166.065
Harassment. (1) A
person commits the crime of harassment if the person intentionally:
(a) Harasses or
annoys another person by subjecting such other person to offensive physical
contact;
(b) Subjects
another to alarm by conveying a false report, known by the conveyor to be
false, concerning death or serious physical injury to a person, which report
reasonably would be expected to cause alarm; or
(c) Subjects
another to alarm by conveying a telephonic, electronic or written threat to
inflict serious physical injury on that person or to commit a felony involving
the person or property of that person or any member of that person’s family,
which threat reasonably would be expected to cause alarm.
(2)(a) A person
is criminally liable for harassment if the person knowingly permits any
telephone or electronic device under the person’s control to be used in
violation of subsection (1) of this section.
(b) Harassment
that is committed under the circumstances described in subsection (1)(c) of
this section is committed in either the county in which the communication
originated or the county in which the communication was received.
(3) Harassment is
a Class B misdemeanor.
(4)
Notwithstanding subsection (3) of this section, harassment is a Class A
misdemeanor if a person violates:
(a) Subsection
(1)(a) of this section by subjecting another person to offensive physical
contact and:
(A) The offensive
physical contact consists of touching the sexual or other intimate parts of the
other person; or
(B)(i) The victim
of the offense is a family or household member of the person; and
(ii) The offense
is committed in the immediate presence of, or is witnessed by, the person’s or
the victim’s minor child or stepchild or a minor child residing within the
household of the person or victim; or
(b) Subsection
(1)(c) of this section and:
(A) The person
has a previous conviction under subsection (1)(c) of this section and the
victim of the current offense was the victim or a member of the family of the
victim of the previous offense;
(B) At the time
the offense was committed, the victim was protected by a stalking protective
order, a restraining order as defined in ORS 24.190 or any other court order
prohibiting the person from contacting the victim;
(C) At the time
the offense was committed, the person reasonably believed the victim to be
under 18 years of age and more than three years younger than the person; or
(D)(i) The person
conveyed a threat to kill the other person or any member of the family of the
other person;
(ii) The person
expressed the intent to carry out the threat; and
(iii) A
reasonable person would believe that the threat was likely to be followed by
action.
(c) Subsection
(1)(a), (b) or (c) of this section by committing the crime of harassment
against:
(A) An election
worker who is performing the election worker’s official duties at the time the
harassment occurs; or
(B) An election
worker because of an action taken or decision made by the election worker
during the performance of the election worker’s official duties.
(5) The Oregon
Criminal Justice Commission shall classify harassment as described in
subsection (4)(a)(B) of this section as a person Class A misdemeanor under the
rules of the commission.
(6)(a) As used in
this section:
(A) “Election
worker” has the meaning given that term in ORS 247.965.
(B) “Electronic
threat” means a threat conveyed by electronic mail, the Internet, a telephone
text message or any other transmission of information by wire, radio, optical
cable, cellular system, electromagnetic system or other similar means.
(C) “Family or
household member” has the meaning given that term in ORS 135.230.
(b) For purposes
of subsection (4) of this section, an offense is witnessed if the offense is
seen or directly perceived in any other manner by the minor child. [1971 c.743 §223;
1981 c.468 §1; 1985 c.498 §1; 1987 c.806 §3; 1995 c.802 §1; 2001 c.870 §2; 2009
c.783 §1; 2013 c.649 §26; 2017 c.430 §1; 2019 c.304 §3; 2022 c.114 §2; 2025
c.375 §3]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
373
cases (
147 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case:
State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985).
State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985).
· cites it 44× “A comparison of “harassment” as defined in ORS 166.065 (l)(d) with “coercion,” as defined in the statute invalidated in Robertson , shows the following differences.”
State v. Keller, 594 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 29× “In doing so, we pointed out that this subsection of ORS 166.065 was derived from New York Penal Law § 240.”
State v. Sallinger, 504 P.2d 1383 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).
· cites it 33× “225, based on an indictment that charged he unlawfully entered a dwelling house with the intent to commit the crime of harassment, ORS 166.065, therein. His principal contention on appeal is that the harassment statute, ORS 166.”
State v. Ray, 733 P.2d 28 (Or. 1987).
