Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-404 (2026)

Waiver of immunity or liability limits - Liabilities arising under federal law

✓ current as of May 2026

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(a) A governmental entity or the insurer of such governmental entity shall not be held liable for any claim arising under state law for which the governmental entity has immunity under this chapter unless the governmental entity has expressly waived such immunity. A governmental entity or the insurer of such governmental entity shall not be held liable for any judgment in excess of the limits of liability set forth in § 29-20-403, unless the governmental entity has expressly waived such limits. The waiver of such immunity or such limits of liability by a governmental entity shall only be valid if such waiver is expressly contained in the provisions or endorsement of a policy or contract of insurance authorized by this chapter to cover its liability under this chapter.

(b) This chapter shall not be construed to prohibit or limit a governmental entity from purchasing a policy or contract of insurance in such amounts of coverage as it deems proper for liabilities which may arise under federal law. If a governmental entity has such policy or contract of insurance for liabilities which may arise under federal law, such policy or contract of insurance shall not be construed or deemed a waiver of any immunity provided in this chapter or of the limits of liability set forth in § 29-20-403, for any claims arising under state law.

Acts 1973, ch. 345, § 25; T.C.A., § 23-3328; Acts 1985, ch. 301, § 1.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 12 cases, 1981–2009 · leading case: Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. 1987).

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Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. 1987). · cites it 4× “" T.C.A. § 29-20-404(b) (Supp. 1986). The next year, the 94th General Assembly enacted Chapter 730, 1986 Public Acts, codified at T.”

Coburn v. City of Dyersburg, 774 S.W.2d 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 7× “At the time the policy was issued, T.C.A. § 29-20-404, a part of the GTLA, read as follows: Insurer to waive sovereign immunity defense.”

Erwin v. Rose, 980 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 7× “The county has raised the point that the trial judge erred in entering a judgment against the county in excess of the $130,000 limit set in Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-404(a). The excess resulted from the accrual of post-judgment interest from the date the original judgment was…”

Johnson v. Smith, 621 S.W.2d 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). “TCA 29-20-310(b) provides as follows: No claim may be brought against an employee or judgment entered against an employee for damages for which the governmental entity is liable under this chapter unless the amount of damages sought or judgment entered exceeds the mini *572 mum…”

Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 599 (Tenn. 1987). · cites it 4× “” T.C.A. § 29-20-404(b) (Supp. 1986). The next year, the 94th General Assembly enacted Chapter 730,1986 Public Acts, codified at T.”

Richard Deberry v. Lexington Elec. Sys. (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 7× “Before a plaintiff may recover a judgment in excess of the minimum limits, section 29-20-404 imposes another requirement: The governmental entity must have expressly waived the minimum limits of liability and such waiver must be contained in the entity’s insurance policy.”

Faye Black v. City of Memphis (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “In support of her argument she cites Section 29-20-404,4 3 Because we have determined that the trial court did not indicate that it found that sanctions against the City were warranted, we do not reach the issue of whether the GTLA precludes a trial court from awarding sanctions…”

Katy Wilson v. Dickson Cnty. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 4× “Dickson County has not waived its immunity by the purchase of a policy of insurance because the policy did not expressly so provide, T.C.A. § 29-20-404. See, Colburn v. City of Dyersburg, 774 S.”

Emmanual Small v. Shelby Cnty. Schs., a/k/a Bd. Of Educ., Shelby Cnty. Schs. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 3× “The Court reasoned as follows: There is nothing in T.C.A. §§ 29-20-404(a) and 29-20-403 to indicate that an award of discretionary costs is an exception to the absolutely-stated monetary limitation of the GTLA.”

Ray Gabrielle Cox v. Anderson Cnty. High. Dept. & Anderson Cnty., Tennessee - Concurring (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “3 See T.C.A. § 29-20-404(a) (Supp. 1999)(“A governmental entity.”

Erwin, et. ux. v. Lovell (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “§ 29-20-404 (a). The excess resulted from the accrual of post-judgment interest from the date the original judgment was entered, April 17, 1996, until it was paid on May 28, 1996.”

Darin Shaffer v. Shelby Co. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “As was stated in Cox, no exceptions exist in Section 29-20-404(a) or 29-20-403, which would allow recovery in any manner above the statutory amount.”

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-404(a) — 8 cases

Erwin v. Rose, 980 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “The county has raised the point that the trial judge erred in entering a judgment against the county in excess of the $130,000 limit set in Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-404(a). The excess resulted from the accrual of post-judgment interest from the date the original judgment was…”

Emmanual Small v. Shelby Cnty. Schs., a/k/a Bd. Of Educ., Shelby Cnty. Schs. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). “The Court reasoned as follows: There is nothing in T.C.A. §§ 29-20-404(a) and 29-20-403 to indicate that an award of discretionary costs is an exception to the absolutely-stated monetary limitation of the GTLA.”

Ray Gabrielle Cox v. Anderson Cnty. High. Dept. & Anderson Cnty., Tennessee - Concurring (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). “3 See T.C.A. § 29-20-404(a) (Supp. 1999)(“A governmental entity.”

Faye Black v. City of Memphis (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “In support of her argument she cites Section 29-20-404,4 3 Because we have determined that the trial court did not indicate that it found that sanctions against the City were warranted, we do not reach the issue of whether the GTLA precludes a trial court from awarding sanctions…”

Katy Wilson v. Dickson Cnty. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “Dickson County has not waived its immunity by the purchase of a policy of insurance because the policy did not expressly so provide, T.C.A. § 29-20-404. See, Colburn v. City of Dyersburg, 774 S.”

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-404(b) — 2 cases

Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. 1987). “" T.C.A. § 29-20-404(b) (Supp. 1986). The next year, the 94th General Assembly enacted Chapter 730, 1986 Public Acts, codified at T.”

Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 599 (Tenn. 1987). “” T.C.A. § 29-20-404(b) (Supp. 1986). The next year, the 94th General Assembly enacted Chapter 730,1986 Public Acts, codified at T.”

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