Rhode Island General Laws
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-3 (2026)
Limitation of damages — Cities, towns, and fire districts
✓ current as of July 2026
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In any tort action against any city or town or any fire district, any damages recovered therein shall not exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); provided, however, that in all instances in which the city or town or fire district was engaged in a proprietary function in the commission of the tort, the limitation of damages set forth in this section shall not apply.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1981–2022 · leading case: Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 2001).
Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 2001). “1 In those appeals, we are called upon to determine whether the trial justice erred in denying the town’s trial and post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law; its motion for a new trial; and whether he erred in his application of G.L.1956 § 9-31-3 of the Governmental…”
L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of the Town of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I. 1997). “" Further, we are of the opinion that § 9-31-3 of the Governmental Tort Liability Act applies in this case and therefore sets a limit on the amount of damages for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations.”
Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1986). “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-3, as amended by P.L.1970, ch. 181, § 2; and (3) in confirming the special master’s addition of prejudgment interest to the award of damages.”
Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256 (R.I. 1996). “Section 9-31-3. Thus, subject to the applicability of certain other potential defenses (such as the public-duty doctrine), the state and its municipalities, like all other employers, are now "liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private individual or…”
Morales v. Town of Johnston, 895 A.2d 721 (R.I. 2006). “Central Falls argued that the statutory cap on damages as set forth in the Tort Claims Act, G.L.1956 § 9-31-3, 4 should limit the award to $100,000 and that prejudgment interest should not be added to the judgment.”
Feeney v. Napolitano, 825 A.2d 1 (R.I. 2003). “Feeney (plaintiff or Feeney), failed to sue Masi in his individual capacity and, therefore, she is entitled to recover only $100,000 from the city, the maximum amount of damages allowed under G.L.1956 § 9-31-3. Thus, we hereby vacate the portion of the damage award made against…”
Daniel v. Cross, 749 A.2d 6 (R.I. 2000). “The defendants, George Cross in his capacity as Finance Director of the Town of Cumberland, and the Town of Cumberland (hereinafter collectively referred to as the town), appeal from the trial justice’s decision to waive the $100,-000 liability limit set forth in G.L.1956 §…”
Andrade v. Perry, 863 A.2d 1272 (R.I. 2004). “This Court concluded that “[b]e-cause the activity in question was governmental, the claim against the city was covered by the limitations contained in § 9-31-3 of the Tort Claims Act.” Matarese, 689 A.”
Matarese v. Dunham, 689 A.2d 1057 (R.I. 1997). “Limitations on recovery against municipalities are specified in § 9-31-3, which provides: “In any tort action against any city or town or any fire district, any damages recovered therein shall not exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) provided, however, that…”
McCarthy v. Johnson, 574 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1990). “1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-31-3. 1 McCarthy brought suit on July 17, 1986, naming as defendants individual city councilmen, city treasurer Johnson and the McLaughlins, who were the owners of the tree.”
DiCenzo v. Ruscetta, 510 A.2d 417 (R.I. 1986). “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-3, as amended by P.L. 1970, ch. 181, § 2, the Superior Court entered a judgment against the city for $50,000.”
Kuhl v. Perri, 706 A.2d 1328 (R.I. 1998). “Lastly, the town argued that even if it owed Duane a duty vis-á-vis the snowbank, the plaintiffs’ damages should be limited to § 100,000 pursuant to G.L. § 9-31-3. Persuaded by these contentions, the hearing justice granted the town’s motion for summary judgment.”
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