· cites it 18× “Oregon's earlier harassment statute forbidding some types of telephone calls was constitutionally inadequate because it did not require an "effect" on the listener and the prohibited conduct was not narrowly defined.”
State v. Eggers, 532 P.3d 518 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 9× “” As charged here, a person commits the crime of harassment under ORS 166.065 if the person intentionally “[h]arasses or annoys another person” by “[s]ubjecting such other person to offensive physical con- tact.”
State v. Rogers, 457 P.3d 363 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 7× “With respect to the meaning of “convey” within ORS 166.065 (1)(c), the state argues that the plain meaning of that term includes indirect communication through intermediaries.”
State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982).
· cites it 4× “Blair, supra, we similarly were unable to define and explain what would constitute communicating “in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm,” which was made the crime of “harassment” by ORS 166.065(1) (c). There is an additional element bearing on the review of statutes for…”
State v. Eggers, 372 Or. 789 (Or. 2024).
· cites it 5× “The misdemeanor crime of harassment—set out at ORS 166.065—provides that one, among many, ways a per- son can commit the crime is “if the person intentionally * * * [h]arasses or annoys another person by * * * [s]ubjecting such other person to offensive physical contact.”
State v. Harrington, 680 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 14× “345, or harassment, ORS 166.065, when such crimes are motivated by the race, color, religion or national origin of the victim.”
State v. Shifflett, 398 P.3d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 6× “Defendant was charged by information with one count of harassment (Count 1), ORS 166.065, 1 and two counts of telephonic harassment (Counts 2 and 3), ORS 166.”
State v. Enakiev, 29 P.3d 1160 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 7× “Defendant was charged with harassment and harassment by touching the sexual or intimate parts of another under ORS 166.065. 3 At trial, defendant sought to put on testimony from six witnesses—defendant’s wife, the pastor of his church, the pastor’s wife, the associate pastor, a…”
State v. Murphy, 475 P.3d 100 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 5× “On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judg- ment of acquittal (MJOA), arguing that: (1) the state did not meet its burden of adducing evidence that the victim reasonably believed that defendant would imminently carry out his threats; and…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1) — 28 cases
State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985).
“A comparison of “harassment” as defined in ORS 166.065 (l)(d) with “coercion,” as defined in the statute invalidated in Robertson , shows the following differences.”
State v. Sallinger, 504 P.2d 1383 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).
“225, based on an indictment that charged he unlawfully entered a dwelling house with the intent to commit the crime of harassment, ORS 166.065, therein. His principal contention on appeal is that the harassment statute, ORS 166.”
State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982).
“Blair, supra, we similarly were unable to define and explain what would constitute communicating “in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm,” which was made the crime of “harassment” by ORS 166.065(1) (c). There is an additional element bearing on the review of statutes for…”
State v. Harrington, 680 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
“345, or harassment, ORS 166.065, when such crimes are motivated by the race, color, religion or national origin of the victim.”
State v. Keller, 594 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
“In doing so, we pointed out that this subsection of ORS 166.065 was derived from New York Penal Law § 240.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(A) — 2 cases
State v. Eggers, 372 Or. 789 (Or. 2024).
“The misdemeanor crime of harassment—set out at ORS 166.065—provides that one, among many, ways a per- son can commit the crime is “if the person intentionally * * * [h]arasses or annoys another person by * * * [s]ubjecting such other person to offensive physical contact.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(a) — 20 cases
State v. Keller, 594 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
“In doing so, we pointed out that this subsection of ORS 166.065 was derived from New York Penal Law § 240.”
State v. Sallinger, 504 P.2d 1383 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).
“225, based on an indictment that charged he unlawfully entered a dwelling house with the intent to commit the crime of harassment, ORS 166.065, therein. His principal contention on appeal is that the harassment statute, ORS 166.”
State v. Eggers, 532 P.3d 518 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
“” As charged here, a person commits the crime of harassment under ORS 166.065 if the person intentionally “[h]arasses or annoys another person” by “[s]ubjecting such other person to offensive physical con- tact.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(a)(A) — 18 cases
State v. Eggers, 532 P.3d 518 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
“” As charged here, a person commits the crime of harassment under ORS 166.065 if the person intentionally “[h]arasses or annoys another person” by “[s]ubjecting such other person to offensive physical con- tact.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(a)(B) — 4 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(a)(C) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(b) — 3 cases
State v. Harrington, 680 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
“345, or harassment, ORS 166.065, when such crimes are motivated by the race, color, religion or national origin of the victim.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(c) — 15 cases
State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982).
