 §4; 1997 c.852 §3; 1999 c.1055 §12; 2007 c.867 §6; 2011 c.334 §2; 2019 c.634 §5; 2019 c.635 §11]

 

      Note: See second note under 137.700.

The 20 cases that cite Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.707 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Conrad, 381 P.3d 880 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 137.707 19×subsections: (2) 18×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“” ORS 137.707 codifies the portion of Ballot Measure 11 (1995) that requires mandatory minimum sentences for defendants that are 15, 16, and 17 years of age convicted of certain crimes- — -including first-degree sexual abuse.”
The case’s holding
A trial court satisfies the required balancing test if the totality of the circumstances indicates the court implicitly weighed the costs of the evidence against its benefits.
Later courts cite it for
“the totality of the attendant circumstances.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Thorp, 2 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 137.707 20×subsections: (4)(a)(G) 2× (4)(a)(R) 2× (4)(b)(B) 2× (4)(b)(C) 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“At sentencing, the trial court refused to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 75 months for the crime of second degree rape required by ORS 137.707, finding that such a sentence would be unconstitutional as applied to this defendant, under Article I, section 16, of the…”
The case’s holding
A mandatory minimum sentence violates the state constitution only if it is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable persons.
Later courts cite it for
“the test for determining whether a sentence violates the proportionality provision in article i, section 16, is whether the sentence is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable persons as to what is right and proper.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Link, 441 P.3d 664 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 137.707 7×subsections: (2) 3× (1) (1)(a) (5)(b)(A)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“105(1) provides, in part, that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in ORS 137.707, when a defendant is convicted of *175 aggravated murder * * * the defendant shall be sentenced, pursuant to ORS 163.”
The case’s holding
The Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing a state's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders without a procedural mechanism for the sentencer to consider the mitigating qualities of youth.
Later courts cite it for
“court cannot impose the state's most severe penalties on a juvenile offender without regard for the unique qualities of youth that might make imposition of that sentence inappropriate” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Link, 482 P.3d 28 (Or. 2021).
cites § 137.707 4×subsections: (1)(a) (2)cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“005(1) (2001) (noting that ORS 137.707 sets forth an exception to the juvenile court’s “exclusive original jurisdiction” over “any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age and who has committed an act which is a violation, or which if done by an adult would…”
The case’s holding
Courts generally decline to reach unpreserved arguments under state law (noting a recent trend in case law against reaching such arguments).
Later courts cite it for
“just as an issue that was not preserved at the trial court ordinarily is not amenable to consideration by the court of appeals, issues that were not raised in a party's brief to the court of appeals ordinarily will not be considered by this court.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Pike, 33 P.3d 374 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 137.707 15×subsections: (5)(b)(B) 3× (1)(a) 2× (5) 2× (1)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“See ORS 137.707. Subsection (l)(a) of that statute provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when a person charged with * * * an offense listed in subsection (4)(a) of this section is 15, 16 or 17 years of age at the time the offense is committed, * * * the person…”
Later courts cite it for
“as a general rule, if a person is over 18 when he or she is charged with a criminal offense, that person will be tried as an adult,” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Godines, 236 P.3d 824 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 137.707 9×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“700 provided, in part: “(1) When a person is convicted of one of the offenses listed in subsection (2)(a) of this section, * * * the court shall impose, and the person shall serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment listed in subsection (2) of this section.”
Later courts cite it for
“we necessarily must examine the merits of defendant's alleged error for the sole purpose of determining whether that alleged error is an 'obvious' one.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Yarger, 908 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2009).
cites § 137.707 7×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“In reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals stated: From a purely textual standpoint, the phrase “15, 16 or 17 years of age at the time the offense is committed” in ORS 137.707 is, as the trial court recognized, arguably susceptible to both a broad and a narrow…”
8
GREENState v. Gaige, 468 P.3d 532 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 137.707 9×subsections: (1)(b) 2× (1)(a)cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“ORS 137.707 (2015), amended by Or Laws 2019, ch 634, § 5,3 in effect when defendant committed his crimes, 3 In 2019, the legislature substantially amended ORS 137.”
Later courts cite it for
“due process requires the sort of hearing for which a defendant argues only when a state's statutory scheme grants a juvenile court discretion to determine whether a youth should be remanded to adult court or, instead, remain in juvenile court.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENState v. Rhodes, 941 P.2d 1072 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 137.707 6×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“He contends that the trial court erred in imposing the mandatory minimum sentence of 75 months as prescribed by ORS 137.707. 1 We review the trial court’s imposition of sentence for errors of law, ORS 138.”
