42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9765
Merger of sentences.
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§ 9765. Merger of sentences.
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.
(Dec. 9, 2002, P.L.1705, No.215, eff. 60 days)
2002 Amendment. Act 215 added section 9765.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 256
cases (109 in the last 5 years), 2005–2026 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Baldwin
Commonwealth v. Baldwin (2009)
“We allowed this appeal to consider whether 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 requires that Appellant's two convictions merge for sentencing purposes.”
Commonwealth v. Jones (2006)
“The Commonwealth counters by arguing that merger is a question of legislative intent, and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 states that offenses merge only where "all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense" and the crimes arise from…”
Commonwealth v. Raven (2014)
“42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. Accordingly, merger is appropriate only when two distinct criteria are satisfied: (1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act; and (2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are included within the statutory elements of the other.”
Com. v. Faison, W. (2023)
“Sentencing merger questions are governed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765: No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense.”
Commonwealth v. Davidson (2007)
“See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765; Gatling, 807 A.2d at 894 .”
Commonwealth v. Sarvey (2018)
“In reaching that decision, the Court analyzed 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765, which contains the following language: No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory…”
Commonwealth v. Jenkins (2014)
“42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. Accordingly, merger is appropriate only when two distinct criteria are satisfied: (1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act; and (2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are included within the statutory elements of the other.”
Commonwealth v. Wade (2011)
“Did not the lower court violate appellant’s right under the Pennsylvania Constitution not to be put twice in jeopardy by imposing consecutive sentences for robbery and robbery of a motor vehicle and is not 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 violative of both the double jeopardy and separation of…”
Com. v. James, J (2023)
“42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. This Court has explained that “[t]he statute’s mandate is clear.”
Commonwealth v. Tighe (2018)
“42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. The trial court opined that these crimes merge due to the fact that "the act upon which indecent assault is predicated has already been taken into account by the rape or involuntary sexual assault and merges[.”
Commonwealth v. Baker (2008)
“In 2002, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted Section 9765 of the Judicial Code, which directs that: No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory…”
Commonwealth v. Brown (2017)
“*533 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. The statute “prohibits merger unless two distinct facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are included in the statutory elements of the other.”
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