(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four (4) years
after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce
the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s
lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery
is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of
the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the
cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated
as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action
may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six (6) months
after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary
discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does
it apply to causes of action which have accrued before January 2, 1962.
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any action for breach of warranty
arising out of an alleged design, inspection, testing or manufacturing defect, or
any other alleged defect of whatsoever kind or nature in a product, must be commenced
within ten (10) years after the date the product was first purchased for use or consumption.
Notes of Decisions
Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 336 A.2d 555 (R.I. 1975).
· cites it 12× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) §6A-2-725 1 is an insuperable bar to plaintiffs’ claim *454 in warranty.”
Gail Frances, Inc. v. Alaska Diesel Elec., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 511 (D.R.I. 1999).
· cites it 12× “See R.I.Gen.Laws § 6A-2-725 (1992). The cause of action accrues at the time of the breach itself regardless of whether or not either party is aware of the breach.”
Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp., 619 A.2d 429 (R.I. 1993).
· cites it 6× “1956 (1992 Reenactment) § 6A-2-725. In this appeal we must first decide whether the present tort action is subject to the statute of limitations set forth in § 9-l-13(a) or § 9-l-14(b).”
Qualitex, Inc. v. Coventry Realty Corp., 557 A.2d 850 (R.I. 1989).
· cites it 4× “1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 6A-2-725(5). The two statutes of repose, according to the trial justice, operated to bar plaintiff’s claim and defendants’ cross-claims against ITT Grinnell.”
Plouffe v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 373 A.2d 492 (R.I. 1977).
· cites it 2× “The plaintiffs argue, however, that in an action based on breach of warranty against the manufacturer of a product the statute of limitations as provided for in §6A-2-725, and not §9-1-14 should apply to actions by plaintiffs against such manufacturers.”
In re Gen. Motors LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d 262 (S.D. Ill. 2018).
“• Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-2-725 ; see also Bergenstock v.”
Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 290 A.2d 607 (R.I. 1972).
· cites it 5× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-1-14 or in §6A-2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code.”
Am. States Ins. Co. v. LaFLAM, 808 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D.R.I. 2011).
· cites it 2× “, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-2-725 (limitations periods for actions for breach of contracts for sale must be no less than one year and no more than four years); R.”
Nappi v. John Deere Co., 717 A.2d 650 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 2× “The plaintiff urges this court to apply the general ten-year statute of limitations found in § 9-l-13(a) or the four-year statute of limitations for breach of contract for sale found in G.”
DiRocco v. Blodgett Oven Co. (D.R.I. 2021).
· cites it 2× “Similarly, Rhode Island General Laws § 6A-2-725(5) states, Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any action for breach of warranty arising out of an alleged 1 The definition of “material suppliers” includes manufacturers.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-2-725(2) — 2 cases
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-2-725(5) — 2 cases
Qualitex, Inc. v. Coventry Realty Corp., 557 A.2d 850 (R.I. 1989).
“1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 6A-2-725(5). The two statutes of repose, according to the trial justice, operated to bar plaintiff’s claim and defendants’ cross-claims against ITT Grinnell.”
DiRocco v. Blodgett Oven Co. (D.R.I. 2021).
“Similarly, Rhode Island General Laws § 6A-2-725(5) states, Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any action for breach of warranty arising out of an alleged 1 The definition of “material suppliers” includes manufacturers.”
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