(a) No judgment for a divorce shall become final and operative until three (3) months
after the trial and decision. Final decree from the bond of marriage may be entered
ex parte and in chambers on the suggestion of the prevailing party at any time within
one hundred eighty (180) days next after the expiration of three (3) months from the
date of decision. After the expiration of the one hundred eighty (180) days, final
decrees may be entered only in open court and on motion or upon written consent of
the attorneys or parties. Notice of the filing of the motion shall not be required
in cases in which the original complaint is unanswered.
(b) After entry of the final judgment for a divorce from the bond of marriage, either
party may marry again.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
13
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1962–2025 · leading case:
Keidel v. Keidel, 383 A.2d 264 (R.I. 1978).
Keidel v. Keidel, 383 A.2d 264 (R.I. 1978).
· cites it 3× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) §15-5-23, which, at the time this case tried, read as follows: 1 “Remarriage — Final decree.”
Centazzo v. Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560 (R.I. 1989).
· cites it 2× “Section 15-5-23. A nisi or waiting period of three months must then elapse, at which point a prevailing party in the divorce action may move for entry of a final judgment.”
Levada v. Levada, 359 A.2d 701 (R.I. 1976).
· cites it 4× “1956 f 1969 Reenactment) §15-5-23. 1 II We come now to the December 18, 1975 denial without hearing of respondent’s second objection to the entry of the final decree.”
Alix v. Alix, 497 A.2d 18 (R.I. 1985).
“General Laws 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 15-5-23. See Luttge v. Luttge, 97 R.I. 309, 312 , 197 A.”
Bina v. Bina, 764 A.2d 191 (R.I. 2000).
· cites it 3× “” G.L.1956 § 15-5-23. We have previously explained that the delay required by the statute primarily serves to allow the parties an opportunity for reconciliation.”
Pakuris v. Pakuris, 186 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1962).
· cites it 2× “1956, §15-5-23, reads as follows: “Remarriage — Final decree.”
Sleboda v. Sleboda, 445 A.2d 276 (R.I. 1982).
“…decree in an answered case may be had only on motion and notice to the *279 other party. G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 15-5-23.”
Luttge v. Luttge, 197 A.2d 500 (R.I. 1964).
“1956, §15-5-23. Moreover, the prevailing party cannot be compelled to enter a final decree and thereby take a divorce against his wishes.”
Mendes v. Mendes, 305 A.2d 97 (R.I. 1973).
“A decision granting a divorce shall be appealable upon entry and, except as otherwise provided by law, the correctness of such decision shall not be reviewable upon an appeal from a final decree for divorce entered in pursuance of §15-5-23. Appeals in criminal cases wherein the…”
Quarto v. Quarto, 440 A.2d 737 (R.I. 1982).
“1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 15-5-23, if a final decree is not entered within thirty days after the expiration of three months from the date of the decision, such a final decree may be entered only in open court and on motion with notice to the opposing party in cases in which the…”
Marnee McCollum v. Daniel McCollum (R.I. 2023).
“1956 § 14-1-52(a) - 15 - (“A decision granting a divorce shall be appealable upon entry and * * * the correctness of the decision shall not be reviewable upon an appeal from a final decree for divorce entered in pursuance of § 15-5-23.”). Upon the issuance of a decision pending…”
Peter Marcucci v. Jennifer Marcucci (R.I. 2025).
“1956 § 14-1-52(a), which provides in pertinent part: “A decision granting a divorce shall be appealable upon entry and, except as otherwise provided by law, the correctness of the decision shall not be reviewable upon an appeal from a final decree for divorce entered in…”
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