Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-4 (2026)

Second degree sexual assault

✓ current as of July 2026
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A person is guilty of a second-degree sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual contact with another person and if any of the following circumstances exist:

(1) The accused knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless.

(2) The accused uses force, element of surprise, or coercion.

(3) The accused engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or stimulation.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 65 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1983–2022 · leading case: State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528 (R.I. 1992).
State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528 (R.I. 1992). · cites it 7× “119, § 1, allegedly committed on Christmas Eve in 1981; the other charged second-degree sexual assault in violation of § 11-37-4, allegedly committed in May 1984.”
State v. Helberth Perez, 161 A.3d 487 (R.I. 2017). · cites it 7× “The state notes that there is a “salient distinction” between “sexual penetration” as contemplated in the first-degree sexual assault statute, § 11-37-2, 8 and “sexual contact” as proscribed in the second-degree sexual assault statute, § 11-37-4, 9 viz., § 11-37-4, unlike §…”
State v. Pereira, 973 A.2d 19 (R.I. 2009). · cites it 6× “2 (count 1), one count of second-degree sexual assault against his niece, Kim, in violation of §§ 11-37-4(A), 11-37-5 (count 2), and one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault against Kim, in violation of §§ 11-37-8.”
Palazzolo v. Ruggiano, 993 F. Supp. 45 (D.R.I. 1998). · cites it 13× “That offense is described in R.I.Gen.Laws § 11-37-4 which provides: 11-37-4.”
State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2012). · cites it 4× “Facts and Travel On April 18, 2007, a six-count criminal information was filed against Dubois in Superior Court, alleging one count of second-degree sexual assault under G.L.1956 § 11-37-4, and five counts of second-degree child molestation in violation of § 11-37-8.”
State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007). · cites it 6× “Specifically, DiPetrillo argues that the trial justice "conflated the `force or coercion' standard" adopted by the General Assembly with other theories, such as: "the non-consent standard; the psychological-coercion-of-susceptible-victim standard; and the disagreeable sexual…”
State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I. 1996). · cites it 4× “Section 11-37-4(3). All those second-degree sexual assaults, however, specifically involve only unlawful sexual contact and not sexual penetration.”
State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228 (R.I. 1993). · cites it 4× “Count 3 charged the defendant with violating § 11-37-4, as amended by P.L.1986, ch. 191, § 1, and § 11-37-5 by engaging in sexual contact with his stepdaughter, Monique.”
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998). · cites it 4× “1995), and our interpretation of the term "sexual contact" (the first element of § 11-37-4) in cases involving second-degree sexual assault, see State v.”
State v. Reynaldo Gomez, 116 A.3d 216 (R.I. 2015). · cites it 4× “Following this incident, defendant was charged by a criminal information, filed in Superior Court on November 29, 2011, with one count of second-degree sexual assault pursuant to § 11-37-4. A jury trial in Superior Court took place over five days in July 2013.”
State v. Texter, 923 A.2d 568 (R.I. 2007). · cites it 3× “The defendant, Eugene Texter, was charged by information with two counts of second-degree sexual assault, in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-37-4, and one count of simple assault, in violation of G.”
Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562 (D.R.I. 1996). · cites it 2× “R.I. Gen.Laws § 11-37-4(2) (1994) states: Definition of guilt of second degree sexual assault.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-4(1) — 1 case
State v. Cook, 45 A.3d 1272 (R.I. 2012).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-4(2) — 7 cases
Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562 (D.R.I. 1996). “R.I. Gen.Laws § 11-37-4(2) (1994) states: Definition of guilt of second degree sexual assault.”
Palazzolo v. Ruggiano, 993 F. Supp. 45 (D.R.I. 1998). “That offense is described in R.I.Gen.Laws § 11-37-4 which provides: 11-37-4.”
State v. Reynaldo Gomez, 116 A.3d 216 (R.I. 2015). “Following this incident, defendant was charged by a criminal information, filed in Superior Court on November 29, 2011, with one count of second-degree sexual assault pursuant to § 11-37-4. A jury trial in Superior Court took place over five days in July 2013.”
State v. Roger Watkins, 92 A.3d 172 (R.I. 2014).
United States v. Mack Doak, 47 F.4th 1340 (11th Cir. 2022).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-4(3) — 3 cases
State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I. 1996). “Section 11-37-4(3). All those second-degree sexual assaults, however, specifically involve only unlawful sexual contact and not sexual penetration.”
Palazzolo v. Ruggiano, 993 F. Supp. 45 (D.R.I. 1998). “That offense is described in R.I.Gen.Laws § 11-37-4 which provides: 11-37-4.”
McCann v. Bryon L. Rosquist, D.C., P.C., 185 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 1999).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-4(A) — 1 case
State v. Pereira, 973 A.2d 19 (R.I. 2009). “2 (count 1), one count of second-degree sexual assault against his niece, Kim, in violation of §§ 11-37-4(A), 11-37-5 (count 2), and one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault against Kim, in violation of §§ 11-37-8.”
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