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Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-101 (2026)

Grounds of incompetency

✓ current as of May 2026
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No judge or chancellor shall be competent, except by consent of all parties, to sit in the following cases:

Code 1858, § 3913 (deriv. Acts 1825, ch. 54, § 2; 1835-1836, ch. 68, § 1; 1843-1844, ch. 25, § 1); Shan., § 5706; Code 1932, § 9892; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 17-201.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 66 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1990–2025 · leading case: Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
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Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “6, § 11 or Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-101 (1994), these decisions are discretionary.”
State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2010). · cites it 2× “Unless the basis for recu-sal is one of the mandatory grounds in Article 6, Section 11 of the Tennessee Constitution or Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-2-101 (2009), these decisions are discretionary.”
Leonard Edward Smith v. State of Tennessee, 357 S.W.3d 322 (Tenn. 2011). · cites it 2× “” Furthermore, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 3(E)(1) provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) the judge has' a…”
Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “Art 6 § 11; Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-2-101 (1994). A judge must be objective when making his or her determination.”
State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12 (Tenn. 2008). · cites it 2× “A similar restriction appears in Tennessee Code Annotated section 17-2-101(1). The purpose of these provisions is to guard against the prejudgment of a litigant’s rights and to avoid situations in which the litigants might believe that the court reached a prejudiced conclusion…”
Wright v. Pate, 117 S.W.3d 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 4× “6, § 11 or T.C.A. § 17-2-101 (1994), the Trial Judge’s refusal to recuse is reviewed as an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Conway, 77 S.W.3d 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “” Similarly, Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-2-101(3) requires recusal when the judge “[h]as been of counsel in the cause” except by consent of all the parties.”
Baker v. Hooper, 50 S.W.3d 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “6, § 11 or T.C.A. § 17-2-101 (1994), the Trial Judge’s refusal to recuse is reviewed as an abuse of discretion.”
Candace Watson v. City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). “Article VI, § 11 of the Tennessee Constitution, Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-2-101, and the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit a judge from presiding over a matter in which the judge has an interest in the outcome or where the judge is connected to either party.”
Danielle Malmquist v. Shem Malmquist, 415 S.W.3d 826 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “Tennessee Code Annotated Section 17-2-101 states that: “No judge or chancellor shall be competent, except by consent of all parties, to sit in the following cases: (1) Where the judge or chancellor is interested in the event of any cause; .”
State v. Blackmon, 984 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1998). · cites it 2× “” Further, Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-2-101(4) (1991) provides: “No judge or chancellor shall be competent, except by consent of all parties, to sit in any of the following cases: [When the judge or chancellor] .”
State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). “§§ 17-2-101, -202. It would not be logical to limit the authority to rule on a motion for a new trial to the successor in office to the late trial judge because the successor would be in no better position to rule on the motion than any other judge who could sit by interchange.”
Show all 66 citing cases →
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-101(1) — 5 cases
State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12 (Tenn. 2008). “A similar restriction appears in Tennessee Code Annotated section 17-2-101(1). The purpose of these provisions is to guard against the prejudgment of a litigant’s rights and to avoid situations in which the litigants might believe that the court reached a prejudiced conclusion…”
State of Tennessee v. Michael Dale Rimmer (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006).
Sedley Alley v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006).
David Keen v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006).
Kennath Henderson v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-101(1994) — 2 cases
Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “6, § 11 or Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-101 (1994), these decisions are discretionary.”
Corrado v. Hickman, 113 S.W.3d 319 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-101(3) — 4 cases
State v. Conway, 77 S.W.3d 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). “” Similarly, Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-2-101(3) requires recusal when the judge “[h]as been of counsel in the cause” except by consent of all the parties.”
State of Tennessee v. Tina M. Dixon (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
Eddie Wayne Gordon v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
Ashad R.A. Muhammad Ali v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-101(4) — 3 cases
State v. Blackmon, 984 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1998). “” Further, Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-2-101(4) (1991) provides: “No judge or chancellor shall be competent, except by consent of all parties, to sit in any of the following cases: [When the judge or chancellor] .”
Sheddrick Harris v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
Sheddrick Harris v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2018).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-101(5) — 1 case
David Scott Winfrey v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
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