215.441 Use of
real property for religious activities. (1) If a church, synagogue, temple, mosque, chapel,
meeting house or other nonresidential place of worship is allowed on real
property under state law and rules and local zoning ordinances and regulations,
a county shall allow the reasonable use of the real property for activities
customarily associated with the practices of the religious activity, including:
(a) Worship
services.
(b) Religion
classes.
(c) Weddings.
(d) Funerals.
(e) Meal
programs.
(f) Child care or
any preschool or prekindergarten education, but not private or parochial
education for kindergarten through grade 12 or higher education.
(2) A county may:
(a) Subject real
property described in subsection (1) of this section to reasonable regulations,
including site review or design review, concerning the physical characteristics
of the uses authorized under subsection (1) of this section; or
(b) Prohibit or
restrict the use of real property by a place of worship described in subsection
(1) of this section if the county finds that the level of service of public
facilities, including transportation, water supply, sewer and storm drain
systems is not adequate to serve the place of worship described in subsection
(1) of this section.
(3)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a county may allow a
private or parochial school for kindergarten through grade 12 or higher
education to be sited under applicable state law and rules and local zoning
ordinances and regulations. [2001 c.886 §2; 2017 c.745 §7; 2019 c.640 §19; 2021
c.385 §4; 2021 c.446 §4; 2025 c.267 §1]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
6
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 2010–2021 · leading case:
Tarr v. Multnomah Cnty., 473 P.3d 603 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
Tarr v. Multnomah Cnty., 473 P.3d 603 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 37× “441 did not preclude Multnomah County from requiring intervenors to show that their proposed mosque conformed to county compatibility standards, but that intervenors had nevertheless made that show- ing. On review, petitioners contend in four assignments of error that interve-…”
Friends of Yamhill Cnty., Inc. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 238 P.3d 1016 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
“, “operations for the exploration for minerals” and “creation, restoration or enhancement of wetlands”)); ORS 215.441 and ORS 227.500 (regulating “use of * * * real property for activities customarily associated with” places of worship).”
Moore v. City of Eugene, 482 P.3d 190 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“, “operations for the exploration for minerals” and “creation, restoration or enhancement of wetlands”)); ORS 215.441 and ORS 227.500 (regulat- ing “use of * * * real property for activities customar- ily associated with” places of worship).”
Coles Valley Church v. Oregon Land Use Bd. of Appeals (D. Or. 2020).
· cites it 2× “See also ORS § 215.441(1)(g). Plaintiffs responded that the RLUIPA required local governments to allow churches to use their own land for the free exercise of religion “to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of” the United States Constitution and RLUIPA and therefore the…”
Coles Valley Church v. Oregon Land Use Bd. of Appeals (D. Or. 2021).
· cites it 2× “¶ 20 (emphasis added); see also ORS § 215.441(1)(g). Plaintiffs responded that the RLUIPA required local governments to allow churches to use their own land for the free exercise of religion “to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of” the United States Constitution and…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.441(1) — 1 case
Tarr v. Multnomah Cnty., 473 P.3d 603 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“441 did not preclude Multnomah County from requiring intervenors to show that their proposed mosque conformed to county compatibility standards, but that intervenors had nevertheless made that show- ing. On review, petitioners contend in four assignments of error that interve-…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.441(1)(g) — 2 cases
Coles Valley Church v. Oregon Land Use Bd. of Appeals (D. Or. 2020).
“See also ORS § 215.441(1)(g). Plaintiffs responded that the RLUIPA required local governments to allow churches to use their own land for the free exercise of religion “to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of” the United States Constitution and RLUIPA and therefore the…”
Coles Valley Church v. Oregon Land Use Bd. of Appeals (D. Or. 2021).
“¶ 20 (emphasis added); see also ORS § 215.441(1)(g). Plaintiffs responded that the RLUIPA required local governments to allow churches to use their own land for the free exercise of religion “to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of” the United States Constitution and…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.441(2) — 1 case
Tarr v. Multnomah Cnty., 473 P.3d 603 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“441 did not preclude Multnomah County from requiring intervenors to show that their proposed mosque conformed to county compatibility standards, but that intervenors had nevertheless made that show- ing. On review, petitioners contend in four assignments of error that interve-…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.441(2)(b) — 1 case
Tarr v. Multnomah Cnty., 473 P.3d 603 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“441 did not preclude Multnomah County from requiring intervenors to show that their proposed mosque conformed to county compatibility standards, but that intervenors had nevertheless made that show- ing. On review, petitioners contend in four assignments of error that interve-…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.441(3) — 1 case
Tarr v. Multnomah Cnty., 473 P.3d 603 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“441 did not preclude Multnomah County from requiring intervenors to show that their proposed mosque conformed to county compatibility standards, but that intervenors had nevertheless made that show- ing. On review, petitioners contend in four assignments of error that interve-…”
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