(a) An appeal of an enactment of or an amendment to a zoning ordinance may be taken to
the superior court for the county in which the municipality is situated by filing
a complaint within thirty (30) days after the enactment or amendment has become effective.
The appeal may be taken by an aggrieved party or by any legal resident or landowner
of the municipality or by any group of residents or landowners whether or not incorporated,
of the municipality. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the zoning ordinance,
as enacted or amended, but the court may, in its discretion, grant a stay on appropriate
terms, which may include the filing of a bond, and make other orders that it deems
necessary for an equitable disposition of the appeal.
(b) The complaint shall state with specificity the area or areas in which the enactment
or amendment does not conform with the comprehensive plan and/or the manner in which
it constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation.
(c) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury. The court shall first consider
whether the enactment or amendment of the zoning ordinance is in conformance with
the comprehensive plan. If the enactment or amendment is not in conformance with the
comprehensive plan, then the court shall invalidate the enactment or the amendment,
or those parts of the enactment or amendment which are not in conformance with the
comprehensive plan. The court shall not revise the ordinance to conform with the comprehensive
plan, but may suggest appropriate language as part of the court decision.
(d) In the case of an aggrieved party, where the court has found that the enactment or
amendment of the zoning ordinance is in conformance with the comprehensive plan, then
the court shall next determine whether the enactment or amendment works as a taking
of property from the aggrieved party. If the court determines that there has been
a taking, the court shall remand the case to the legislative body of the municipality,
with its findings that a taking has occurred, and order the municipality to either
provide just compensation or rescind the enactment or amendment within thirty (30)
days.
(e) The superior court retains jurisdiction, in the event that the aggrieved party and
the municipality do not agree on the amount of compensation, in which case the superior
court shall hold further hearings to determine and to award compensation. The superior
court retains jurisdiction to determine the amount of an award of compensation for
any temporary taking, if that taking exists.
(f) The court may, in its discretion, upon the motion of the parties or on its own motion,
award reasonable attorney’s fees to any party to an appeal, including a municipality.
Notes of Decisions
P.J.C. Realty, Inc. v. Barry, 811 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2002).
· cites it 7× “1956 (1999 Reenactment) § 45-24-71. We sustain the city’s appeal from the judgment of mandamus.”
Dallman v. Isaacs, 911 A.2d 700 (R.I. 2006).
· cites it 10× “For purposes of an appeal of an amendment to a municipal zoning ordinance in accordance with G.L.1956 § 45-24-71, when does a town council amendment to the zoning ordinance become effective — when the council votes on the amendment or at some later point in time? “2.”
Sousa v. Town of Coventry, 774 A.2d 812 (R.I. 2001).
· cites it 4× “She found that, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-71, plaintiffs had thirty days to appeal the amendment of the zoning ordinance to the Superior Court, but that they had failed to comply with this statutorily prescribed time frame.”
Smithfield Voters for Responsible Dev., Inc. v. LaGreca, 755 A.2d 126 (R.I. 2000).
· cites it 10× “Can a nonprofit corporation whose members are municipal residents and local landowners qualify as an “association” under G.L.1956 § 45-24-71 for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal to the Superior Court from a zoning amendment? For the reasons explicated below, we have answered…”
Tucker Estates Charlestown, LLC v. Town of Charlestown, 964 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 2009).
· cites it 2× “The defendant, the Town of Charlestown (defendant), moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint, asserting that the action was barred by the thirty-day time limit on appeals of the enactment of a zoning ordinance, under § 45-24-71(a). The motion justice agreed, holding that plaintiffs…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-71(a) — 4 cases
P.J.C. Realty, Inc. v. Barry, 811 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2002).
“1956 (1999 Reenactment) § 45-24-71. We sustain the city’s appeal from the judgment of mandamus.”
Sousa v. Town of Coventry, 774 A.2d 812 (R.I. 2001).
“She found that, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-71, plaintiffs had thirty days to appeal the amendment of the zoning ordinance to the Superior Court, but that they had failed to comply with this statutorily prescribed time frame.”
Tucker Estates Charlestown, LLC v. Town of Charlestown, 964 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 2009).
“The defendant, the Town of Charlestown (defendant), moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint, asserting that the action was barred by the thirty-day time limit on appeals of the enactment of a zoning ordinance, under § 45-24-71(a). The motion justice agreed, holding that plaintiffs…”
Dallman v. Isaacs, 911 A.2d 700 (R.I. 2006).
“For purposes of an appeal of an amendment to a municipal zoning ordinance in accordance with G.L.1956 § 45-24-71, when does a town council amendment to the zoning ordinance become effective — when the council votes on the amendment or at some later point in time? “2.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-71(f) — 1 case
Smithfield Voters for Responsible Dev., Inc. v. LaGreca, 755 A.2d 126 (R.I. 2000).
“Can a nonprofit corporation whose members are municipal residents and local landowners qualify as an “association” under G.L.1956 § 45-24-71 for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal to the Superior Court from a zoning amendment? For the reasons explicated below, we have answered…”
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