§ 8309. Civil rights violations.
(a) Redress for personal injury.--A person who incurs injury to his person or damage or loss to his property as a result
of conduct described in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2710 (relating to ethnic intimidation) or 3307
(relating to institutional vandalism) shall have a right of action against the actor
for injunction, damages or other appropriate civil or equitable relief. In the action,
the issue of whether the defendant engaged in the conduct alleged shall be determined
according to the burden of proof used in other civil actions for similar relief. The
plaintiff may seek recovery for any of the following:
(1) General and special damages, including damages for emotional distress. Damages under
this paragraph shall be actual damages or $500, whichever is greater.
(2) Punitive damages.
(3) Reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(4) Injunctive and other equitable relief.
(5) Such other relief which the court deems necessary and proper.
(b) Redress sought by public official on behalf of others.--When conduct which would constitute a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2710 or 3307 has occurred,
the district attorney of the county in which the violation took place or the Attorney
General, after consulting with the district attorney, may institute a civil action
for injunctive or other equitable relief if needed to protect any person or property.
The civil action shall be brought in the name of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
in the county where the violation occurred.
(c) Filing of court orders.--The prothonotary of the court in which a civil action is brought under subsection
(a) or (b) shall transmit two certified copies of any order issued in the action to
each appropriate law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over locations where the
defendant is alleged to have committed the act and where the defendant resides or
has his principal place of business. The sheriff of the county in which the defendant
resides shall serve a copy of the order on the defendant. Unless otherwise ordered
by the court, service shall be by delivering a copy in hand to the defendant. Law
enforcement agencies shall establish procedures adequate to ensure that all officers
responsible for the enforcement of the order are informed of its existence and terms.
When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a defendant has
violated the provisions of an order, the officer may arrest him.
(d) Contempt notice required to be part of order.--In actions brought under this section, when a court issues a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary or permanent injunction ordering a defendant to refrain from
certain conduct or activities, the order issued shall contain the following statement:
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.
(e) Penalties.--A violation of an order issued and served as set forth in this section shall be a
misdemeanor of the second degree. If bodily injury results from the violation, the
violation shall be a misdemeanor of the first degree.
(f) Vacated orders.--When the court vacates a temporary restraining order or a preliminary or permanent
injunction issued under this section, the prothonotary shall promptly notify in writing
each appropriate law enforcement agency which had been notified of the issuance of
the order and shall direct each such agency to destroy all records of the order, and
the agency shall comply with the directive upon receipt of the notification.
(Dec. 19, 1990, P.L.1394, No.216, eff. 60 days)
1990 Amendment. Act 216 added section 8309.
Notes of Decisions
Garfield v. Homowack Lodge, Inc., 378 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
· cites it 12× “" 42 Pa.C.S. § 8309 [6] defines the acts which constitute "doing business" under the Pennsylvania "long-arm" statute: "(a) General rule.”
Laffey v. Lehigh Valley Dairy Coop., 390 A.2d 238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
· cites it 2× “, whether the Bank’s activities in Pennsylvania were sufficient to subject it to the in personam jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts, notwithstanding the exception contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8309(c). Paragraph six of the Trustee’s complaint to join the Bank as an additional…”
Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 452 F. Supp. 130 (M.D. Penn. 1978).
“Because Section 8309(b) of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8309(b) (Purdon), makes the statutory reach co-extensive with requirements of due process we must decide whether Defendants had sufficient contacts with the forum state to make exercise of…”
City of Philadelphia v. Bullion, 368 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
“Two of the ways in which “doing business” is defined in the statute under Section 8309 of the Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §8309 are: (1) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise…”
Davis v. C & NW Transp. Co., 405 A.2d 959 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
“42 Pa.C.S. § 8309(b). Judicial jurisdiction allowed by state statute is limited in scope by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.”
Deere v. Zilber, 338 A.2d 615 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
“” 42 Pa. C.S. §8309(b). In Cecere v. Ohringer Home Furniture Company, 208 Pa.”
Martin v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 548 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
“Establishing personal jurisdiction over the individual on the basis of doing business requires evidence showing not only that he did business within the state, see 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8309, but also that he conducted that business “for himself and not for or on behalf of his…”
Woods v. Harry (M.D. Penn. 2023).
· cites it 9× “Plaintiff appears to be quoting 42 Pa. C.S. § 8309(a), which provides in pertinent part: (a) Redress for personal injury.”
Kovalev v. Lab'y Corp. of Am. (E.D. Pa. 2023).
· cites it 2× “result of Labcorp’s violations of sanitary and safety protocols (Count IID; (4) assault by harassment or independent claim for harassment (Count IV); (5) assault by ethnic intimidation or independent claim for ethnic intimidation (Count V); (6) civil conspiracy — conspiracy to…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8309(a) — 2 cases
Woods v. Harry (M.D. Penn. 2023).
“Plaintiff appears to be quoting 42 Pa. C.S. § 8309(a), which provides in pertinent part: (a) Redress for personal injury.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8309(a)(1) — 1 case
Garfield v. Homowack Lodge, Inc., 378 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
“" 42 Pa.C.S. § 8309 [6] defines the acts which constitute "doing business" under the Pennsylvania "long-arm" statute: "(a) General rule.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8309(b) — 5 cases
Garfield v. Homowack Lodge, Inc., 378 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
“" 42 Pa.C.S. § 8309 [6] defines the acts which constitute "doing business" under the Pennsylvania "long-arm" statute: "(a) General rule.”
Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 452 F. Supp. 130 (M.D. Penn. 1978).
“Because Section 8309(b) of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8309(b) (Purdon), makes the statutory reach co-extensive with requirements of due process we must decide whether Defendants had sufficient contacts with the forum state to make exercise of…”
Davis v. C & NW Transp. Co., 405 A.2d 959 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
“42 Pa.C.S. § 8309(b). Judicial jurisdiction allowed by state statute is limited in scope by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.”
Deere v. Zilber, 338 A.2d 615 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
“” 42 Pa. C.S. §8309(b). In Cecere v. Ohringer Home Furniture Company, 208 Pa.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8309(c) — 1 case
Laffey v. Lehigh Valley Dairy Coop., 390 A.2d 238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
“, whether the Bank’s activities in Pennsylvania were sufficient to subject it to the in personam jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts, notwithstanding the exception contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8309(c). Paragraph six of the Trustee’s complaint to join the Bank as an additional…”
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