(a) In any controversy over which the workers’ compensation court has jurisdiction pursuant
to this chapter and § 45-21.2-9, any judge of that court shall, pursuant to §§ 28-35-11 — 28-35-28, and the rules of practice of the court, hear all questions of law and fact involved
in the controversy and presented by any party in interest, and he or she shall within
ten (10) days after the hearing, unless the parties otherwise agree, decide the merits
of the controversy pursuant to the law and the fair preponderance of the evidence
and the court shall immediately notify the parties.
(b) Within seventy-two (72) hours of notice, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays,
the judge shall enter a decree upon the decision, which shall contain findings of
fact, but within that time any party may appear and present a form of decree for consideration.
Notes of Decisions
Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 375 A.2d 920 (R.I. 1977).
· cites it 7× “The company first points to the 19-month hiatus between the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and the filing of the full commission’s decision and then claims that the actions taken by the trial commissioner and the full commission are directly contrary to the…”
Carr v. Gen. Insulated Wire Works, Inc., 199 A.2d 24 (R.I. 1964).
· cites it 8× “The respondent in this court argues that the provisions of § 28-35-27 which govern the disposition of a cause by a trial commissioner after hearing preclude any reopening of a cause after decision thereon even though a decree has not been entered.”
Martinez v. Bar-Tan Mfg., 521 A.2d 134 (R.I. 1987).
· cites it 3× “2d 24 (1964), where we held that in enacting G.L.1956 § 28-35-27, the Legislature did intend to preclude a trial commissioner from reopening a case after rendering a decision but before entering the decree.”
Washington High. Dev., Inc. v. Bendick, 576 A.2d 115 (R.I. 1990).
“In the same case the decision of the trial commissioner was rendered ten months after the conclusion of testimony although § 28-35-27 specified that he should render his decision within ten days after the hearing had concluded.”
Rowell v. Kaplan, 235 A.2d 91 (R.I. 1967).
“Such a construction differs in degree from that given in this state to the somewhat similar requirement of §28-35-27. That section provides that decrees in workmen’s compensation controversies shall “contain findings of fact,” and we have said that a failure to comply renders…”
Armour & Co. v. Greco, 185 A.2d 98 (R.I. 1962).
· cites it 2× “Section 28-35-27 expressly provides that the commission is to “hear all questions of law and fact involved” in the controversy.”
Larose v. Warwick Brass Foundry, Inc., 198 A.2d 668 (R.I. 1964).
“In the first place, a trial commissioner is required under §28-35-27 to “decide the merits of the controversy pursuant to' the law and the fair preponderance of the evidence * * *” and “enter a decree upon the decision, which shall contain findings of fact * * Thereafter any…”
Costa v. Cars, Inc., 219 A.2d 122 (R.I. 1966).
“1956, §28-35-27, we treat the *687 decree entered on November 5, 1962 as relating back to September 5, 1961, the date on which the testimony was concluded.”
Wynne v. Pawtuxet Valley Dyeing Co., 224 A.2d 612 (R.I. 1966).
“There we held that pursuant to the provisions of §28-35-27 the trial commissioner had no jurisdiction to reopen a case once he had made a decision within the ten-day period set forth in the statute.”
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Pompei, 161 A.2d 566 (R.I. 1960).
“1956, §28-35-27. On appeal to the full commission the petitioner undoubtedly argued, as he has here, that certain additional findings should have been included.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-27(2) — 1 case
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