42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711

 Sentencing procedure for murder of the first degree.

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SUBCHAPTER B

SENTENCING AUTHORITY

 

Sec.

9711.  Sentencing procedure for murder of the first degree.

9711.1. Sentencing for certain murders of infant persons.

9712.  Sentences for offenses committed with firearms.

9712.1. Sentences for certain drug offenses committed with firearms.

9713.  Sentences for offenses committed on public transportation.

9714.  Sentences for second and subsequent offenses.

9715.  Life imprisonment for homicide.

9716.  Two or more mandatory minimum sentences applicable.

9717.  Sentences for offenses against elderly persons.

9718.  Sentences for offenses against infant persons.

9718.1. Sexual offender treatment.

9718.2. Sentences for sexual offenders.

9718.3. Sentence for failure to comply with registration of sexual offenders (Expired).

9718.4. Sentence for failure to comply with registration of sexual offenders.

9718.5. Mandatory period of probation for certain sexual offenders.

9719.  Sentences for offenses committed while impersonating a law enforcement officer.

9719.1. Sentences for offenses committed against law enforcement officer.

9720.  Sentencing for criminal mischief.

9720.1. Restitution for identity theft (Repealed).

9720.2. Sentencing for trafficking of persons.

9720.3. Sentencing for certain paroled offenders.

9720.4. Sentencing for offenses committed in association with a criminal gang.

9720.5. Sentencing for offenses involving sexual abuse of children.

9720.6. Sentencing for arson offenses.

9720.7. Sentencing for burglary.

9720.8. Sentencing for offenses involving domestic violence in the presence of a minor.

§ 9711.  Sentencing procedure for murder of the first degree.

(a)  Procedure in jury trials.--

(1)  After a verdict of murder of the first degree is recorded and before the jury is discharged, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing in which the jury shall determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.

(2)  In the sentencing hearing, evidence concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim is admissible. Additionally, evidence may be presented as to any other matter that the court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed. Evidence shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances specified in subsections (d) and (e), and information concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim. Evidence of aggravating circumstances shall be limited to those circumstances specified in subsection (d).

(3)  After the presentation of evidence, the court shall permit counsel to present argument for or against the sentence of death. The court shall then instruct the jury in accordance with subsection (c).

(4)  Failure of the jury to unanimously agree upon a sentence shall not impeach or in any way affect the guilty verdict previously recorded.

(b)  Procedure in nonjury trials and guilty pleas.--If the defendant has waived a jury trial or pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose unless waived by the defendant with the consent of the Commonwealth, in which case the trial judge shall hear the evidence and determine the penalty in the same manner as would a jury as provided in subsection (a).

(c)  Instructions to jury.--

(1)  Before the jury retires to consider the sentencing verdict, the court shall instruct the jury on the following matters:

(i)  The aggravating circumstances specified in subsection (d) as to which there is some evidence.

(ii)  The mitigating circumstances specified in subsection (e) as to which there is some evidence.

(iii)  Aggravating circumstances must be proved by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt; mitigating circumstances must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.

(iv)  The verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life imprisonment in all other cases.

(v)  The court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.

(2)  The court shall instruct the jury that if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and at least one mitigating circumstance, it shall consider, in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any evidence presented about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family. The court shall also instruct the jury on any other matter that may be just and proper under the circumstances.

(d)  Aggravating circumstances.--Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:

(1)  The victim was a firefighter, peace officer, public servant concerned in official detention, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121 (relating to escape), judge of any court in the unified judicial system, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, a deputy attorney general, district attorney, assistant district attorney, member of the General Assembly, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor General, State Treasurer, State law enforcement official, local law enforcement official, Federal law enforcement official or person employed to assist or assisting any law enforcement official in the performance of his duties, who was killed in the performance of his duties or as a result of his official position.

(2)  The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted to pay or be paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the killing of the victim.

(3)  The victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage.

(4)  The death of the victim occurred while defendant was engaged in the hijacking of an aircraft.

(5)  The victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony committed by the defendant and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the defendant in any grand jury or criminal proceeding involving such offenses.

(6)  The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.

(7)  In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense.

(8)  The offense was committed by means of torture.

(9)  The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.

(10)  The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State offense, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable or the defendant was undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission of the offense.

(11)  The defendant has been convicted of another murder committed in any jurisdiction and committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.

(12)  The defendant has been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503 (relating to voluntary manslaughter), or a substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.