“Blair, supra, we similarly were unable to define and explain what would constitute communicating “in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm,” which was made the crime of “harassment” by ORS 166.065(1) (c). There is an additional element bearing on the review of statutes for…”
State v. Rogers, 457 P.3d 363 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
“With respect to the meaning of “convey” within ORS 166.065 (1)(c), the state argues that the plain meaning of that term includes indirect communication through intermediaries.”
State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985).
“A comparison of “harassment” as defined in ORS 166.065 (l)(d) with “coercion,” as defined in the statute invalidated in Robertson , shows the following differences.”
State v. Ray, 733 P.2d 28 (Or. 1987).
“Oregon's earlier harassment statute forbidding some types of telephone calls was constitutionally inadequate because it did not require an "effect" on the listener and the prohibited conduct was not narrowly defined.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(d) — 13 cases
State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985).
“A comparison of “harassment” as defined in ORS 166.065 (l)(d) with “coercion,” as defined in the statute invalidated in Robertson , shows the following differences.”
State v. Sallinger, 504 P.2d 1383 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).
“225, based on an indictment that charged he unlawfully entered a dwelling house with the intent to commit the crime of harassment, ORS 166.065, therein. His principal contention on appeal is that the harassment statute, ORS 166.”
State v. Rogers, 457 P.3d 363 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
“With respect to the meaning of “convey” within ORS 166.065 (1)(c), the state argues that the plain meaning of that term includes indirect communication through intermediaries.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(e) — 6 cases
State v. Ray, 733 P.2d 28 (Or. 1987).
“Oregon's earlier harassment statute forbidding some types of telephone calls was constitutionally inadequate because it did not require an "effect" on the listener and the prohibited conduct was not narrowly defined.”
State v. Shifflett, 398 P.3d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
“Defendant was charged by information with one count of harassment (Count 1), ORS 166.065, 1 and two counts of telephonic harassment (Counts 2 and 3), ORS 166.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(f) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(2) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(3) — 27 cases
State v. Eggers, 532 P.3d 518 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
“” As charged here, a person commits the crime of harassment under ORS 166.065 if the person intentionally “[h]arasses or annoys another person” by “[s]ubjecting such other person to offensive physical con- tact.”
State v. Enakiev, 29 P.3d 1160 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
“Defendant was charged with harassment and harassment by touching the sexual or intimate parts of another under ORS 166.065. 3 At trial, defendant sought to put on testimony from six witnesses—defendant’s wife, the pastor of his church, the pastor’s wife, the associate pastor, a…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(4) — 16 cases
State v. Enakiev, 29 P.3d 1160 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
“Defendant was charged with harassment and harassment by touching the sexual or intimate parts of another under ORS 166.065. 3 At trial, defendant sought to put on testimony from six witnesses—defendant’s wife, the pastor of his church, the pastor’s wife, the associate pastor, a…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(4)(a) — 4 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(4)(a)(A) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(4)(b) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(6)(b) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(l)(a) — 7 cases
State v. Keller, 594 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
“In doing so, we pointed out that this subsection of ORS 166.065 was derived from New York Penal Law § 240.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(l)(a)(A) — 11 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(l)(a)(B) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(l)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Harrington, 680 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
“345, or harassment, ORS 166.065, when such crimes are motivated by the race, color, religion or national origin of the victim.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(l)(c) — 8 cases
State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985).
“A comparison of “harassment” as defined in ORS 166.065 (l)(d) with “coercion,” as defined in the statute invalidated in Robertson , shows the following differences.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(l)(d) — 13 cases
State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985).
“A comparison of “harassment” as defined in ORS 166.065 (l)(d) with “coercion,” as defined in the statute invalidated in Robertson , shows the following differences.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(l)(e) — 4 cases
State v. Ray, 733 P.2d 28 (Or. 1987).
“Oregon's earlier harassment statute forbidding some types of telephone calls was constitutionally inadequate because it did not require an "effect" on the listener and the prohibited conduct was not narrowly defined.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(l)(f) — 2 cases
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