Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103 (2026)
Priority population - Standards of care - Funding - Legislative intent - Contract with licensed community mental health agency
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) The department shall identify adults with severe disabling mental illness and children with serious emotional disturbance.
- (b) Persons described in subsection (a) are a priority population for the department's mental health services and supports. The department shall set the array of services and supports for this priority population annually in its plan. The state will fund and the department will maintain the array of services and supports for persons in this priority population. Consistent with applicable eligibility requirements, the state may provide the funding for the services through the medicaid program or any waiver granted under the medicaid program, specifically including TennCare, other public funds, or private funds.
- (c) It is the legislative intent that the department of mental health and substance abuse services maintain the funding amount and the extent of services of the behavioral health safety net of the state at least at the annualized levels provided as of January 1, 2009. In the event that appropriations to the department are not sufficient to continue funding these critical services at a level at least equivalent to the services being provided as of January 1, 2009, then the department shall provide a report to the planning and policy council created by § 33-1-401 and the fiscal review committee created by § 3-7-101. The report shall identify all means the department intends to use to increase resources available.
- (d) The department may contract with any licensed community mental health agency for the provision of services under the behavioral health safety net, as long as the community mental health agency is able to sufficiently demonstrate to the department that the community mental health agency is able to provide to individuals who will be served under the behavioral health safety net all of the behavioral health services that are included within adult behavioral health services for the seriously and persistently mentally ill, as defined in § 71-5-103.
Amended by 2020 Tenn. Acts, ch. 578, s 1, eff. 7/1/2020.
Acts 1994, ch. 861, §§ 1-4; T.C.A., § 33-1-208; Acts 2000, ch. 947, §§ 1, 6; 2002, ch. 730, § 30; 2009 , ch. 95, § 3; 2010 , ch. 1100, § 45; 2012 , ch. 575, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15
cases, 1987–2004 · leading case: Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993). “(mental illness); Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103 et seq. (Supp.”
Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “§ 33-6-103 and Tenn. Code. Ann. § 33-6-108 placed the ultimate responsibility for discharge on the superintendent of the hospital.”
People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988). “Code Ann. § 25-03.1-02(11)(b) (Supp.1987) (substantial likelihood of harm); Ohio Rev.”
Williams v. Shelby Cnty. Health Care Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Tenn. 1992). “§ 33-6-103. 3 *1308 At that time Dr. Scroggins, a medical doctor at the University of Tennessee Medical School in its residency program, 4 was on duty in the emergency room of the Med.”
State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “ed others in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, OR (D) the person is unable to avoid severe impairment or injury from specific risks, AND (2) there is a substantial likelihood that such harm will occur unless the person is placed under…”
United States v. Tennessee, 798 F. Supp. 483 (W.D. Tenn. 1992). “Apparently, the Superintendent of Arlington may deny a request for admission pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 33-6-103. . Although the Parham case was a challenge to Georgia’s procedures for voluntary commitment of children under the age of 18 to state mental hospitals, the Court…”
John Ruff v. Raleigh Assembly (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “Downs and Rita Officer did not follow the commitment procedures under T.C.A. § 33-6-103 thru 104 when they caused the Appellant to be admitted to the Memphis -3- Mental Health Institute following the incident at the church on September 19, 1990.”
Rene Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of TN, Inc. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “§ 33-6-103 and Tenn. Code. Ann. § 33-6-108 placed the ultimate responsibility for discharge on the superintendent of the hospital.”
State of Tennessee v. Janice Floyd (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). “If the state believes the appellant is committable at some future time, it may file the appropriate documentation required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-6-103. See Brown, 1990 WL 40998 , at *4-5 (two judges recommending any further proceedings must be pursuant to…”
United States v. State, 798 F. Supp. 483 (W.D. Tenn. 1992). “[6] Apparently, the Superintendent of Arlington may deny a request for admission pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 33-6-103. [7] Although the Parham case was a challenge to Georgia's procedures for voluntary commitment of children under the age of 18 to state mental hospitals, the…”
Pamela D. Vickroy v. Pathways, Inc., Dyersburg, TN, Kimberly Bord, J. Forstlam, M.D. Methodist Hosp., Coleman Foss, Adm'r, & W. Mental Health Inst. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). “Forest-Lam signed a “Certificate of Need for Emergency Admission Under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 33-6-103(c)” to have Vickroy transferred to Western Mental Health Institute (“Western”) in Bolivar, Tennessee.”
Shirley Shelburne v. Frontier Health (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “Shelburne did not meet the criteria for commitment set forth in T.C.A. § 33-6-103(a)-(e) (Supp. 2000). Kirk stated that had he determined that Mr.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(1) — 1 case
Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “§ 33-6-103 and Tenn. Code. Ann. § 33-6-108 placed the ultimate responsibility for discharge on the superintendent of the hospital.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(a) — 3 cases
Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “§ 33-6-103 and Tenn. Code. Ann. § 33-6-108 placed the ultimate responsibility for discharge on the superintendent of the hospital.”
Shirley Shelburne v. Frontier Health (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “Shelburne did not meet the criteria for commitment set forth in T.C.A. § 33-6-103(a)-(e) (Supp. 2000). Kirk stated that had he determined that Mr.”
Rene Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of TN, Inc. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “§ 33-6-103 and Tenn. Code. Ann. § 33-6-108 placed the ultimate responsibility for discharge on the superintendent of the hospital.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(a)(2) — 1 case
People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988). “Code Ann. § 25-03.1-02(11)(b) (Supp.1987) (substantial likelihood of harm); Ohio Rev.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(b) — 1 case
John Ruff v. Raleigh Assembly (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “Downs and Rita Officer did not follow the commitment procedures under T.C.A. § 33-6-103 thru 104 when they caused the Appellant to be admitted to the Memphis -3- Mental Health Institute following the incident at the church on September 19, 1990.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(c) — 1 case
Pamela D. Vickroy v. Pathways, Inc., Dyersburg, TN, Kimberly Bord, J. Forstlam, M.D. Methodist Hosp., Coleman Foss, Adm'r, & W. Mental Health Inst. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). “Forest-Lam signed a “Certificate of Need for Emergency Admission Under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 33-6-103(c)” to have Vickroy transferred to Western Mental Health Institute (“Western”) in Bolivar, Tennessee.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(c)(4) — 1 case
People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988). “Code Ann. § 25-03.1-02(11)(b) (Supp.1987) (substantial likelihood of harm); Ohio Rev.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(f) — 1 case
John Ruff v. Raleigh Assembly (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “Downs and Rita Officer did not follow the commitment procedures under T.C.A. § 33-6-103 thru 104 when they caused the Appellant to be admitted to the Memphis -3- Mental Health Institute following the incident at the church on September 19, 1990.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(f)(2) — 1 case
Shirley Shelburne v. Frontier Health (Tenn. 1997).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(f)(2)(A) — 1 case
Shirley Shelburne v. Frontier Health (Tenn. 1997).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(h) — 2 cases
Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “§ 33-6-103 and Tenn. Code. Ann. § 33-6-108 placed the ultimate responsibility for discharge on the superintendent of the hospital.”
Rene Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of TN, Inc. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “§ 33-6-103 and Tenn. Code. Ann. § 33-6-108 placed the ultimate responsibility for discharge on the superintendent of the hospital.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-103(l) — 1 case
Rene Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of TN, Inc. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “§ 33-6-103 and Tenn. Code. Ann. § 33-6-108 placed the ultimate responsibility for discharge on the superintendent of the hospital.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.