R.I. Gen. Laws
Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-19 (2026)

Disability postponing running of statute

✓ current as of July 2026
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If any person at the time any such cause of action shall accrue to him or her shall be under the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, or beyond the limits of the United States, the person may bring the cause of action, within the time limited under this chapter, after the impediment is removed.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1976–2024 · leading case: Jean Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hosp., 115 A.3d 938 (R.I. 2015).
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Jean Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hosp., 115 A.3d 938 (R.I. 2015). · cites it 70× “Regarding Corning and Quest, plaintiffs argued that the applicable statute of limitations for these claims was set forth in § 9-1-19 rather than § 9-1-14.1. 2 These medical professionals are: Lewis Glasser, M.”
Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476 (R.I. 2002). · cites it 31× “The plaintiff has argued on appeal that the statute of limitations was tolled by G.L. 1956 § 9-1-19 1 because he was of “unsound mind.”
Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1996). · cites it 37× “It is clear that if a child victim of sexual abuse alleges repressed recollection of the abuse, and the trial justice finds the repressed-recollection allegation to be valid, the tolling provisions, if applicable, of G.L. 1956 § 9-1-19 would trigger in against the nonperpetrator…”
Smith v. O'connell, 997 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1998). · cites it 31× “R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-1-19. The third provision is found in § 9-1-20 which postpones accrual of a cause of action *233 that has been fraudulently concealed.”
Helen L. Hyde v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence Jeffrey Thomas v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 139 A.3d 452 (R.I. 2016). · cites it 23× “Second, he argued that plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts that would support tolling of the statute under the “unsound mind” provision found at G.L.1956 § 9-1-19. The plaintiffs opposed the motions to dismiss, arguing that repressed memory, in and of itself, was a…”
Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670 (R.I. 1997). · cites it 12× “The plaintiffs noted that, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-19, the statute of limitations on civil actions does not run during a plaintiff's minority, and argued that, as a matter of "equity, symmetry and basic fairness," the statute of limitations should also not run "against those…”
Rachal v. O'Neil, 925 A.2d 920 (R.I. 2007). · cites it 22× “More than a year later, the Rachals sought to amend their complaint and add a defendant, but their motion to amend was rebuffed in Superior Court, notwithstanding G.L.1956 § 9-1-19, which tolls the statute of limitations on personal injury actions that accrue to minors until…”
Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174 (R.I. 2008). · cites it 4× “Indeed, as this Court explicitly stated in that case: “We perceive no persuasive policy considerations that the General Assembly failed to consider when enacting § 9-1-51 that would support judicial application of a discovery rule to claims made against…”
Johnson v. Newport Cnty. Chapter for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 799 A.2d 289 (R.I. 2002). · cites it 6× “Discussion The trial justice found that the tolling provision for people of unsound mind as provided by G.L.1956 § 9-1-19 2 was of no assistance to the plaintiff because a separate provision, § 9-1-24, 3 bars its application in circumstances such as these in which a different…”
Bishop v. Jaworski, 524 A.2d 1102 (R.I. 1987). · cites it 10× “” In certain circumstances statutes of limitation may be tolled when at the time the cause of action accrues a potential plaintiff is considered disabled according to § 9-1-19. Section 9-1-19 provides: “If any person at the time any such cause of action shall accrue to him shall…”
Bakalakis v. Women & Infants' Hosp., 619 A.2d 1105 (R.I. 1993). · cites it 7× “It is whether the general disability tolling statute, § 9-1-19, affects or in effect supersedes the provisions of § 9-1-14.”
Jean Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hosp., 89 A.3d 806 (R.I. 2014). · cites it 5× “Finally, counsel for plaintiffs argued that § 9-1-19 — the general disability tolling statute applicable to causes of action other than medical malpractice — rather than § 9-1-14.”
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