(a) The supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, and the
workers’ compensation court, by a majority of their members, shall have the power
to make rules for regulating practice, procedure, and business therein. The chief
magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall have the power to make rules for regulating
practice, procedure, and business in the traffic tribunal. The rules of the superior,
family, district court, workers’ compensation court, and the traffic tribunal shall
be subject to the approval of the supreme court. Such rules, when effective, shall
supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith.
(b) In prescribing such rules, the court shall have regard to the simplification of the
system of pleading, practice, and procedure in the courts in which the rules shall
apply in order to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits; provided,
however, that each respective court shall not in the rules of procedure require a
party to a civil action to produce either by discovery, motion to produce or interrogatory
an income tax return, W-2 statement, or copies thereof. The rules presently in effect
in the courts of the judicial system shall remain and continue in force and effect
until revised, amended, repealed, or superseded by rules adopted in accordance with
this section.
Notes of Decisions
Cashman Equip. Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc., 139 A.3d 379 (R.I. 2016).
· cites it 5× “See G.L.1956 § 8-6-2(a). In addition, Cardi contests Cashman’s assertions that the discovery it requests would make for more effective cross-examination, would serve judicial economy, or would effectuate cost savings.”
In Re McBurney Law Servs., Inc., 798 A.2d 877 (R.I. 2002).
· cites it 4× “Because our rules specifically address lawyers who practice in a professional service corporation and because these rules "supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith," G.L.1956 § 8-6-2(a), I would hold that Rule 10(g) supersedes § 7-5.”
State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 4× “That rule, proposed by the justices of the Superior Court in April 1972 and later approved by this Supreme Court, became effective on September 1, 1972. On that date Rule 16 assumed the same force and effect as any statute duly enacted by the General Assembly.”
State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150 (R.I. 2009).
· cites it 5× “Sections 8-6-2, 8-8.2-1. But that does not end our inquiry.”
DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc., 755 A.2d 757 (R.I. 2000).
· cites it 2× “See G.L.1956 § 8-6-2(a). Thus, Petrarca was entitled to condition his election upon DiLuglio’s rightful ownership of PAB’s shares—subject to the risk that if his position challenging that ownership turned out to be a frivolous one or one taken in bad faith, he would subject…”
In the Matter of Keven A. McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126 (R.I. 2015).
· cites it 4× “This includes appointing 15 See also G.L. 1956 § 8-6-2 (judicial authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure); G.”
Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463 (R.I. 2000).
· cites it 2× “It was argued that the standard under § 9-29-21 4 is one of objective reasonableness that is in direct conflict with the subjective good faith standard that the Family Court Rule 11 encompasses, and therefore cannot be the basis for the sanctions ordered here.”
Tonetti Enter., LLC v. Mendon Road Leasing Corp., 943 A.2d 1063 (R.I. 2008).
· cites it 2× “See also G.L. 1956 § 8-6-2(a) (“The rules of the superi- or, family, district court and the traffic tribunal shall be subject to the approval of the supreme court.”
State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258 (R.I. 1980).
“1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 8-6-2, as amended by P.L. 1975, ch. 222, § I- Although the Post-Conviction Remedy Act is silent with respect to bail, Feng asserts that the Legislature impliedly adopted the ABA Standards Relating to *1264 Post-Conviction Remedies (approved draft, 1968)…”
Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361 (R.I. 1982).
“1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 8-6-2, as amended, P.L. 1975, ch. 222, § 1, recites that the rules of procedure for the Superior Court “shall supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith.”
State v. DeCiantis, 813 A.2d 986 (R.I. 2003).
“General Laws 1956 § 8-6-2(a) provides that ”[t]he rules of the superior, family, district court and the traffic tribunal shall be subject to the approval of the supreme court.”
DeBiasio v. Gervais Elec. Corp., 459 A.2d 941 (R.I. 1983).
· cites it 20× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 8-6-2, as amended by P.L. 1975, ch. 222, § 1 which reads: "Rules of practice and procedure.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2(a) — 8 cases
Cashman Equip. Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc., 139 A.3d 379 (R.I. 2016).
“See G.L.1956 § 8-6-2(a). In addition, Cardi contests Cashman’s assertions that the discovery it requests would make for more effective cross-examination, would serve judicial economy, or would effectuate cost savings.”
In Re McBurney Law Servs., Inc., 798 A.2d 877 (R.I. 2002).
“Because our rules specifically address lawyers who practice in a professional service corporation and because these rules "supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith," G.L.1956 § 8-6-2(a), I would hold that Rule 10(g) supersedes § 7-5.”
DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc., 755 A.2d 757 (R.I. 2000).
“See G.L.1956 § 8-6-2(a). Thus, Petrarca was entitled to condition his election upon DiLuglio’s rightful ownership of PAB’s shares—subject to the risk that if his position challenging that ownership turned out to be a frivolous one or one taken in bad faith, he would subject…”
Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463 (R.I. 2000).
“It was argued that the standard under § 9-29-21 4 is one of objective reasonableness that is in direct conflict with the subjective good faith standard that the Family Court Rule 11 encompasses, and therefore cannot be the basis for the sanctions ordered here.”
Tonetti Enter., LLC v. Mendon Road Leasing Corp., 943 A.2d 1063 (R.I. 2008).
“See also G.L. 1956 § 8-6-2(a) (“The rules of the superi- or, family, district court and the traffic tribunal shall be subject to the approval of the supreme court.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2(b) — 1 case
State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150 (R.I. 2009).
“Sections 8-6-2, 8-8.2-1. But that does not end our inquiry.”
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