When used in this chapter:
(1) “Age” means anyone who is at least forty (40) years of age.
(2) “Because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” includes, but is not limited to, because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, and women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work, and nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
(3) “Commission” means the Rhode Island commission against discrimination created by this
chapter.
(4) “Confidential” means to remain secret and not to be disclosed to another person or
entity.
(5) “Conviction” means, for the purposes of this chapter only, any verdict or finding
of guilt after a criminal trial or any plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a criminal
charge.
(6) “Disability” means a disability as defined in § 42-87-1.
(7) “Discriminate” includes segregate or separate.
(8) “Employee” does not include any individual employed by their parents, spouse, or child,
or in the domestic service of any person.
(9)(i) “Employer” includes the state and all political subdivisions of the state and any
person in this state employing four (4) or more individuals, and any person acting
in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly.
(ii) Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to apply to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of its religion to perform work connected with the carrying on of its
activities.
(10) “Employment agency” includes any person undertaking, with or without compensation,
to procure opportunities to work, or to procure, recruit, refer, or place employees.
(11) “Firefighter” means an employee the duties of whose position include work connected
with the control and extinguishment of fires or the maintenance and use of firefighting
apparatus and equipment, including an employee engaged in this activity who is transferred
or promoted to a supervisory or administrative position.
(12) “Gender identity or expression” includes a person’s actual or perceived gender, as
well as a person’s gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-related appearance,
or gender-related expression; whether or not that gender identity, gender-related
self image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression is different from
that traditionally associated with the person’s sex at birth.
(13) “Labor organization” includes any organization that exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
terms or conditions of employment, or of other mutual aid or protection in relation
to employment.
(14) “Law enforcement officer” means an employee the duties of whose position include investigation,
apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against
the criminal laws of the state, including an employee engaged in such activity who
is transferred or promoted to a supervisory or administrative position. For the purpose
of this subdivision, “detention” includes the duties of employees assigned to guard
individuals incarcerated in any penal institution.
(15) “Non-disparagement agreement” means an agreement which restricts an individual from
taking any action to include, but not be limited to, speaking or publicizing information
that negatively impacts the other party to the agreement to include the reputation,
products, services, employees, and management of the protected party.
(16) “Person” includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations,
corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.
(17) “Protective hairstyles” means and includes, but is not limited to, hair texture or
hairstyles, if that hair texture or that hairstyle is commonly associated with a particular
race or national origin (including a hairstyle in which hair is tightly coiled or
tightly curled, locks, cornrows, twists, braids, Bantu knots, and Afros).
(18) “Race” means and includes traits historically associated with the race, including,
but not limited to, hair texture and protective hairstyles.
(19) “Religion” includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer, union, or employment agency demonstrates that it is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s or union member’s
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of its business.
(20) “Sexual orientation” means having or being perceived as having an orientation for
heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality.
(21) The terms, as used regarding persons with disabilities:
(i) “Auxiliary aids and services” and “reasonable accommodation” shall have the same meaning
as those items are defined in § 42-87-1.1; and
(ii) “Hardship” means an “undue hardship” as defined in § 42-87-1.1.
Notes of Decisions
Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 359 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1976).
· cites it 15× “Mason buttresses her argument by noting that §28-5-38 mandates that the provisions of the Fair Employment Practices Act be “construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof” and by further noting that the declared policy of the Fair Employment Practices Act is…”
DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13 (R.I. 2005).
· cites it 8× “” Section 28-5-6(4). The statute further defines “[m]ajor life activities” as “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”
Ctr. for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 3× “See § 28-5-6. As the commission’s decision noted, Barros was qualified for the position in that she had successfully completed a three-month probationary period, had become a permanent employee, and had received several positive performance evaluations.”
Mayer v. Prof'l Ambulance, LLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d 408 (D.R.I. 2016).
· cites it 2× “§ 2000e-2, 2000e(k); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6, § 28-5-7(l)(i),(ii), § 28-5-7.”
Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007).
· cites it 2× “" "(d) For the purposes of this section, the terms `sex', `disability' and `age' have the same meaning as those terms are defined in § 28-5-6, the state fair employment practices act.”
Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996).
“§ 12112 (a); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-6, 5-7. At the close of Katz’s case, the district court granted City Metal’s motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.”
Chang v. Univ. of Rhode Island, 375 A.2d 925 (R.I. 1977).
· cites it 3× “The 1974 amendment also expressly included “the state and all political subdivisions thereof” within the definition of the term “employer.”
Poulin v. Custom Craft, Inc., 996 A.2d 654 (R.I. 2010).
· cites it 2× “1956 § 42-112-1; G.L.1956 § 28-5-6(4)(ii). 4 . Although the plaintiff's notice of appeal was premature, it is nevertheless valid as final judgment was ultimately entered.”
Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032 (R.I. 2004).
“” Sections 28-5-6(1), 42-112-1(d). To provide understanding to the above statutes, we look to the federal interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”
Dep't of Corr. of State of Ri v. Tucker, 657 A.2d 546 (R.I. 1995).
· cites it 2× “Rhode Island General Laws Section 36-4r42 gives the Personnel Appeal Board the authority to hear and decide allegations of race discrimination made by state employees.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(1) — 1 case
Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032 (R.I. 2004).
“” Sections 28-5-6(1), 42-112-1(d). To provide understanding to the above statutes, we look to the federal interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(13) — 1 case
Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 359 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1976).
“Mason buttresses her argument by noting that §28-5-38 mandates that the provisions of the Fair Employment Practices Act be “construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof” and by further noting that the declared policy of the Fair Employment Practices Act is…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(2) — 1 case
Ctr. for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680 (R.I. 1998).
“See § 28-5-6. As the commission’s decision noted, Barros was qualified for the position in that she had successfully completed a three-month probationary period, had become a permanent employee, and had received several positive performance evaluations.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(2)(A) — 1 case
Dep't of Corr. of State of Ri v. Tucker, 657 A.2d 546 (R.I. 1995).
“Rhode Island General Laws Section 36-4r42 gives the Personnel Appeal Board the authority to hear and decide allegations of race discrimination made by state employees.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(4) — 1 case
DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13 (R.I. 2005).
“” Section 28-5-6(4). The statute further defines “[m]ajor life activities” as “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(4)(ii) — 2 cases
DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13 (R.I. 2005).
“” Section 28-5-6(4). The statute further defines “[m]ajor life activities” as “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”
Poulin v. Custom Craft, Inc., 996 A.2d 654 (R.I. 2010).
“1956 § 42-112-1; G.L.1956 § 28-5-6(4)(ii). 4 . Although the plaintiff's notice of appeal was premature, it is nevertheless valid as final judgment was ultimately entered.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(7) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(7)(A) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(8) — 2 cases
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(9) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(9)(i) — 2 cases
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(B) — 1 case
Chang v. Univ. of Rhode Island, 375 A.2d 925 (R.I. 1977).
“The 1974 amendment also expressly included “the state and all political subdivisions thereof” within the definition of the term “employer.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(G) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6(H) — 1 case
Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 359 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1976).
“Mason buttresses her argument by noting that §28-5-38 mandates that the provisions of the Fair Employment Practices Act be “construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof” and by further noting that the declared policy of the Fair Employment Practices Act is…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.