⁴ It is true that Appellant did not ultimately present an alibi defense at trial; however, he did issue notice of an alibi defense prior to trial. Subsequently, following a change of counsel, Appellant’s alibi defense was abandoned. - 10 - J-A35006-15 As to whether recording #664517 was hearsay, this argument is wholly undeveloped and, in any event, it has been waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Appellant did not object to recording #664517 on hearsay grounds at trial. Additionally, as noted above, if such a claim had been preserved, it would be meritless because Appellant’s own statements are generally not barred by the hearsay rule. Moreover, Appellant’s only objection at trial regarding the prejudicial nature of recording #664517 was with regard to discussions contained therein pertaining to his consideration of entering a guilty plea. See N.T., 9/16/13-9/19/13, at 170. The trial court agreed to redact any plea-related discussions. Id. Thus, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admitting recording #664517. The third recording at issue was designated as #671415. Appellant’s argument with regard to this recording is, in its entirety, as follows: Recording #671415 is a phone conversation from March 5, 2013 in which a person identified by the prosecution as [Appellant] instructs a person purported as being Ms. Chandler to have a friend write a letter to him apologizing and affirming that her testimony is coerced by police threats. Ms. Chandler was never called to testify. Aside from the obvious effect of crude language, this evidence prejudices the jury against [Appellant] by painting him as a conniving, desperate man. It does not, however, tend to prove any fact in question. The prejudicial effect of this hearsay evidence outweighed its relevance and it should have been excluded. Appellant’s Brief, at 13. Our review of the record indicates that Appellant did not specifically object to the admission of recording #671415 on any grounds. See N.T., - 11 - J-A35006-15 9/16/13-9/19/13, at 172-74. Accordingly, this matter has been waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). The final recording at issue was designated as #672680. Appellant’s argument with regard to this recording is, in its entirety, as follows: Recording #672680 is a phone conversation from March 11, 2013 in which a person purported as being [Appellant] claims to not having been involved in the assault and that there is a mistake in identification. He states that it only matters what "they" can prove and that "shorty" needs to say it wasn't him. This, again, may have been proper only as rebuttal evidence. Since it was not used as such, it was inadmissible. The prejudicial effect of this hearsay evidence outweighed its relevance and it should have been excluded. Appellant’s Brief, at 13. For the same reasons discussed above with respect to recordings #664393 and #664517, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of recording #672680. Detective Rush’s interpretations of Appellant’s jail phone calls In his second claim of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to “interpret” the aforementioned recordings of Appellant’s jail phone calls. Detective Daniel Rush of the City of Washington Police Department was the lead investigator in the instant case. As part of discovery, the defense requested any jail phone call recordings made by Appellant. Detective Rush, in conjunction with Deputy Warden Strawn of the Washington County Jail, compiled and reviewed those recordings. N.T., 9/16/13-9/19/13, at 157. The recordings were admitted during the course of Detective Rush’s testimony. When Detective Rush was - 12 - J-A35006-15 asked by the prosecutor about the significance of a particular recording, Appellant objected as follows: Objection, your honor. I think, again, it's improper for the police officer to interpret to the jury what they just heard. If they're concerned about the jury not being able to understand or hear, transcripts could be produced of the call. It's improper for an interpretation from the detective as to what the jury just heard. Id. at 197. In response, the prosecutor argued that the jury was free to accept or reject Detective Rush’s interpretation of the recordings. Id. at 197-198. The trial court disagreed, and instructed the prosecutor, “You can ask did something draw your attention or what significance it is in your investigation, but to have him interpret that, that's the jury's function.” Id. at 198. The prosecutor then asked Detective Rush, “What significance is that to your investigation?” Id. No further objections were lodged by Appellant. Appellant contends Detective Rush’s “interpretations” prejudiced him. However, it is clear that following Appellant’s objection, the trial court directed the prosecutor to reframe his questioning in line with Appellant’s objection. When the prosecutor did so, Appellant issued no further objections. Thus, the trial court effectively sustained Appellant’s objection, and Appellant did not subsequently complain that the court’s instructions were insufficient to remedy his concern, nor did he request a mistrial when Detective Rush answered the reframed question. Accordingly, we ascertain - 13 - J-A35006-15 no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s treatment of Appellant’s objection, and conclude, therefore, that Appellant’s second claim lacks merit. References to Appellant’s pre-trial alibi notice Appellant’s third claim concerns the testimony of Deputy Warden Strawn, who testified that the aforementioned recordings had been compiled in response to Appellant’s pre-trial alibi