Rhode Island General Laws
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-14-1 (2026)
Reasonable and prudent speeds
✓ current as of July 2026
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No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event, speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care. Violations of this section are subject to fines enumerated in § 31-41.1-4.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 26
cases, 1960–2018 · leading case: State v. Brown, 196 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1963).
State v. Brown, 196 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1963). “General laws 1956, §31-14-1, provides in part that “No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.”
State v. Benjamin D. Minior, 175 A.3d 1202 (R.I. 2018). “In my view, there was a sufficient mutuality of interest between the town of Bristol and the state when the town prosecuted defendant for exceeding reasonable and prudent speeds, a violation of a state statute, G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1. See Duffy v. Milder, 896 A.”
State v. Lutye, 287 A.2d 634 (R.I. 1972). “At the outset defendant argues that the complaint, although it charged that the speed at which he had been oper *492 ating was imprudent and unreasonable, is nonetheless fatally defective because it failed to track the language of the second sentence of §31-14-1 by alleging that…”
State v. Campbell, 196 A.2d 131 (R.I. 1963). “1956, §31-14-1. The defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds that the offense as charged in the language of the statute was too' vague and indefinite and that the statute itself for the same reason was violative of art.”
Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. as subrogee of Dean F. Pepper v. D.F. Pepper Constr., Inc., 59 A.3d 106 (R.I. 2013). “” G.L.1956 § 31-14-1. Further, “speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance * * Id.”
State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1974). “1956 (1968 Reenactment) §31-14-1. 1 The complaint and warrant alleges that he operated a motor vehicle on October 26, 1971, “* * * on Rt.”
Markham v. Cross Transp., Inc., 376 A.2d 1359 (R.I. 1977). “1956 (1968 Reenactment) §§31-14-1 and 31-14-3 to show that statutory standard for drivers as bearing on the issue of negligence.”
State v. Noble, 186 A.2d 336 (R.I. 1962). “1956, §31-14-3, and reads as follows: “The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of §31-14-1, drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when…”
State of Rhode Island ex rel. Town of Little Compton v. David Simmons, 87 A.3d 412 (R.I. 2014). “1956 § 31-27-2; failure to maintain proper control of a motor vehicle, in violation of G.L.1956 § 31-14-1; and failing to report an accident, in violation of G.”
Malinowski v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 727 A.2d 194 (R.I. 1999). “— The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of § 31-14-1,[ 2 ] ¿hive at an appropriate reduced speed * * * when [a] special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.”
State v. LaPlante, 409 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1979). “1956 (1968 Reenactment) §§31-14-1 and -2, followed by the disjunctive conjunction “or.”
State v. Roberts, 420 A.2d 837 (R.I. 1980). “1956 (1968 Reenactment) §§ 31-14-1 and 31-14-2 5 followed by the printed phrase “or did.”
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