(13)  The defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice in the killing, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c) (relating to liability for conduct of another; complicity), while in the perpetration of a felony under the provisions of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L.233, No.64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and punishable under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 (relating to drug trafficking sentencing and penalties).

(14)  At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been involved, associated or in competition with the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution or delivery of any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or similar law of any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States, and the defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the killing resulted from or was related to that association, involvement or competition to promote the defendant's activities in selling, manufacturing, distributing or delivering controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances.

(15)  At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been a nongovernmental informant or had otherwise provided any investigative, law enforcement or police agency with information concerning criminal activity and the defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the killing was in retaliation for the victim's activities as a nongovernmental informant or in providing information concerning criminal activity to an investigative, law enforcement or police agency.

(16)  The victim was a child under 12 years of age.

(17)  At the time of the killing, the victim was in her third trimester of pregnancy or the defendant had knowledge of the victim's pregnancy.

(18)  At the time of the killing the defendant was subject to a court order restricting in any way the defendant's behavior toward the victim pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. Ch. 61 (relating to protection from abuse) or any other order of a court of common pleas or of the minor judiciary designed in whole or in part to protect the victim from the defendant.

(e)  Mitigating circumstances.--Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:

(1)  The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.

(2)  The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

(3)  The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.

(4)  The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.

(5)  The defendant acted under extreme duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution under 18 Pa.C.S. § 309 (relating to duress), or acted under the substantial domination of another person.

(6)  The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal acts.

(7)  The defendant's participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.

(8)  Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.

(f)  Sentencing verdict by the jury.--

(1)  After hearing all the evidence and receiving the instructions from the court, the jury shall deliberate and render a sentencing verdict. In rendering the verdict, if the sentence is death, the jury shall set forth in such form as designated by the court the findings upon which the sentence is based.

(2)  Based upon these findings, the jury shall set forth in writing whether the sentence is death or life imprisonment.

(g)  Recording sentencing verdict.--Whenever the jury shall agree upon a sentencing verdict, it shall be received and recorded by the court. The court shall thereafter impose upon the defendant the sentence fixed by the jury.

(h)  Review of death sentence.--

(1)  A sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules.

(2)  In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate the sentence of death and remand for further proceedings as provided in paragraph (4).

(3)  The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:

(i)  the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; or

(ii)  the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d).

(4)  If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be vacated because none of the aggravating circumstances are supported by sufficient evidence, then it shall remand for the imposition of a life imprisonment sentence. If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be vacated for any other reason, it shall remand for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to subsections (a) through (g).

(i)  Record of death sentence to Governor.--Where a sentence of death is upheld by the Supreme Court, the prothonotary of the Supreme Court shall transmit to the Governor a full and complete record of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence, opinion and order by the Supreme Court within 30 days of one of the following, whichever occurs first:

(1)  the expiration of the time period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari or extension thereof where neither has been filed;

(2)  the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari; or

(3)  the disposition of the appeal by the United States Supreme Court, if that court grants the petition for writ of certiorari.

Notice of this transmission shall contemporaneously be provided to the Secretary of Corrections.

(j)  Issuance of warrant.--(Repealed).

(k)  Terms of confinement.--(Repealed).

(l)  Witnesses to execution.--(Repealed).

(m)  Certification of superintendent.--(Repealed).

(n)  Postmortem examination.--(Repealed).

(o)  Costs of execution and examination.--(Repealed).

(Mar. 26, 1974, P.L.213, No.46, eff. imd.; Dec. 30, 1974, P.L.1052, No.345, eff. 90 days; Sept. 13, 1978, P.L.756, No.141, eff. imd.; Oct. 5, 1980, P.L.693, No.142, eff. 60 days; July 7, 1986, P.L.400, No.87, eff. 60 days; Dec. 21, 1988, P.L.1862, No.179, eff. imd.; Dec. 22, 1989, P.L.727, No.99, eff. imd.; Mar. 15, 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., P.L.966, No.4, eff. imd.; Oct. 11, 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., P.L.1064, No.22, eff. 60 days; Nov. 17, 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., P.L.1117, No.31, eff. 60 days; Apr. 25, 1997, P.L.84, No.6, eff. 60 days; June 25, 1997, P.L.293, No.28, eff. imd.; June 18, 1998, P.L.622, No.80, eff. 60 days; Oct. 12, 1999, P.L.420, No.38, eff. 60 days)

