U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4

Armed Career Criminal

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(a) A defendant who is subject to an enhanced sentence under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) is an armed career criminal.

(b) The offense level for an armed career criminal is the greatest of:

(1) the offense level applicable from Chapters Two and Three; or

(2) the offense level from §4B1.1 (Career Offender) if applicable; or

(3) (A) 34, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or ammunition in connection with either a crime of violence, as defined in §4B1.2(a), or a controlled substance offense, as defined in §4B1.2(b), or if the firearm possessed by the defendant was of a type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)*; or

(B) 33, otherwise.*

*If an adjustment from §3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility) applies, decrease the offense level by the number of levels corresponding to that adjustment.

(1) the criminal history category from Chapter Four, Part A (Criminal History), or §4B1.1 (Career Offender) if applicable; or

(2) Category VI, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or ammunition in connection with either a crime of violence, as defined in §4B1.2(a), or a controlled substance offense, as defined in §4B1.2(b), or if the firearm possessed by the defendant was of a type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); or

(3) Category IV.

Commentary

Application Notes:

1. This guideline applies in the case of a defendant subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence if the instant offense of conviction is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and the defendant has at least three prior convictions for a "violent felony" or "serious drug offense," or both, committed on occasions different from one another. The terms "violent felony" and "serious drug offense" are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2). It is to be noted that the definitions of "violent felony" and "serious drug offense" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) are not identical to the definitions of "crime of violence" and "controlled substance offense" used in §4B1.1 (Career Offender), nor are the time periods for the counting of prior sentences under §4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History) applicable to the determination of whether a defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

It is also to be noted that the procedural steps relative to the imposition of an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) are not set forth by statute and may vary to some extent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

2. Application of §4B1.4 in Cases Involving Convictions Under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a).—If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a), do not apply either subsection (b)(3)(A) or (c)(2). A sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a) accounts for the conduct covered by subsections (b)(3)(A) and (c)(2) because of the relatedness of the conduct covered by these subsections to the conduct that forms the basis for the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a).

Background: This section implements 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which requires a minimum sentence of imprisonment of fifteen years for a defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense. If the offense level determined under this section is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, the offense level determined under this section shall be applied. A minimum criminal history category (Category IV) is provided, reflecting that each defendant to whom this section applies will have at least three prior convictions for serious offenses.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1990 (amendment 355). Amended effective November 1, 1992 (amendment 459); November 1, 2002 (amendment 646); November 1, 2004 (amendment 674); November 1, 2018 (amendment 813); November 1, 2025 (amendment 836).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 1,130 cases (80 in the last 5 years), 1991–2026 · leading case: United States v. Gary, 74 F.3d 304 (1st Cir. 1996).

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United States v. Gary, 74 F.3d 304 (1st Cir. 1996). · cites it 13× “, the “Petite policy”); (4) whether Gary was selectively prosecuted on account of his race; (5) whether Gary received a fair trial in light of the government’s reliance on what he contends was “perjured testimony by a law enforcement official”; and (6) whether the district court…”

United States v. Jerome Hadley, 431 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2005). · cites it 7× “In light of Defendant’s concession at his sentencing hearing that he is an armed career criminal within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a), {see 3/21/2003 Sentencing Hearing Tr.”

United States v. Moyer, 282 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2002). · cites it 9× “Moyer’s guidelines sentencing range was calculated by applying U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. Believing it was bound by the mandatory provisions of § 5G1.”

United States v. Carl Bennett, 472 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2006). · cites it 4× “Sentencing Offense Level The base offense level for an armed career criminal sentenced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3) is 34 if the defendant used or possessed the firearm in question in connection with, inter alia, a crime of violence.”

United States v. Nathan E. Gundy, 842 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016). · cites it 4× “Because the district court sustained Gundy’s objection to the 4-level increase, Gundy’s total offense level became 33 under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b). With a total offense level of 33 and a criminal history category of VI, Gundy’s advisory guidelines range was 235 to 293 months’…”

United States v. Kevin Joseph Pluta, 144 F.3d 968 (6th Cir. 1998). · cites it 9× “§ 924 (e) (emphasis added); see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. By its terms, the guideline covers only a limited range of behavior (nonviolent behavior is not included) and even then only requires a finding that such behavior occurred on three prior occasions.”

United States v. Shannon Wayne Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). · cites it 4× “It applied U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 (b)(3)(A) and determined that Tighe’s offense level was 31 (34 minus three points for an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment) and that given his criminal history category, the sentencing range for Count I was 188-235 months.”

United States v. Young, 115 F.3d 834 (11th Cir. 1997). · cites it 11× “4(b)(3)(A), which states: (b) The offense level for an armed career criminal is the greatest of: (3)(A) 34, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or ammunition in connection with a crime of violence or controlled substance offense, as defined in § 4B1.”

United States v. Isaac Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2016). · cites it 3× “2 Due to his status as an armed career criminal under § 924(e), Seabrooks’s offense level increased from 30 to 33 under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B). His status as an armed career criminal raised his criminal history category from III to IV under U.”

United States v. James Brown, 52 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 1995). · cites it 7× “§ 924 (e)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. He was also classified as a career offender pursuant to U.”

United States v. Earl Robert Wade, 458 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006). · cites it 3× “The PSI also indicated that Wade was an armed career criminal within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 because he had been convicted of a violation of § 924(e) and of three or more prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses.”

United States v. Daniel J. Lyons, Jr., 403 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). · cites it 4× “§ 924 (e) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a). Thus, based on a criminal history Category VI and a total offense level of 33, his sentencing range was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment.”

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United States v. Earl Robert Wade, 458 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006). “The PSI also indicated that Wade was an armed career criminal within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 because he had been convicted of a violation of § 924(e) and of three or more prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses.”

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United States v. Daniel J. Lyons, Jr., 403 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). “§ 924 (e) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a). Thus, based on a criminal history Category VI and a total offense level of 33, his sentencing range was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment.”

United States v. Nathan E. Gundy, 842 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016). “Because the district court sustained Gundy’s objection to the 4-level increase, Gundy’s total offense level became 33 under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b). With a total offense level of 33 and a criminal history category of VI, Gundy’s advisory guidelines range was 235 to 293 months’…”

United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2009).

United States v. Donald Edward Miles, 290 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002).

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United States v. Gary, 74 F.3d 304 (1st Cir. 1996). “, the “Petite policy”); (4) whether Gary was selectively prosecuted on account of his race; (5) whether Gary received a fair trial in light of the government’s reliance on what he contends was “perjured testimony by a law enforcement official”; and (6) whether the district court…”

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United States v. Neal, 578 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2009).

United States v. Mareco Caraway, 411 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Jerome Hadley, 431 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2005). “In light of Defendant’s concession at his sentencing hearing that he is an armed career criminal within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a), {see 3/21/2003 Sentencing Hearing Tr.”

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United States v. Kevin Joseph Pluta, 144 F.3d 968 (6th Cir. 1998). “§ 924 (e) (emphasis added); see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. By its terms, the guideline covers only a limited range of behavior (nonviolent behavior is not included) and even then only requires a finding that such behavior occurred on three prior occasions.”

— U.S.S.G. §4B1.4(b)(3)(B) — 155 cases

United States v. Isaac Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2016). “2 Due to his status as an armed career criminal under § 924(e), Seabrooks’s offense level increased from 30 to 33 under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B). His status as an armed career criminal raised his criminal history category from III to IV under U.”

United States v. Nakey Demetruis White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Tony Lee Thompson, 421 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2005).

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