The case’s holding
A mandatory 75-month sentence for first-degree sexual abuse of a child is not disproportionate under the Oregon Constitution's cruel and unusual punishment clause.
10
GREENState v. Cid, 500 P.3d 758 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 137.707 3×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“700 rather than ORS 137.707 and (2) failing to clarify that defendant was eligible for a “Second Look hearing” pursuant to “ORS 420A.”
Later courts cite it for
“based on the court's erroneous understanding that imposition of the fines was mandatory,” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENState v. George, 97 P.3d 656 (Or. 2004).
cites § 137.707 3×subsections: (2) 3×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“(4) During the sentencing proceeding, the state asked Baker, the mother of defendant's intended rape victim, to testify about how a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole might affect her and her daughter. Defendant objected, but his objection was overruled.”
Later courts cite it for
“our requirements respecting preservation do not demand that parties make what the record demonstrates would be futile gestures.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENGraham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
cites § 137.707 1×cited by 3,358 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“) Oregon Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 137.707, 137.719(1) (2009) Pennsylvania 42 Pa.”
Later courts cite it for
“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” · 252 citing courts
13
GREENState ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Fitch, 84 P.3d 190 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 137.707 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“See ORS 137.707; see generally State v. Pike, 177 Or.”
The case’s holding
The juvenile code decriminalizes responsibility for the commission of a crime rather than the conduct itself, meaning hindering prosecution applies to conduct classified as a felony.
Later courts cite it for
“juvenile adjudications are not the legal equivalent of criminal prosecutions.” · 2 citing courts
14
NEUTRALState v. Cid, 545 P.3d 1278 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
cites § 137.707 30×subsections: (1) 8× (4)cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 137.707
“In his second, third, and fourth assignments of error and third supplemental pro se assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to merge the guilty findings on three pairs of charges.”
15
GREENState v. Luers, 153 P.3d 688 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 137.707 1×subsections: (2)(b)(A)cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“The trial court therefore did not err in denying defendant’s motions for judgments of acquittal on the elements of his arson convictions elevating them to ORS 137.707(2)(b)(A) offenses. B. Merger of Convictions 1.”
The case’s holding
The mere assertion that evidence relating to some charges will influence the jury's consideration of other charges is insufficient to establish substantial prejudice requiring severance.
Later courts cite it for
“the mere assertion that evidence relating to some charges will influence the jury's consideration of other charges is insufficient” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Kinkel, 56 P.3d 463 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 137.707 2×subsections: (4)(a)(C)cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“Because defendant’s sentences are mandatory minimum sentences under ORS 137.707, he is not eligible for any form of sentence reduction or modification.”
17
GREENState v. Warren, 5 P.3d 1115 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 137.707 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“ORS 137.707. Thus, an argument could be made that the legislature has determined, despite the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, that the offenses are of equal gravity.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must make specific factual findings demonstrating a defendant's willingness to commit multiple discrete offenses to justify consecutive sentences under ORS 137.123(5).
Later courts cite it for
“for errors of law appearing in the record or whether there is evidence to support the trial court's findings” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENNeff v. Jackson Cnty., 67 P.3d 977 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 137.707 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“For that matter, under defendants’ view, a juvenile would attain “15 years of age” for purposes of the application of Ballot Measure 11, ORS 137.707, three or four days before 12 his or her fifteenth birthday.”
19
GREENState v. Link, 208 P.3d 936 (Or. 2009).
cites § 137.707 1×subsections: (2)cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“Defendant was not eligible for the death penalty by virtue of ORS 137.707(2) (prohibiting death penalty for defendant who was under 18 years of age when crime was committed).”
The case’s holding
The question of guilt on a specific charge has independent significance that cannot be foreclosed by merger, and aggravated felony murder requires the defendant to personally perform the homicide.