 

1999 Amendment.  Act 38 amended subsec. (i).

1998 Repeal.  Act 80 repealed subsecs. (j), (k), (l), (m), (n) and (o).

1997 Amendments.  Act 6 added subsec. (d)(18) and Act 28 amended subsec. (h).

1995 Amendments.  Act 4, 1st Sp.Sess., amended subsecs. (d) and (i) and added subsecs. (j), (k), (l), (m), (n) and (o), Act 22, 1st Sp.Sess., amended subsecs. (a)(2), (b) and (c)(2) and Act 31, 1st Sp.Sess., added subsec. (d)(17). Section 4 of Act 4, 1st Sp.Sess., provided that Act 4 shall apply to cases in which the Governor has, as of the effective date of Act 4, not yet received the transcript of the record. Section 2 of Act 22, 1st Sp.Sess., provided that the amendment of subsecs. (a)(2), (b) and (c)(2) shall apply to sentences imposed for offenses which take place on or after the effective date of Act 22.

1980 Amendment.  Act 142 amended subsecs. (d)(1) and (e)(5).

1978 Amendment.  Act 141 added present section 9711 (as section 1311 of Title 18) and repealed former section 1311 relating to the same subject matter.

Cross References.  Section 9711 is referred to in sections 722, 9543.1, 9577, 9738 of this title; section 1102 of Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses); section 4302 of Title 61 (Prisons and Parole).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 942 cases (61 in the last 5 years), 1982–2026 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Robinson
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2004) pa · cites it 61× “The jury also found the following as mitigating circumstances pursuant to the "catch-all" provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711: [21] (1) "family background and environment;" (2) "use of alcohol and drugs;" and (3) "school history.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2006) pa · cites it 46× “42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). During the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that Spotz had proved one mitigating circumstance and that the Commonwealth had established three aggravating circumstances, including that Spotz "committed a killing while in the perpetration…”
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2005) pa · cites it 44× “Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i), the prothonotary of this court is directed to immediately transmit to the Governor’s office the file and complete record of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence, and review by the Supreme Court.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2011) pa · cites it 33× “Although, during the penalty phase, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the trial court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2), "[c]apital juries are to weigh only the aggravating and mitigating…”
Commonwealth v. Lesko (2011) pa · cites it 39× “Lesko notes that, on direct appeal, counsel asserted only that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of three aggravating circumstances arising *403 out of the two murder convictions under the capital sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We will proceed to…”
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers (2008) pa · cites it 42× “31, which provided: [18] In the trial of any homicide case, after a verdict of Murder of the First Degree is recorded and the court proceeds to the determination of whether a sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty should be duly imposed, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. §…”
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2005) pa · cites it 43× “§ 2502 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 were part of the same statute.”
Commonwealth v. Bomar (2003) pa · cites it 26× “Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute Finally, appellant alleges that Pennsylvania's death penalty statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 et seq., is unconstitutional as applied in Delaware County because the Delaware County District Attorney's Office has consistently requested the…”
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2011) pa · cites it 25× “See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2) and (3). The prosecutor’s reference to the “weight” to be given to the experience of the rape victim is nothing more than a request to the jury to provide the appropriate weight to the aggravating factor that the Commonwealth was seeking to prove.”
Commonwealth v. Means (2001) pa · cites it 44× “Art. 1 §§ 1, 9, 13, 26 and 28. [3] Following argument, the trial court sustained appellee's motion to preclude the introduction of victim impact testimony and declared subsections (a)(2) and (c)(2) of 42 Pa.”
Commonwealth v. Pagan (2008) pa · cites it 30× “The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court is directed to transmit a complete record of this case to the Governor in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i). . The trial court found these subsequent claims to be meritless and denied any relief.”
Commonwealth v. Williams (2006) pa · cites it 31× “The General Assembly has ensured by statute that, in a capital case, the jury's "verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in [42 Pa.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(1) — 3 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(3)(h)(iii) — 6 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(3)(i) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(5) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(6) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(8) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(9) — 2 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(H)(3) — 1 case
Stevens v. Beard (2010) pawd
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(H)(3)(III) — 1 case
Kindler v. Horn (2003) paed
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(I) — 2 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(a) — 18 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(a)(1) — 44 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(a)(2) — 75 cases
Commonwealth v. Means (2001) pa “Art. 1 §§ 1, 9, 13, 26 and 28. [3] Following argument, the trial court sustained appellee's motion to preclude the introduction of victim impact testimony and declared subsections (a)(2) and (c)(2) of 42 Pa.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(a)(2)(1989) — 1 case
Copenhefer v. Horn (2012) ca3
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(a)(3) — 15 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(a)(4) — 2 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(aMg) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(b) — 18 cases
Taylor v. Horn (2007) ca3
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c) — 24 cases
Commonwealth v. Lesko (2011) pa “Lesko notes that, on direct appeal, counsel asserted only that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of three aggravating circumstances arising *403 out of the two murder convictions under the capital sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We will proceed to…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1) — 15 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(IV) — 1 case
Haney v. State (1991) alacrimapp