notice. Appellant objected that the reference to the alibi motion was irrelevant and prejudicial because he had stipulated to the authenticity of the recordings. The trial court overruled the objection. N.T., 9/16/13-9/19/13, at 188-89. In its opinion, the trial court states: Deputy Warden Strawn testified that he oversees that daily operation of the Washington County Correctional Facility including the monitoring and recording of all inmate telephone calls. The Deputy Warden's testimony was relevant as it showed when the calls were received by [Appellant], and by whom the calls were made. The testimony simply demonstrated the chronology and development of the foundation for the introduction of [Appellant]'s statements made during the recorded calls. TCO, at 14. In addition, as discussed above, evidence of Appellant’s giving an alibi notice was also relevant to his consciousness of guilt. Thus, Appellant’s claim that Deputy Warden Strawn’s reference to the same was irrelevant is meritless. As to the prejudicial nature of that evidence, we note that the record demonstrates that the mentioning of Appellant’s alibi notice by Deputy Warden Strawn was, as the trial court indicates, only made for the purpose of establishing the chronology of the conversations heard on the - 14 - J-A35006-15 recordings. Deputy Warden Strawn did not in any way opine at length regarding the nature or merits of Appellant’s alibi notice. Moreover, Appellant fails to offer any supporting case law for his argument that such evidence is unduly prejudicial. Appellant references Pa.R.Crim.P. 567(F) to support his claim, but that Rule is, at best, not germane to his argument and, at worst, may actually serve to undermine his claim. Rule 567 sets forth the rules governing alibi defense notices. Subsection F dictates: (F) Failure to Call Witnesses. No adverse inference may be drawn against the defendant, nor may any comment be made concerning the defendant's failure to call available alibi witnesses, when such witnesses have been prevented from testifying by reason of this rule, unless the defendant or the defendant's attorney shall attempt to explain such failure to the jury. Pa.R.Crim.P. 567(F) (emphasis added). Thus, while Rule 567(F) does proscribe references to a defendant’s failure to call “available” alibi witnesses, it only does so when such witnesses fail to testify “by reason of” Rule 567. For instance, Rule 567(B) states: (B) Failure to File Notice. (1) If the defendant fails to file and serve the notice of alibi as required by this rule, the court may exclude entirely any evidence offered by the defendant for the purpose of proving the defense, except testimony by the defendant, may grant a continuance to enable the Commonwealth to investigate such evidence, or may make such other order as the interests of justice require. - 15 - J-A35006-15 (2) If the defendant omits any witness from the notice of alibi, the court at trial may exclude the testimony of the omitted witness, may grant a continuance to enable the Commonwealth to investigate the witness, or may make such other order as the interests of justice require. Pa.R.Crim.P. 567(B). Thus, Rule 567(F) implicitly suggests that references to a defendant’s failure to call an alibi witnesses may be made by the prosecution when that witness’ testimony was not presented at trial for reasons other than Appellant’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of Rule 567. Appellant concedes that he was not prevented from calling an alibi witness by operation of Rule 567. Appellant’s Brief, at 16. Nevertheless, Appellant believes the “spirit of this rule still applies.” Id. Appellant simply misunderstands the nature and purpose of this rule. Rule 567(F) does not set forth a general policy disfavoring references to abandoned alibi defenses. Instead, it serves to correct potential, unfair prejudice, which might arise when a defendant has been prevented from offering an alibi witness at trial due to that defendant’s failure to properly comply with the notice requirements set forth in Rule 567. Thus, Rule 567(F) operates to protect a defendant who wishes to offer an alibi witness, but cannot do so due to a procedural bar. It would be extremely unfair for a prosecutor to comment adversely on a defendant’s failure to call an alibi witness when the alibi witness is both available and willing to testify but procedurally barred from doing so. Rule 567 does not serve to protect a defendant from any mention of an abandoned alibi defense when that defendant has abandoned that - 16 - J-A35006-15 defense altogether for strategic or substantive reasons. Thus, we ascertain no prejudice in the mentioning of Appellant’s alibi notice based on the “spirit” of Rule 567(F). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted Deputy Warden Strawn to briefly reference Appellant’s pre-trial alibi notice. Prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination Next, Appellant contends the prosecutor engaged in a course of prosecutorial misconduct while cross-examining him. Appellant complains that the prosecutor’s questions were “harassing” and “confrontational [in] nature[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 17. Appellant does not cite to any specific objection he made, or specific conduct by the prosecutor which he finds particularly egregious. Instead, Appellant directs our attention to a span of more than 30 pages in the trial transcript. Appellant’s Brief, at 17 (citing N.T., 9/16/13-9/19/13, at 239- 73). Our review of that portion of the record does indicate that the cross- examination of Appellant was contentious. Numerous objections were