Later courts cite it for
“the question whether a person is guilty as charged has an independent significance that cannot be foreclosed by later merger. merger presumes the validity of the convictions being merged; acquittals do not merge with convictions.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Dugan, 387 P.3d 439 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 137.707 1×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 137.707
“Defendant, who was tried as an adult under ORS 137.707, waived his right to a jury trial and the trial court found him guilty of two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, ORS 163.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199720112025

One bar per year. Tallest: 6 cases in 2022. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Or. Ct. App.44Or.8D. Or.4SCOTUS29th Cir.1Fla.1Ohio Ct. App.1
By subsection
(1)8 cases
State v. Link, 441 P.3d 664 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).“105(1) provides, in part, that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in ORS 137.707, when a defendant is convicted of *175 aggravated murder * * * the defendant shall be sentenced, pursuant to ORS 163.”
Hardegger v. Amsberry, 473 P.3d 576 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Pike, 33 P.3d 374 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).“See ORS 137.707. Subsection (l)(a) of that statute provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when a person charged with * * * an offense listed in subsection (4)(a) of this section is 15, 16 or 17 years of age at the time the offense is committed, * * * the person…”
State v. Cid, 545 P.3d 1278 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).“In his second, third, and fourth assignments of error and third supplemental pro se assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to merge the guilty findings on three pairs of charges.”
Sexton v. Persson, 341 P.3d 881 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(1)(a)7 cases
State v. Link, 482 P.3d 28 (Or. 2021).“005(1) (2001) (noting that ORS 137.707 sets forth an exception to the juvenile court’s “exclusive original jurisdiction” over “any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age and who has committed an act which is a violation, or which if done by an adult would…”
State v. Link, 441 P.3d 664 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Pike, 33 P.3d 374 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Gaige, 468 P.3d 532 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).“ORS 137.707 (2015), amended by Or Laws 2019, ch 634, § 5,3 in effect when defendant committed his crimes, 3 In 2019, the legislature substantially amended ORS 137.”
State v. Smith, 482 P.3d 174 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(1)(b)2 cases
State v. Gaige, 468 P.3d 532 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Smith, 482 P.3d 174 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
(2)10 cases
State v. Conrad, 381 P.3d 880 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).“” ORS 137.707 codifies the portion of Ballot Measure 11 (1995) that requires mandatory minimum sentences for defendants that are 15, 16, and 17 years of age convicted of certain crimes- — -including first-degree sexual abuse.”
State v. Link, 441 P.3d 664 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. George, 97 P.3d 656 (Or. 2004).“(4) During the sentencing proceeding, the state asked Baker, the mother of defendant's intended rape victim, to testify about how a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole might affect her and her daughter. Defendant objected, but his objection was overruled.”
State v. Link, 482 P.3d 28 (Or. 2021).
State v. Link, 208 P.3d 936 (Or. 2009).“Defendant was not eligible for the death penalty by virtue of ORS 137.707(2) (prohibiting death penalty for defendant who was under 18 years of age when crime was committed).”
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(2)(b)(A)1 case
State v. Luers, 153 P.3d 688 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).“The trial court therefore did not err in denying defendant’s motions for judgments of acquittal on the elements of his arson convictions elevating them to ORS 137.707(2)(b)(A) offenses. B. Merger of Convictions 1.”
(4)5 cases
State v. Marshall, 227 P.3d 786 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Pike, 33 P.3d 374 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
Sexton v. Persson, 341 P.3d 881 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
State v. Cid, 545 P.3d 1278 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Cid, No. A178968 (Or. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2024).
(4)(a)1 case
Dugger v. Schiedler, 27 P.3d 498 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
(4)(a)(C)1 case
State v. Kinkel, 56 P.3d 463 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).“Because defendant’s sentences are mandatory minimum sentences under ORS 137.707, he is not eligible for any form of sentence reduction or modification.”
(4)(a)(G)1 case
State v. Thorp, 2 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).“At sentencing, the trial court refused to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 75 months for the crime of second degree rape required by ORS 137.707, finding that such a sentence would be unconstitutional as applied to this defendant, under Article I, section 16, of the…”
(4)(a)(M)1 case
State v. Fudge, 320 Or. App. 614 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
(4)(a)(R)4 cases
State v. Thorp, 2 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
State v. Shoemaker, 965 P.2d 418 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Lavert, 991 P.2d 1067 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Hamilton, 974 P.2d 245 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
(4)(b)(B)1 case
State v. Thorp, 2 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
(4)(b)(C)1 case
State v. Thorp, 2 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
(5)1 case
State v. Pike, 33 P.3d 374 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
(5)(b)(A)1 case
State v. Link, 441 P.3d 664 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
(5)(b)(B)1 case
State v. Pike, 33 P.3d 374 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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