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(b) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(h) — 3 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(i) — 3 cases
Com. v. Baptiste, D. (2021) pasuperct
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(ii) — 7 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(iii) — 14 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) — 128 cases
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2006) pa “42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). During the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that Spotz had proved one mitigating circumstance and that the Commonwealth had established three aggravating circumstances, including that Spotz "committed a killing while in the perpetration…”
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2011) pa “Although, during the penalty phase, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the trial court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2), "[c]apital juries are to weigh only the aggravating and mitigating…”
Commonwealth v. Bomar (2003) pa “Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute Finally, appellant alleges that Pennsylvania's death penalty statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 et seq., is unconstitutional as applied in Delaware County because the Delaware County District Attorney's Office has consistently requested the…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)(1988) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(v) — 8 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(2) — 12 cases
Commonwealth v. Means (2001) pa “Art. 1 §§ 1, 9, 13, 26 and 28. [3] Following argument, the trial court sustained appellee's motion to preclude the introduction of victim impact testimony and declared subsections (a)(2) and (c)(2) of 42 Pa.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(3) — 2 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(3)(iv) — 1 case
Commonwealth v. Williams (2006) pa “The General Assembly has ensured by statute that, in a capital case, the jury's "verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in [42 Pa.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(4) — 2 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(8) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(i) — 2 cases
Commonwealth v. Thomas (1999) pasuperct
Commonwealth v. Blackwell (1994) pasuperct
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(i)(iv) — 2 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(ii) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(iii) — 4 cases
Commonwealth v. Blackwell (1994) pasuperct
Jermyn v. Horn (2001) ca3
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(iv) — 29 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(l)(4) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(l)(i) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(l)(ii) — 5 cases
Abdul-Salaam v. Beard (2014) pamd
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(l)(iii) — 16 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(l)(iv) — 122 cases
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2011) pa “Although, during the penalty phase, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the trial court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2), "[c]apital juries are to weigh only the aggravating and mitigating…”
Commonwealth v. Bomar (2003) pa “Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute Finally, appellant alleges that Pennsylvania's death penalty statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 et seq., is unconstitutional as applied in Delaware County because the Delaware County District Attorney's Office has consistently requested the…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(l)(iv)(1988) — 2 cases
Oken v. State (2003) md
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(l)(v) — 7 cases
Laird v. Horn (2001) paed
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d) — 98 cases
Commonwealth v. Means (2001) pa “Art. 1 §§ 1, 9, 13, 26 and 28. [3] Following argument, the trial court sustained appellee's motion to preclude the introduction of victim impact testimony and declared subsections (a)(2) and (c)(2) of 42 Pa.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2011) pa “Although, during the penalty phase, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the trial court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2), "[c]apital juries are to weigh only the aggravating and mitigating…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(1) — 40 cases
Commonwealth v. Lesko (2011) pa “Lesko notes that, on direct appeal, counsel asserted only that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of three aggravating circumstances arising *403 out of the two murder convictions under the capital sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We will proceed to…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(10) — 68 cases
Commonwealth v. Pagan (2008) pa “The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court is directed to transmit a complete record of this case to the Governor in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i). . The trial court found these subsequent claims to be meritless and denied any relief.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(11) — 64 cases
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2004) pa “The jury also found the following as mitigating circumstances pursuant to the "catch-all" provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711: [21] (1) "family background and environment;" (2) "use of alcohol and drugs;" and (3) "school history.”
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2005) pa “Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i), the prothonotary of this court is directed to immediately transmit to the Governor’s office the file and complete record of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence, and review by the Supreme Court.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(12) — 17 cases
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2006) pa “42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). During the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that Spotz had proved one mitigating circumstance and that the Commonwealth had established three aggravating circumstances, including that Spotz "committed a killing while in the perpetration…”
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2011) pa “Although, during the penalty phase, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the trial court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2), "[c]apital juries are to weigh only the aggravating and mitigating…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(13) — 7 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(14) — 17 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(15) — 7 cases
Commonwealth v. Means (2001) pa “Art. 1 §§ 1, 9, 13, 26 and 28. [3] Following argument, the trial court sustained appellee's motion to preclude the introduction of victim impact testimony and declared subsections (a)(2) and (c)(2) of 42 Pa.”
Com. v. Little, K. (2021) pasuperct
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(16) — 23 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(17) — 5 cases
Ankrom v. State (2013) ala
