(a) Any police officer or police officers, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision
of the bureau of police and fire, or any similar department, board, or bureau of a
city or town having control of the police department, or any other duly constituted
authority within the police department of the city or town, which decision orders
the dismissal, reduction in rank, suspension, fine, performance of extra hours of
duty, loss of seniority rights, transfer with or without a reduction in pay, or reprimand,
and the decision is based on charges involving violation of departmental regulations,
may appeal the decision to the superior court of the state of Rhode Island for the
county in which the city or town is located; provided, that no appeal is allowed unless
all administrative remedies available under the municipal charter have been exhausted;
and, provided, further, that an appeal does not stay the operation of the decision.
Upon appeal, the police officer or police officers are entitled to a trial de novo
before a justice of the superior court without a jury.
(b) The superior court may uphold the decision, reverse the decision, restore the police
officer to the officer’s former rank, revoke the suspension, reduce the penalty, negate
the transfer, or allow a transfer without loss of pay. If the decision is reversed
or modified by the superior court, the police officer or police officers shall, to
the extent that the decision is reversed or modified, be reimbursed monetarily or
by compensatory time off for all loss of pay and/or extra duty hours performed.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases, 1971–2014 · leading case:
Lynch v. King, 391 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1978).
Lynch v. King, 391 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1978).
· cites it 4× “The respondent contends that the proper vehicle for review of a decision by the hearing committee is appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to §42-28.”
City of Pawtucket v. Nichalas Laprade, 94 A.3d 503 (R.I. 2014).
· cites it 14× “6-12 provided that a police officer who sought to appeal from a decision rendered by a LEOBOR hearing committee could do so in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 45-20-1.1, which provided that any police officer (and not the charging law enforcement agency) who was aggrieved by a final…”
Weeks v. Pers. Bd. of Review, Etc., 373 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1977).
· cites it 17× “1956 (1970 Reenactment) § 45-20-1.1, which provides for a trial de novo in Superior Court for certain appeals by police officers, violates the doctrine of separation of powers by conferring on courts authority over executive or administrative functions.”
In Re Denisewich, 643 A.2d 1194 (R.I. 1994).
· cites it 3× “1956 (1991 Reenactment) § 45-20-1.1. That section directs the Superior Court to conduct a de novo review of the hearing committee’s decision and “to determine the facts anew and * * * decide * * * what penalty, if any, should be imposed.”
E. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Rocha, 373 A.2d 496 (R.I. 1977).
“1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-20-1.1, which permits a police officer who has been disciplined because of charges involving moral turpitude or violation of departmental regulations to take an appeal to the Superior Court, where he is entitled to “a trial de novo before a justice of…”
Simmons v. Town Council of Town of Coventry, 312 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1973).
· cites it 3× “1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-20-1.1. This section permits a police officer who may have been disciplined because of charges “involving moral turpitude or violation of departmental regulations” to take an appeal to the Superior Court where he shall be entitled to a “* * * trial de…”
Kurbiec v. Bastien, 385 A.2d 667 (R.I. 1978).
· cites it 3× “1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-20-1.1 1 The trial justice held that in dismissing plaintiff, defendants had exceeded their authority because they did not confine their review to the issue of suspension and because by increasing the sanction on plaintiff from a suspension to a…”
Kurbiec v. Bastien, 428 A.2d 303 (R.I. 1981).
· cites it 4× “1956 (1970 Reenactment) § 45-20-1.1. Indeed, this court has so observed in respect to the instant case in Kurbiec v.”
Aiudi v. Baillargeon, 399 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1979).
“1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-20-1.1, which provides for a trial de novo in respect to all issues of fact and law relating to the dismissal of a police officer.”
Southland v. Town Council, 279 A.2d 441 (R.I. 1971).
· cites it 4× “1956, §45-20-1.1, and on July 10, 1970, after a hearing on that appeal, the trial justice granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal, and from the judgment entered pursuant thereto Southland is prosecuting an appeal to this court.”
Potter v. McQueeney, 338 F. Supp. 1133 (D.R.I. 1972).
“Under § 45-20-1.1. of the General Laws of Rhode Island (1970 Reenactment), any policeman who is suspended for violation of departmental regulations may appeal such decision to the Rhode Island Superior Court after exhaustion of all administrative remedies available under the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.