§ 907. Possessing instruments of crime.
(a) Criminal instruments generally.--A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument
of crime with intent to employ it criminally.
(b) Possession of weapon.--A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses a firearm or other
weapon concealed upon his person with intent to employ it criminally.
(c) Unlawful body armor.--A person commits a felony of the third degree if in the course of the commission of
a felony or in the attempt to commit a felony he uses or wears body armor or has in
his control, custody or possession any body armor.
(d) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given
to them in this subsection:
"Body armor." Any protective covering for the body, or parts thereof, made of any polyaramid fiber
or any resin-treated glass fiber cloth or any material or combination of materials
made or designed to prevent, resist, deflect or deter the penetration thereof by ammunition,
knife, cutting or piercing instrument or any other weapon.
"Instrument of crime." Any of the following:
(1) Anything specially made or specially adapted for criminal use.
(2) Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances
not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have.
"Weapon." Anything readily capable of lethal use and possessed under circumstances not manifestly
appropriate for lawful uses which it may have. The term includes a firearm which is
not loaded or lacks a clip or other component to render it immediately operable, and
components which can readily be assembled into a weapon.
(July 6, 1995, P.L.238, No.27, eff. 60 days; July 11, 1996, P.L.552, No.98, eff. 60
days)
1996 Amendment. Act 98 overlooked the amendment by Act 27 of 1995, but the amendments do not conflict
in substance and have both been given effect in setting forth the text of section
907.
Cross References. Section 907 is referred to in sections 912, 2718 of this title; section 6102 of Title
23 (Domestic Relations); section 9774.1 of Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
857
cases (
106 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case:
Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 3× “§ 2701; and 18 Pa.C.S. § 907, respectively. 2 , Officer Rosa omitted this statement from his official written report of the incident.”
Commonwealth v. Stanley, 401 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
· cites it 8× “ging that the court below committed the following errors: (1) the lower court erred in not granting his motion to suppress the revolver; (2) the lower court erred in not sustaining his demurrer to the firearms charges because the Commonwealth failed to prove that appellant was…”
Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 883 A.2d 479 (Pa. 2005).
· cites it 4× “This Court granted review in these cross-appeals to address two separate issues of statutory interpretation: (1) whether under the relevant statutory definition of an instrument of crime, a conviction for Possession of an Instrument of Crime ("PIC"), 18 Pa.C.S. § 907, requires…”
Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 2× “2d 532, 533 (1947) (stating “[a]n ax, a baseball bat, an iron bar, a heavy cuspidor, and even a bedroom slipper have been held to constitute deadly weapons under varying circumstances”), Regarding Appellant’s conviction for possessing an instrument of a crime, *888 we observe…”
Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 806 A.2d 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 8× “18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). The statute then defined "instrument of crime," in pertinent part, as follows: (2) anything commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have.”
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617 (Pa. 2002).
· cites it 2× “, 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(b) ("A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses a firearm or other weapon concealed upon his person with intent to employ it criminally.”
Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2010).
· cites it 2× “2d at 1002 (holding that clothes iron was “specially adapted” for criminal purpose of murder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(d) when appellant broke handle off, used plate or front of iron to inflict lacerations on victim’s head, and used handle to inflict punctures and lacerations…”
Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 2× “18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a); Commonwealth v. Jones, 416 A.”
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003).
· cites it 2× “[2] 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). [3] The 1995 PCRA amendments provided for a "transitional, statutory grace period" of one year, applicable to first petitions in cases where the judgment of sentence became final before the January 16, 1996 effective date of the 1995 amendments.”
Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2012).
· cites it 2× “§ 2502(a) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 907, respectively. [3] The aggravating circumstances were a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person, 42 Pa.”
Commonwealth v. Howard, 645 A.2d 1300 (Pa. 1994).
· cites it 4× “[2] 18 Pa.C.S. § 907. [3] A sentence of guilt without further penalty was imposed for the violation of 18 Pa.”
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385 (Pa. 2003).
· cites it 2× “[5] Specifically, appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to object to the prosecutor's repeated references that appellant had "executed" the two victims; (2) failing to object to a penalty phase jury charge which was defective because it (a)…”
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(1): 2 cases
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(6): 1 case
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(A): 7 cases
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(B): 1 case
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(a): 376 cases
Commonwealth v. Stanley, 401 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
“ging that the court below committed the following errors: (1) the lower court erred in not granting his motion to suppress the revolver; (2) the lower court erred in not sustaining his demurrer to the firearms charges because the Commonwealth failed to prove that appellant was…”
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003).
“[2] 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). [3] The 1995 PCRA amendments provided for a "transitional, statutory grace period" of one year, applicable to first petitions in cases where the judgment of sentence became final before the January 16, 1996 effective date of the 1995 amendments.”
Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
“§ 2701; and 18 Pa.C.S. § 907, respectively. 2 , Officer Rosa omitted this statement from his official written report of the incident.”
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(a)(c): 1 case
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(b): 69 cases
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617 (Pa. 2002).
“, 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(b) ("A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses a firearm or other weapon concealed upon his person with intent to employ it criminally.”
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(c): 12 cases
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(c)(2): 2 cases
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(d): 36 cases
Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
“§ 2701; and 18 Pa.C.S. § 907, respectively. 2 , Officer Rosa omitted this statement from his official written report of the incident.”
Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2010).
“2d at 1002 (holding that clothes iron was “specially adapted” for criminal purpose of murder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(d) when appellant broke handle off, used plate or front of iron to inflict lacerations on victim’s head, and used handle to inflict punctures and lacerations…”
Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 806 A.2d 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). The statute then defined "instrument of crime," in pertinent part, as follows: (2) anything commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have.”
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(d)(2): 12 cases
Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
“2d 532, 533 (1947) (stating “[a]n ax, a baseball bat, an iron bar, a heavy cuspidor, and even a bedroom slipper have been held to constitute deadly weapons under varying circumstances”), Regarding Appellant’s conviction for possessing an instrument of a crime, *888 we observe…”
Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2010).
“2d at 1002 (holding that clothes iron was “specially adapted” for criminal purpose of murder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(d) when appellant broke handle off, used plate or front of iron to inflict lacerations on victim’s head, and used handle to inflict punctures and lacerations…”
Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 806 A.2d 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). The statute then defined "instrument of crime," in pertinent part, as follows: (2) anything commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have.”
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(e): 1 case
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