lodged by defense counsel for a variety of reasons. Some of these objections were overruled, and some were sustained. Often, the trial court effectively sustained Appellant’s objections by directing the prosecutor to rephrase his questions in order to comport with defense counsel’s objection. As to any specific objection, such matters are waived, as Appellant did not properly preserve any particular objection in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (“Any - 17 - J-A35006-15 issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”). In any event, we deem any claim based on a particular objection as meritless because Appellant has failed to meaningfully develop such a claim for our review. “[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009). Appellant does appear to be arguing that the prosecutor engaged in pattern of behavior that constituted prosecutorial misconduct, regardless of the resolution of any complaint about a particular comment or question made during the cross-examination of Appellant. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17 (“There was a total disregard for the solemnity of the court and an anything-goes attitude with regard to cross-examination.”). However, it is well-settled that no number of failed individual prosecutorial misconduct claims can attain merit collectively. See Commonwealth v. Culver, 51 A.3d 866, 882 (Pa. Super. 2012). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s fourth claim of error is waived and/or meritless. Prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument – mischaracterization of testimony Next, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it failed to issue a specific corrective instruction to the jury after the prosecutor ostensibly misconstrued the nature of the testimony of the Victim and Tori Thomas. Appellant contends that, during closing remarks, the prosecutor incorrectly - 18 - J-A35006-15 stated that the Victim and Thomas testified that Appellant did not knock on any doors after the stabbing. He argues that “the [prosecutor]’s mischaracterization of this testimony caused prejudice to [Appellant] and the [c]ourt erred in declining to give a detailed curative instruction to the jury.” Appellant’s Brief, at 18. Appellant testified that he knocked on several doors following the stabbing in an attempt to obtain help for the Victim. N.T., 9/16/13-9/19/13, at 231. Appellant believes his testimony demonstrated that he lacked the specific intent to kill the Victim, the core theory of his defense to the charge of attempted murder. Appellant believes the prosecutor misconstrued the testimony of Ms. Thomas and the Victim because: “Ms. Thomas testified that [Appellant] knocked on at least one door. [The Victim] testified that he did not see where [Appellant] went.” Appellant’s Brief, at 19. Appellant’s claim arises out of the following remarks by the prosecutor, which he believes are not consistent with Ms. Thomas’ and the Victim’s actual testimony: [The Victim] and [Ms. Thomas] both said that after he got stabbed, [the Victim] said he walked away, he wasn’t knocking on no doors. He walked away, he returned, he looked like he was going to hit me again, knocked me out of the way and [said]: let’s get the fuck out of here. [Appellant] says he was knocking on doors asking for help. There’s a line from Macbeth, Macbeth was asked like: why did you act in a certain way that you did – this is from Macbeth – the guy answered: “Who can be wise, amazed, temperate and furious, [l]oyal and neutral in the moment?” No man. You can’t have conflicted emotions like that. You can’t tell me you’re stabbing a guy with a knife and a second later you’re - 19 - J-A35006-15 (demonstrating knocking) – let’s get help for this guy. That’s BS. Nobody does that. What he did was walk around – [the Victim] said: I thought he was trying to ditch the knife someplace. He came back, walked around, comes back, maybe he didn’t want to be seen over there where the body was going to be, comes back and he flees the scene. That’s evidence of guilt. N.T. (closing arguments), 9/17/13, at 31. It is well established that a prosecutor is free to argue that the evidence leads to guilt and is permitted to suggest all favorable and reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence. A prosecutor also may argue his case with logical force and vigor. Additionally, a trial court's decision not to grant a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Rios, 684 A.2d 1025, 1032-33 (Pa. 1996) (internal citations omitted). The trial court indicates that it did not find the prosecutor’s closing remarks as having mischaracterized the testimony of the Victim or Ms. Thomas. The court states: As the record demonstrates, there was no mischaracterization of the evidence. Ms. Thomas testified that [Appellant] knocked on Breann Watts' door before leaving the scene with Ms. Chandler. However, there was no testimony by Ms. Thomas demonstrating that [Appellant] knocked on her neighbor's door in order to get help for the Victim. In fact, Ms. Thomas testified, "they just stabbed him and left him to bleed to death on my stoop." Nevertheless, the [t]rial [c]ourt asserts that any mischaracterization of the testimony was an inadvertent misstatement of fact. The effect of the prosecutor's argument was to respond to the [d]efense's closing argument. Since the defense had vigorously attempted to show [Appellant]'s lack of intent to kill, the prosecutor's argument was appropriate and by no means was calculated to inflame the jury or to deny [Appellant] his right to a fair trial. Moreover, the [t]rial [c]ourt - 20 - J-A35006-15 instructed the jury that counsel's recollection of the facts is not binding on the jury. TCO, at 18-19. We agree with the trial court’s analysis. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s remarks did not, as Appellant claims, affirmatively assert that the Victim or Ms. Thomas had specifically testified that Appellant did not knock on any doors. With regard to Ms. Thomas, it seems as if the prosecutor began by speaking about the testimony of the Victim and Ms. Thomas, but then quickly constrained his comment to focus exclusively on the Victim’s testimony. Thus, it does not appear that the prosecutor made any specific assertion about Ms. Thomas’ testimony at all in the passage cited by Appellant. And, while the Victim did not specifically or literally testify that Appellant did not knock on any doors, his testimony can be fairly interpreted as supporting that factual conclusion by omission. The Victim testified that he observed Appellant’s actions after the stabbing, and he did not mention Appellant’s knocking on any doors before he eventually fled the scene. Thus, the factual premise of Appellant’s fifth claim lacks a foundation in the record. For this reason, and the reasons set forth by the trial court, Appellant’s fifth claim is meritless. Prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument – mischaracterization of defense arguments Next, Appellant asserts that prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor ostensibly mischaracterized the defense’s closing argument - 21 - J-A35006-15 as having stated that Appellant would be innocent of homicide if the victim had died. Appellant argues: In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated[,] "Suppose somebody didn't answer and he died there. If you're following [defense counsel’s] logic then, he didn't commit homicide, because I didn't mean to do it. That's silly." This statement mischaracterized [d]efense [c]ounsel's argument and misstates the law. If [Appellant] had killed [the Victim] without the specific intent to kill, then he would be innocent of first degree murder. He would not necessarily be innocent of homicide and [d]efense [c]ounsel never posited that he would. After this incorrect description of the law, the jury would be reasonable in believing that [d]efense [c]ounsel's argument was ludicrous. If the jury believed that a specific intent to kill had not been proven, they should have found [Appellant] not guilty of attempted homicide. By confusing the jury about the elements of the offense, the prosecutor usurped the criminal process and may have fooled the jury into following his fictional characterization of the law. A specific corrective instruction was necessary to fix this error, but was not given. This error prejudiced [Appellant] and warrants a reversal. Appellant’s Brief, at 20. The trial court’s opinion may be read to suggest that it found the prosecutor’s remarks to be a fair response to defense counsel’s assertions during Appellant’s closing argument. See Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 750 A.2d 243, 249 (Pa. 2000) (plurality opinion) (“A remark by a prosecutor, otherwise improper, may be appropriate if it is in fair response to the argument and comment of defense counsel.”) (citing United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31 (1988)); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 687 A.2d 1102, 1109 (Pa. 1996). In any event, the trial court found that remark did not “interfere[] with the jury’s fair and impartial assessment of the - 22 - J-A35006-15 evidence” and “did not affect the jury’s ability to render a true verdict.” TCO, at 19. We agree that there is no merit to Appellant’s claim. We do not ascertain anything improper regarding the prosecutor’s statements that would even require invocation of the “fair response” doctrine. It is not at all obvious from the record that the prosecutor was attempting to describe the law; instead, it appears as if the prosecutor was commenting on the credibility of the defense’s position that Appellant lacked the specific intent to kill when Appellant, unprovoked, had used a knife to stab the victim in the chest, and then subsequently failed to render any aid. Appellant’s argument is a red herring, suggesting that the prosecutor’s remark was making a statement about the law rather than an interpretation of the facts. To the contrary, the prosecutor’s remark does not appear to describe the legal theory of the defense as “silly” at all. 5 Rather, the prosecutor’s remark appears to have labeled “silly” the defense’s interpretation of the facts as supporting that legal defense. The prosecutor’s remark was made immediately after a summary of several facts that supported the conclusion that Appellant had failed to render aid to the Victim whom Appellant had just stabbed, N.T. (closing arguments), 9/17/13, at 25- ____________________________________________