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(18) — 8 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(2) — 28 cases
Commonwealth v. Pagan (2008) pa “The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court is directed to transmit a complete record of this case to the Governor in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i). . The trial court found these subsequent claims to be meritless and denied any relief.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(3) — 10 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(4) — 2 cases
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2005) pa “§ 2502 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 were part of the same statute.”
State v. Young (1993) utah
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(5) — 48 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6) — 320 cases
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2006) pa “42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). During the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that Spotz had proved one mitigating circumstance and that the Commonwealth had established three aggravating circumstances, including that Spotz "committed a killing while in the perpetration…”
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2005) pa “§ 2502 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 were part of the same statute.”
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2004) pa “The jury also found the following as mitigating circumstances pursuant to the "catch-all" provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711: [21] (1) "family background and environment;" (2) "use of alcohol and drugs;" and (3) "school history.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6)(9) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6)(ii) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(7) — 141 cases
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers (2008) pa “31, which provided: [18] In the trial of any homicide case, after a verdict of Murder of the First Degree is recorded and the court proceeds to the determination of whether a sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty should be duly imposed, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. §…”
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2005) pa “§ 2502 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 were part of the same statute.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(8) — 86 cases
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2004) pa “The jury also found the following as mitigating circumstances pursuant to the "catch-all" provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711: [21] (1) "family background and environment;" (2) "use of alcohol and drugs;" and (3) "school history.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(9) — 203 cases
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2005) pa “Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i), the prothonotary of this court is directed to immediately transmit to the Governor’s office the file and complete record of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence, and review by the Supreme Court.”
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2011) pa “See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2) and (3). The prosecutor’s reference to the “weight” to be given to the experience of the rape victim is nothing more than a request to the jury to provide the appropriate weight to the aggravating factor that the Commonwealth was seeking to prove.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(ll) — 53 cases
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2004) pa “The jury also found the following as mitigating circumstances pursuant to the "catch-all" provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711: [21] (1) "family background and environment;" (2) "use of alcohol and drugs;" and (3) "school history.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e) — 44 cases
Commonwealth v. Means (2001) pa “Art. 1 §§ 1, 9, 13, 26 and 28. [3] Following argument, the trial court sustained appellee's motion to preclude the introduction of victim impact testimony and declared subsections (a)(2) and (c)(2) of 42 Pa.”
Commonwealth v. Bomar (2003) pa “Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute Finally, appellant alleges that Pennsylvania's death penalty statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 et seq., is unconstitutional as applied in Delaware County because the Delaware County District Attorney's Office has consistently requested the…”
Commonwealth v. Lesko (2011) pa “Lesko notes that, on direct appeal, counsel asserted only that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of three aggravating circumstances arising *403 out of the two murder convictions under the capital sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We will proceed to…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(1) — 138 cases
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2005) pa “Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i), the prothonotary of this court is directed to immediately transmit to the Governor’s office the file and complete record of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence, and review by the Supreme Court.”
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2011) pa “See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2) and (3). The prosecutor’s reference to the “weight” to be given to the experience of the rape victim is nothing more than a request to the jury to provide the appropriate weight to the aggravating factor that the Commonwealth was seeking to prove.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(1)(iv) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(2) — 143 cases
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers (2008) pa “31, which provided: [18] In the trial of any homicide case, after a verdict of Murder of the First Degree is recorded and the court proceeds to the determination of whether a sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty should be duly imposed, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. §…”
Commonwealth v. Lesko (2011) pa “Lesko notes that, on direct appeal, counsel asserted only that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of three aggravating circumstances arising *403 out of the two murder convictions under the capital sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We will proceed to…”
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2011) pa “Although, during the penalty phase, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the trial court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2), "[c]apital juries are to weigh only the aggravating and mitigating…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(3) — 77 cases
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers (2008) pa “31, which provided: [18] In the trial of any homicide case, after a verdict of Murder of the First Degree is recorded and the court proceeds to the determination of whether a sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty should be duly imposed, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. §…”
