Rhode Island General Laws
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-8 (2026)
Interest on judgment for money
✓ current as of July 2026
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Every judgment for money shall draw interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum to the time of its discharge.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1968–2021 · leading case: Armacost v. Amica Mut. Ins., 821 F. Supp. 75 (D.R.I. 1993).
Armacost v. Amica Mut. Ins., 821 F. Supp. 75 (D.R.I. 1993). “When a plaintiffs claim is serious enough to approach policy limits, an insurer’s incentive to settle in order to avoid the effect of a general interest statute evaporates. The insurer can refuse to settle with impunity, because its total exposure is limited by the policy.”
Cardi Corp. v. State, 561 A.2d 384 (R.I. 1989). “Cardi agrees that postjudgment interest is not included in the judgment so that it is not subject to the $5 million cap but is nonetheless independently authorized by § 9-21-8 as an inherent right to any damage award.”
Kurczy v. St. Joseph Vets. Ass'n, Inc., 820 A.2d 929 (R.I. 2003). “1956] § 9-21-8 provides that postjudgment interest shall apply to every judgment for money, Cardi Corp.”
Maciszewski v. Flatley, 814 A.2d 342 (R.I. 2003). “the instant action against defendant under § 9-1-50 and also asked for postjudgment interest under G.L.1956 § 9-21-8. On March 25, plaintiff received the check from defendant.”
Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 813 A.2d 47 (R.I. 2003). “Pursuant to that judgment, the Fund could not recover non-statutory prejudgment interest or any sanctions as a result of delay in reimbursement from *49 Levitón, nor were discovery sanctions granted.”
Paola v. Com. Union Assurance Companies, 490 A.2d 498 (R.I. 1985). “Subsequent to our affirmance, Paola was paid the full amount of the arbitrator’s *499 award by Commercial Union.”
Atl. Refining Co. v. Dir. of Pub. Works, 244 A.2d 853 (R.I. 1968). “1956, §9-21-8, as amended, until it becomes final, for only then is the party in whose favor the judgment lies considered to have his rights thereunder perfected and confirmed; only then can full execution be obtained thereon.”
In Re Roco Corp., 37 B.R. 770 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984). “LAWS, § 9-21-8, which establishes the rate of interest on civil judgments, interest of 12% per annum should have been added to the judgment from December 14, 1981 through the date of payment of the principal and all accrued and unpaid interest, and by amending the judgment in…”
Lombardi v. Goodyear Loan Co., 549 A.2d 1025 (R.I. 1988). “1956 (1969 Reenactment) §§ 9-21-8, 9-21-10, and G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 6-26-1 to 12 percent.”
Reagan Constr. Corp. v. Mayer, 712 A.2d 372 (R.I. 1998). “” We hold that the plain meaning of this text is that the post-judgment-interest provisions of §§ 9-21-8 and 9-21-10 are applicable to judgments entered pursuant to § 37-16-24.”
Indus. Nat'l Bank of Rhode Island v. Isele, 290 A.2d 903 (R.I. 1972). “” From our independent research of cases annotated under the aforequoted section it does not appear that said section has ever been made applicable to judgments entered pursuant to §9-14-25 or its precursors.”
Daniels Tobacco Co. Inc. v. Norberg, 335 A.2d 636 (R.I. 1975). “The administrator argues that the only statutory authorities relevant to the payment of ■interest in the instant proceedings are §9-21-8, which provides for interest from the date of entry of the judgment, and §6-26-1, which sets the rate of interest on judgments at 6 percent.”
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