⁵ The defense’s legal theory being that lack of specific intent to kill precludes a conviction for attempted murder. It is not disputed that “[f]or a defendant to be found guilty of attempted murder, the Commonwealth must establish specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 734 (Pa. Super. 2004). - 23 - J-A35006-15 26, and soon after the prosecutor’s critique of Appellant’s self-serving testimony, id. at 24-25. Accordingly, we ascertain no improper argument by the prosecutor. As such, Appellant’s claim lacks merit. Deadly weapon instruction Appellant’s penultimate claim is that the trial court erred in regard to its issuing of an instruction regarding allowable inferences from Appellant’s use of a deadly weapon. Appellant’s claim and argument, in their entirety, are as follows: 7. The Court made reversible error in giving the jury the instruction that there was no question that they could apply the inference of specific intent, with regard to attempted homicide, because a deadly weapon had been used on a vital part of the victim's body. The United States Supreme Court recently held that[,] "Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). In his instruction to the jury, the Judge explained that he had already made that finding of fact, implying that it would be improper for them to decide otherwise. This instruction may have caused the jury to rule in favor of the Commonwealth on vital questions such as intent and sentencing enhancements. It was improper for the Court to remove these factual determinations from the jury and should result in a reversal. Appellant’s Brief, at 21. Appellant’s argument contains no citation to the record wherein the alleged error occurred and/or where this claim was preserved in the trial court. On this basis alone, we could deem Appellant’s issue waived. See Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 433 A.2d 1382, 1390 (Pa. Super. 1981) - 24 - J-A35006-15 (finding an “objection has been waived [where the] appellant has failed to cite to the record, advising us either at what point in the trial the [error] occurred, or in what manner his objection was preserved for appellate review”). Nevertheless, we ascertain no error in the trial court’s instruction. The jury was instructed as follows: When deciding whether [Appellant] had the specific intent to kill, you should consider all the evidence regarding his words and conduct and the attending circumstances that may show his state of mind. If you believe [Appellant] intentionally used a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body, you may regard that as an item of circumstantial evidence which may, if you choose, infer that [Appellant] had the specific intent to kill. Again, a deadly weapon is any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or serious bodily injury or any other device or instrumentality [sic] that in the manner in which it was used or intended to be used is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. In this case, as you heard, [Appellant] admitted using a knife. I don’t think there’s any question that is a deadly weapon and also that the victim was stabbed in the lung, which is also [sic] a vital part of the victim’s body. N.T., 9/16/13-9/19/13, at 295-96. It is well-established that “[t]he specific intent to kill … may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body of another human being.” Commonwealth v. Ewing, 264 A.2d 661, 663 (Pa. 1970) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (hereinafter, “deadly weapon presumption”). The trial court’s instruction properly conveyed this principle. - 25 - J-A35006-15 Furthermore, there is nothing in the trial court’s elaboration on the deadly weapon presumption that was improper. As the record plainly reveals, the court did not, as Appellant contends, instruct the jury that “there was no question that they could apply the inference of specific intent” from the use of a deadly weapon. Appellant’s Brief, at 21. The trial court properly instructed the jury that the choice to apply the deadly weapon presumption was theirs to make. See N.T., 9/16/13-9/19/13, at 295 (“If you believe [Appellant] intentionally used a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body, you may regard that as an item of circumstantial evidence which may, if you choose, infer that [Appellant] had the specific intent to kill.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, although the court instructed the jury that a knife is a deadly weapon and that a lung is a vital part of the Victim’s body, Appellant does not even dispute either of those facts. Indeed, those facts are virtually self-evident. Regardless, the trial court did not tell the jury that Appellant acted intentionally (which was an element of the deadly weapon presumption as recited by the court), nor did the trial court tell the jury that they must apply the deadly weapon presumption given the undisputed facts. Accordingly, even if Appellant had not waived this claim, it clearly lacks merit. Evidence admitted during sentencing proceedings Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it permitted video evidence during the sentencing phase of his trial showing Appellant - 26 - J-A35006-15 engaged in an altercation at the jail. Essentially, Appellant contends that the evidence was not relevant to his sentencing for attempted murder because the altercation occurred after his conviction. However, Appellant fails to cite any relevant case law or other legal authority in support of his claim that this evidence was irrelevant to the formulation of his sentence and, thus, his argument is meritless on that basis alone. Nevertheless, we believe such evidence was clearly relevant to assess Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and/or the protection of the public, both of which are not just relevant concerns at sentencing, but are matters which the sentencing court is required to consider. See Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847-48 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), that is, the protection of the public, [the] gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and [the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant....”) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Appellant’s final claim is meritless. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 2/5/2016 - 27 -