Commonwealth v. Lesko (2011) pa “Lesko notes that, on direct appeal, counsel asserted only that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of three aggravating circumstances arising *403 out of the two murder convictions under the capital sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We will proceed to…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(4) — 72 cases
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2011) pa “Although, during the penalty phase, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the trial court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2), "[c]apital juries are to weigh only the aggravating and mitigating…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(5) — 13 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(7) — 14 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(8) — 256 cases
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2011) pa “Although, during the penalty phase, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the trial court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2), "[c]apital juries are to weigh only the aggravating and mitigating…”
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2005) pa “Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i), the prothonotary of this court is directed to immediately transmit to the Governor’s office the file and complete record of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence, and review by the Supreme Court.”
Commonwealth v. Means (2001) pa “Art. 1 §§ 1, 9, 13, 26 and 28. [3] Following argument, the trial court sustained appellee's motion to preclude the introduction of victim impact testimony and declared subsections (a)(2) and (c)(2) of 42 Pa.”
Commonwealth v. Robinson (2004) pa “The jury also found the following as mitigating circumstances pursuant to the "catch-all" provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711: [21] (1) "family background and environment;" (2) "use of alcohol and drugs;" and (3) "school history.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(iv) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(l) — 2 cases
Hackett v. Price (2004) ca3
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(l)(i) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(l)(iii) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(l)(iv) — 6 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(f) — 10 cases
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers (2008) pa “31, which provided: [18] In the trial of any homicide case, after a verdict of Murder of the First Degree is recorded and the court proceeds to the determination of whether a sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty should be duly imposed, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. §…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(g) — 8 cases
Kindler v. Horn (2008) ca3
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h) — 140 cases
Laird v. Horn (2001) paed
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(1) — 120 cases
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2005) pa “Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i), the prothonotary of this court is directed to immediately transmit to the Governor’s office the file and complete record of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence, and review by the Supreme Court.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(2) — 12 cases
Commonwealth v. Lesko (2011) pa “Lesko notes that, on direct appeal, counsel asserted only that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of three aggravating circumstances arising *403 out of the two murder convictions under the capital sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We will proceed to…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(3) — 197 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(3)(1) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(3)(h) — 20 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(3)(i) — 87 cases
Commonwealth v. Lesko (2011) pa “Lesko notes that, on direct appeal, counsel asserted only that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of three aggravating circumstances arising *403 out of the two murder convictions under the capital sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We will proceed to…”
Commonwealth v. Chmiel (2005) pa “Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i), the prothonotary of this court is directed to immediately transmit to the Governor’s office the file and complete record of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence, and review by the Supreme Court.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2006) pa “42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). During the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that Spotz had proved one mitigating circumstance and that the Commonwealth had established three aggravating circumstances, including that Spotz "committed a killing while in the perpetration…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(3)(ii) — 37 cases
Commonwealth v. Pagan (2008) pa “The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court is directed to transmit a complete record of this case to the Governor in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (i). . The trial court found these subsequent claims to be meritless and denied any relief.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(3)(iii) — 96 cases
Commonwealth v. Spotz (2006) pa “42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). During the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that Spotz had proved one mitigating circumstance and that the Commonwealth had established three aggravating circumstances, including that Spotz "committed a killing while in the perpetration…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(3)(ni) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(4) — 41 cases
Commonwealth v. Lesko (2011) pa “Lesko notes that, on direct appeal, counsel asserted only that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of three aggravating circumstances arising *403 out of the two murder convictions under the capital sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We will proceed to…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(8) — 3 cases
Commonwealth v. Williams (2006) pa “The General Assembly has ensured by statute that, in a capital case, the jury's "verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in [42 Pa.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(8)(i) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(8)(iii) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(i) — 230 cases
Commonwealth v. Bomar (2003) pa “Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute Finally, appellant alleges that Pennsylvania's death penalty statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 et seq., is unconstitutional as applied in Delaware County because the Delaware County District Attorney's Office has consistently requested the…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(j) — 3 cases
Com. v. Pittman, G. (2017) pasuperct
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(j)(l) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(l) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.