(a) This chapter applies to: (1) any contract, combination, or conspiracy, wherever created,
formed, or entered into; (2) any establishment, maintenance, or use of monopoly power;
and (3) any attempt or conspiracy to establish, maintain, or use monopoly power; wherever
any of the foregoing has an impact on trade or commerce of this state sufficient to
invoke the jurisdiction of the superior court.
(b) In deciding whether conduct restrains or monopolizes trade or commerce or may substantially
lessen competition within this state, determination of the relevant market or effective
area of competition shall not be limited by the boundaries of this state. However,
some portion of the relevant market or effective area of competition must be at least
in part within this state.
(c) No action or proceeding instituted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall
be barred on the ground that the activity or conduct complained of in any way affects
or involves interstate or foreign commerce.
(d) In any action under this chapter, the fact that a person or public body has not dealt
directly with the defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery. Provided, however,
that courts shall exclude from the amount of monetary relief awarded in the action
any amount of monetary relief which duplicates amounts which have been awarded for
the same injury.
Notes of Decisions
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 336 F. Supp. 3d 395 (D.N.J. 2018).
“" R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(d). As such, Plaintiffs argue the statute should be applied retroactively and, even if it cannot be applied retroactively, they nevertheless fall within the repealer's protection since Plaintiffs suffered damages past July 15, 2013.”
In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
“The end-payor plaintiffs are correct in their assertions that the Oregon legislature passed an Illinois Brick repealer statute in 2010, see Or.”
In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224 (D. Conn. 2015).
“See R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(d). The indirect purchasers urge (with little argument, and less authority) retroactive application, citing cases for the proposition that such application is sometimes permissible, but nothing to substantiate the claim that the Rhode Island statute…”
In re Effexor Antitrust Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 363 (D.N.J. 2018).
“" R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(d). As such, Plaintiffs argue the statute should be applied retroactively and, even if it cannot be applied retroactively, they nevertheless fall within the repealer's protection since Plaintiffs suffered damages past July 15, 2013.”
Delta Dental of Rhode Island v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 942 F. Supp. 740 (D.R.I. 1996).
· cites it 2× “” R.I.Gen.Laws § 6-36-7(c) (1992). Given this system of joint antitrust enforcement, states retain the ability to regulate commercial activities that takes place within their borders, even if the challenged activity has interstate aspects.”
In re Effexor Antitrust Litig., 337 F. Supp. 3d 435 (D.N.J. 2018).
“" R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(d). As such, Plaintiffs argue the statute should be applied retroactively and, even if it cannot be applied retroactively, they nevertheless fall within the repealer's protection since Plaintiffs suffered damages past July 15, 2013.”
In Re Glumetza Antitrust Litig. (N.D. Cal. 2020).
“R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(d). The . . . statute is presumed to apply only prospectively, absent 18 evidence of legislative intent to the contrary.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(b) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(c) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(d) — 7 cases
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 336 F. Supp. 3d 395 (D.N.J. 2018).
“" R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(d). As such, Plaintiffs argue the statute should be applied retroactively and, even if it cannot be applied retroactively, they nevertheless fall within the repealer's protection since Plaintiffs suffered damages past July 15, 2013.”
In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
“The end-payor plaintiffs are correct in their assertions that the Oregon legislature passed an Illinois Brick repealer statute in 2010, see Or.”
In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224 (D. Conn. 2015).
“See R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(d). The indirect purchasers urge (with little argument, and less authority) retroactive application, citing cases for the proposition that such application is sometimes permissible, but nothing to substantiate the claim that the Rhode Island statute…”
In re Effexor Antitrust Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 363 (D.N.J. 2018).
“" R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-7(d). As such, Plaintiffs argue the statute should be applied retroactively and, even if it cannot be applied retroactively, they nevertheless fall within the repealer's protection since Plaintiffs suffered damages past July 15, 2013.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.