(a) When an employee has sustained an injury that entitles the employee to receive benefits
pursuant to § 28-33-18 or § 28-34-3, the employee may become capable of suitable alternative employment as determined
by the workers’ compensation court, or may be offered suitable alternative employment
as agreed to by the employee and employer with written notice to the director. The
employer or insurer shall pay an injured employee who accepts suitable alternative
employment a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66⅔%)
of the difference between the employee’s average weekly wage, earnings, or salary
before the injury and his or her weekly wages, earnings, or salary from the suitable
alternative employment. Effective January 1, 2025, the employer or insurer shall pay
an injured employee who accepts suitable alternative employment a weekly compensation
equal to sixty-two percent (62%) of the difference between the employee’s average
weekly wage, earnings, or salary before the injury and his or her weekly wages, earnings,
or salary from the suitable alternative employment.
(b) The acceptance of suitable alternative employment shall not be mandatory if it results
in the inequitable forfeiture or loss of seniority with the employer or a monetary
benefit or other substantial benefit including, but not limited to, vested pension
and/or profit sharing contributions, arising from the employment relationship.
(c) If suitable alternative employment as determined by the workers’ compensation court
has been offered to the employee and the employee has refused to accept the employment,
then the workers’ compensation court shall, in fixing the amount of compensation payable
subsequent to the refusal, treat earnings capacity as post-injury earnings, requiring
the employer or insurer to pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to
sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66⅔%) of the difference between the employee’s average
weekly wage, earnings, or salary before the injury and the weekly earning capacity.
In no case shall increases in payments made to an injured employee pursuant to § 28-33-18.3(b)(1) or § 28-33-17(f) be considered in the calculation of the weekly compensation due pursuant to this
section. The fact that the employee is undergoing rehabilitation does not by itself
exempt the employee from the provisions of this subsection.
(d) If the suitable alternative employment is terminated by the employer for reasons other
than misconduct by the employee, the injured employee shall be entitled to be compensated
from the employer in whose employ he or she was injured at the rate to which the employee
was entitled prior to acceptance of the employment after notice by the employee to
the employer in whose employ he or she was injured. The payments shall be made no
later than fourteen (14) days after the notice. If suitable alternative employment
is terminated by the employer for misconduct of the employee, or by the employee,
the compensation payable to the employee shall not exceed that payable during continuance
of suitable alternative employment. Upon request to the workers’ compensation court,
the employee shall have the right to a determination as to whether or not the termination
was justified. Any employee who accepts suitable alternative employment with his or
her employer of record shall continue to maintain the seniority status and all rights
incidental to it that the employee enjoyed prior to his or her injury, except that
these rights shall not exceed the current rights of a similar employee with equal
seniority.
Notes of Decisions
Mumma v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 965 A.2d 437 (R.I. 2009).
· cites it 58× “" [5] She reasoned that the benefits could not extend beyond the 312-week period because the "suitable alternative employment" language of § 28-33-18.2 specifically applies to workers who otherwise would receive benefits for partial disability under § 28-33-18.”
Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., 637 A.2d 367 (R.I. 1994).
· cites it 17× “1956 (1986 Reenactment) § 28-33-18.2. The trial judge concluded that this situation did not involve an offer of suitable alternative employment.”
Wayland Health Ctr. v. Lowe, 475 A.2d 1037 (R.I. 1984).
· cites it 9× “1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 28-33-18.2. The Legislature specifically made § 28-33-18 subject to § 28-33-18.”
Oladapo v. Charlesgate Nursing Corp., 590 A.2d 405 (R.I. 1991).
· cites it 13× “The employer then petitioned the WCC to reduce benefits under § 28-33-18.2 on the basis that employee had refused to accept suitable alternative employment.”
Impulse Packaging, Inc. v. Sicajan, 869 A.2d 593 (R.I. 2005).
· cites it 3× “General Laws 1956 § 28-33-18.2(a), the suitable alternative employment statute, states in pertinent part that: “When an employee has sustained an injury which entitles the employee to receive benefits * * * the employee may become capable of suitable alternative employment as…”
Riffenburg v. Kent Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 715 A.2d 1281 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 5× “As a result, on December 9,1994, Riffenburg forwarded her own § 28-33-18.2 notice to the State Director of Labor (director), indicating that despite the hospital’s refusal to so acknowledge, she had accepted SAE as of March 14,1994.”
Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085 (R.I. 1997).
“See § 28-33-18.2(c). It further held that the trial justice improperly excluded overtime pay from the calculation of Truex’s postinjury wages because overtime pay had not been expressly excluded by the partial-incapacity statute.”
Worcester Textile v. McIntosh, 593 A.2d 70 (R.I. 1991).
“1956 (1986 Reenactment) § 28-33-18.2. The position offered was that of a specker and was described at the hearing as follows: “The position consists of standing or sitting before a flat, upright inspection work area called a perch.”
K-MART v. Whitney, 710 A.2d 667 (R.I. 1998).
“The provisions of this subsection are subject to the provisions of § 28-33-18.2.” (Emphasis added.) Under both versions of the statute, however, an employee has no obligation to seek alternative employment while totally incapacitated for work and should not be penalized because…”
Almacs, Inc. v. Porreca, 702 A.2d 892 (R.I. 1997).
· cites it 2× “Provisions of this subsection are subject to the provisions of section 28-33-18.2.” It is undisputed that employee’s wages for her part-time employment for a twenty-hour workweek, together with her partial-disability payment’s having been reduced by 30 percent was in total less…”
Poisson v. Comtec Info. Sys., Inc., 713 A.2d 230 (R.I. 1998).
“The trial judge of the Workers' Compensation Court affirmed, finding that the process pursuant to the "Suitable alternative employment” statute, § 28-33-18.2, begins upon an offer of employment by the employer and is not applicable to these facts; whereas under § 28-33-47,…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-18.2(a) — 4 cases
Mumma v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 965 A.2d 437 (R.I. 2009).
“" [5] She reasoned that the benefits could not extend beyond the 312-week period because the "suitable alternative employment" language of § 28-33-18.2 specifically applies to workers who otherwise would receive benefits for partial disability under § 28-33-18.”
Oladapo v. Charlesgate Nursing Corp., 590 A.2d 405 (R.I. 1991).
“The employer then petitioned the WCC to reduce benefits under § 28-33-18.2 on the basis that employee had refused to accept suitable alternative employment.”
Impulse Packaging, Inc. v. Sicajan, 869 A.2d 593 (R.I. 2005).
“General Laws 1956 § 28-33-18.2(a), the suitable alternative employment statute, states in pertinent part that: “When an employee has sustained an injury which entitles the employee to receive benefits * * * the employee may become capable of suitable alternative employment as…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-18.2(b) — 2 cases
Mumma v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 965 A.2d 437 (R.I. 2009).
“" [5] She reasoned that the benefits could not extend beyond the 312-week period because the "suitable alternative employment" language of § 28-33-18.2 specifically applies to workers who otherwise would receive benefits for partial disability under § 28-33-18.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-18.2(c) — 4 cases
Oladapo v. Charlesgate Nursing Corp., 590 A.2d 405 (R.I. 1991).
“The employer then petitioned the WCC to reduce benefits under § 28-33-18.2 on the basis that employee had refused to accept suitable alternative employment.”
Impulse Packaging, Inc. v. Sicajan, 869 A.2d 593 (R.I. 2005).
“General Laws 1956 § 28-33-18.2(a), the suitable alternative employment statute, states in pertinent part that: “When an employee has sustained an injury which entitles the employee to receive benefits * * * the employee may become capable of suitable alternative employment as…”
Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085 (R.I. 1997).
“See § 28-33-18.2(c). It further held that the trial justice improperly excluded overtime pay from the calculation of Truex’s postinjury wages because overtime pay had not been expressly excluded by the partial-incapacity statute.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-18.2(d) — 3 cases
Mumma v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 965 A.2d 437 (R.I. 2009).
“" [5] She reasoned that the benefits could not extend beyond the 312-week period because the "suitable alternative employment" language of § 28-33-18.2 specifically applies to workers who otherwise would receive benefits for partial disability under § 28-33-18.”
Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., 637 A.2d 367 (R.I. 1994).
“1956 (1986 Reenactment) § 28-33-18.2. The trial judge concluded that this situation did not involve an offer of suitable alternative employment.”
Riffenburg v. Kent Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 715 A.2d 1281 (R.I. 1998).
“As a result, on December 9,1994, Riffenburg forwarded her own § 28-33-18.2 notice to the State Director of Labor (director), indicating that despite the hospital’s refusal to so acknowledge, she had accepted SAE as of March 14,1994.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.